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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court legalized gay marriage nationwide. For 
many, this decision was emblematic of the enormous and seemingly rapid gains made by 
LGBTQ people over the past thirty years. Yet just a few short months later, the LGBTQ 
community in Houston, Texas experienced a startling defeat when anti-discrimination 
protections – a policy issue that enjoys supermajority support in every state in the nation 
(Flores et al 2015) – were rejected 61%–39% at the ballot, following egregiously transphobic 
bathroom-centered ads and rhetoric. Since then, so called “bathroom bills” have been 
introduced in states and municipalities throughout the country, most notably North Carolina’s 
“HB2.” 
The specificity of this moment – the sudden hyper-visibility of transgender issues and 
bathroom panic coming on the heels of legal marriage equality – exemplifies the complex, 
often conflicting roles of emotions in prejudice and politics. It also reveals or calls attention to 
the significant opposition that remains to LGBTQ people and issues. I argue that the emotion 
of disgust has played a critical role in the history of LGBTQ politics in America and continues 
to do so today as an important and underappreciated source of this continued opposition. 
--- 
Disgust is a powerful tool in politics. Scholars in psychology, political science, and 
other fields have demonstrated that, across a variety of policy issues such as welfare, 
immigration, and LGBTQ politics, feeling disgust has significant political implications. 
Feeling disgust leads to harsher moral judgments, increased prejudices, avoidant and 
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distancing behavior, and “resistance to rational argument” (Cunningham et al 2013; Dasgupta 
et al 2009; Faulkner et al 2004; Inbar et al 2009; Navarrette & Fesler 2006; Olatunji 2008; 
Terrizzi et al 2010). The avoidant behavior is particularly relevant to LGBTQ politics, given 
that one of the central strategies of the gay movement has been the use of contact (Stone 2012) 
to reduce prejudice toward LGBTQ people. In other words, disgust contributes to prejudicial 
attitudes toward out groups (including sexual minorities) and deters the very behaviors (e.g., 
contact) often relied upon to combat these negative attitudes.  
Additionally, disgust has been used to pass legislation and encode prejudice into 
political and social institutions (e.g., Canaday 2011; Foucault 1978; Nussbaum 2004; Rubin 
1984). These actions illustrate how disgust operates both as a psychological phenomenon that 
structures interpersonal interactions, and as a sociopolitical norm that is taught, learned, 
reinforced, and embedded in cultures and institutions.  
 From the history of homosexuality as a diagnosable disease, to HIV/AIDS and fears of 
potential disease transmission, to modern day “culture wars” and fear of “moral 
contamination” or corruption, the historical association between homosexuality and 
disease/contagion has been and continues to be employed in political rhetoric to evoke and 
perpetuate disgust reactions among the public. Current LGBTQ policy issues, such as gay 
marriage, gay adoption, employment discrimination, and transgender rights, all grapple, with 
varying degrees of success, with disgust and its consequences. Gay rights organizations have 
responded, implicitly or otherwise, through their rhetoric and other persuasive strategies, often 
using normalizing and or assimilationist language (e.g., Warner 1999) that, in effect, seeks to 
diffuse disgust reactions: “We’re not so different or strange; we’re just like you; virtually 
normal” (e.g., Sullivan 1995). In short, disgust has influenced LGBTQ history, structured 20th 
and 21st century political opposition, and dictated LGBTQ activist strategies. Closer attention to 
the politics of disgust is vital for understanding both how LGBTQ politics in America arrived 
at this particular moment, and what lies ahead. 
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Paying critical attention to the politics of disgust is also important for many of the 
LGBTQ movement’s general aspirations, as well as researchers’ and scholars’ own interests 
and goals. For example, even prior to the legalization of gay marriage, many activists and 
academics alike declared “Victory!” for the “Triumphant Gay Revolution.”1 However, this 
appearance of steady progress and the supposed inevitability of LGBTQ legal equality may lead 
to too-ambitious missteps. Careful attention to disgust and lingering negative attitudes toward 
LGBTQ people and issues will help illuminate a fuller understanding of the current political 
landscape as well as future obstacles, whereas assumptions that past progress will continue 
linearly and rapidly into the future may lead to costly mistakes. 
 For example, one lesson from Houston and the spate of bathroom bills in the past year 
is that support for LGBTQ issues may not be (1) as solid as believed, or (2) as transferable 
across different issues. Again, nondiscrimination protections are supported by a supermajority 
of residents in every state in the nation, and yet when put to a vote at the Houston ballot box 
and elsewhere around the country, these measures failed miserably (or in the case of the North 
Carolina legislature, anti-LGBTQ protections passed easily). This also suggests that public 
opinion on these issues is easily manipulated, subject to framing effects (Brewer 2003b; Hull 
2001; Lofton & Haider-Markel 2007), social desirability bias (Powell 2013), language choices 
and wording effects (Flores 2015b; McCabe & Heerwig 2011), and other influences. This 
should give pause to scholars and advocates alike who seek to interpret polling data and 
political events.  
Additionally, general support for LGBTQ people, or even specific support for a given 
issue, does not necessarily translate to support for another LGBTQ issue. The voters in 
Houston had previously elected out lesbian Annise Parker to be Houston’s mayor three 
consecutive terms, yet still rejected these nondiscrimination protections while she was still in 
                                                
1 See, for example, Linda Hirshmann’s 2012 book, Victory: The Triumphant Gay Revolution: How a Despised 
Minority Pushed Back, Beat Death, Found Love, and Changed America for Everyone.  
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office. As Mucciaroni (2008) argued in his book about the varying successes and failures of 
individual LGBTQ policies, “Different policies produce different politics (Lowi 1972).” They 
also evoke different emotions. Both academics and advocates should approach the study of 
public opinion more critically than bundling a variety of issues together and expecting 
common attitudes and common outcomes, simply because they happen to be more or less 
affiliated with the same group (i.e., LGBTQ people). 
Finally, the LGBTQ context is still relatively new. Though sexuality has played a 
critical role in American history and politics (e.g., Canaday 2011), the current narrative of 
inevitable victory and continual progress risks scholars deeming “the issue” of LGBTQ politics 
already settled, thus putting away any related research agenda when there is still much more 
to learn about the roles of sexuality, gender, and more in politics. For example, how do people 
balance difference and inclusion? In what ways are the dynamics of LGBTQ politics similar to 
or distinct from the dynamics of racial politics, or class politics, or disability politics? If 
homophobia is the main reason why people oppose LGBTQ-friendly policies, then why do 
some individuals, for example, support nondiscrimination protections but not gay adoption, or 
support gay marriage but not transgender-friendly bathroom policies? What could the answers 
to these questions also tell us about gender or racial or class or disability politics in America?  
This project seeks to lay out a theoretical framework for understanding the lingering 
prejudice and negative attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues. Using a variety of methods, 
including quantitative analysis of public opinion data from the American National Election 
Studies, theory development and historical review, and original experimental analysis and 
survey research, this project examines how LGBTQ policy issues directly elicit disgust, how 
this disgust affects support for a number of important LGBTQ policy issues, and how disgust 
reactions and their impact differ in response to different subgroups of the LGBTQ community.  
This project contributes to the broader literature of public opinion and political 
psychology by illustrating the ways in which emotions have policy-specific interactions. It also 
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demonstrates interactions between emotions and subgroups of a larger social group (e.g., 
different reactions to gay men than to transgender women). These findings are relevant across 
group politics literatures, as no single group is internally homogenous, and very few groups are 
concerned with or affected by only a single policy issue. This project also complements existing 
research on the contact hypothesis and its limitations in efforts to reduce intergroup prejudice. 
Taken together, these findings and implications provide a framework for examining the 
influence of disgust in other political domains, such as immigration or racial politics (e.g., 
Hancock 2004). The findings also suggest that continued success for the LGBTQ movement – 
and any other movement that confronts disgust – will require the understanding that disgust 
influences many beliefs and opinions, even among presumed supporters, and that new 
strategies based on engaging this difficult emotion will be vital. 
--- 
I begin the dissertation by examining the conventional wisdom surrounding the 
massive shifts in public opinion toward LGBTQ issues in recent years. Then I discuss the 
importance of viewing disgust not just as an individual level experience, but as a social 
phenomenon reflective of dominant norms and values. I trace the thread of disgust through 
LGBTQ politics in the 20th century in America, showing that disgust has played an important 
historical role. I then use original survey-embedded experiments to examine the contemporary 
role of disgust in modern attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues. I demonstrate that even 
the mention of LGBTQ policy issues elicits disgust, and that different LGBTQ policy issues 
elicit varying levels and intensities of disgust. I show that these disgust reactions correspond to 
declines in support for LGBTQ policies. I then go on to show that disgust reactions are 
particularly prevalent in attitudes toward transgender people, and transgender women in 
particular, as well as transgender related policies. I conclude by offering broader implications 
for public opinion research and political science more generally.  
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Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2 begins with the commonly asked question, what has caused the remarkable 
shifts in public opinion toward LGBTQ people in recent years? Many argue it is the positive 
influence of contact, or the transformative effect of getting to know someone who is gay or 
lesbian. Using survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), I illustrate 
that the conventional wisdom surrounding the influence of contact is not as far-reaching or 
consistent as widely believed. Indeed, there are many people who know lesbian and gay people 
but do not support LGBTQ issues, or who support LGBTQ issues without knowing a single 
gay person. I argue that disgust is an important motivator of these findings, as well as a useful 
alternative to understanding modern attitudes.  
 In Chapter 3, I lay out a theoretical justification for the study of disgust in LGBTQ 
politics. Drawing from psychology (e.g., Herek 2004), feminist and queer theory (e.g., Cohen 
1997; Rubin 1984), and legal and political theory (e.g., Canaday 2011; Nussbaum 2004), I argue 
that disgust operates not just as a psychological phenomenon, but also as a sociopolitical norm 
that is learned, reinforced, and embedded in cultures and institutions. Disgust reactions both 
express and reify existing dominant norms, and as such are more a reflection of what a 
particular culture (de)values, and not a signal of some inherent repugnance. Understanding 
disgust in this way is important because it shifts the focus from individual-level 
understandings and interventions (i.e., contact) to structural-level understandings of the 
systematic ways in which disgust is deployed in American politics, by whom, and at whose 
expense. Importantly, it also highlights that disgust can be unlearned.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, I use a series of original experiments to examine the relationship 
between disgust, LGBT-related attitudes, and policy support. I show that, across party 
affiliations, many people still experience disgust in reaction to LGBTQ issues, with significant 
consequences for public opinion, policy support, and persuasion. I also illustrate how these 
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impacts vary by subgroup of the LGBTQ community - the strongest effects and largest drops in 
support are consistently in response to transgender people and issues. This reveals that, even 
following national events like the legalization of gay marriage, political questions surrounding 
social acceptance and rights for LGBTQ people are far from settled. 
 In the final chapter, I conclude by reflecting on the implications of these findings for 
LGBTQ politics in the post-marriage era, as well as for group politics, public opinion, political 
psychology, and political science more generally. 
Overall, the implications of the project suggest that people who continue to feel disgust, 
even after (or perhaps because of) the attainment of legal marriage equality, may be much 
more difficult to persuade – in sharp distinction to the conventional wisdom that public 
opinion toward LGBTQ people will continue its rapid progress. In short, for LGBTQ politics, 
the influence of disgust means a very different and more difficult future than both activists 
and scholars currently imagine. At the same time, understanding how disgust affects beliefs 
and behaviors can help guide future efforts in understanding public opinion on LGBTQ issues, 
and can help advocates calibrate their strategies more effectively. Ultimately, I argue that 
LGBTQ advocates will need to develop different persuasive tactics that more directly confront 
the impact of disgust moving forward, particularly as transgender issues become more central.  
This project focuses on understanding this current turning point in LGBTQ politics 
and anticipating the political landscape that lies ahead. I argue that understanding this 
turning point critically depends on understanding the underlying emotional components, 
particularly disgust, of attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues. This work sheds light on 
how marriage equality and bathroom bills can exist contemporaneously, and even be supported 
by the same individual (i.e. a person who is both pro-marriage equality and against trans-
friendly bathroom policies). Additionally, in my work I strive to connect feminist and queer 
theory and critical conversations within LGBTQ activism with scholarship and methods in 
political science and psychology. Putting these diverse fields and spheres into conversation 
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with one another enriches the overall argument and illustrates the unique challenges that lay 
ahead for both researchers and advocates in LGBTQ politics and beyond.  
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Chapter 2: 
Friends and Allies? Revisiting the Influence of Contact On LGBTQ-Related Attitudes2 
 
“All types of contact have positive effects on support for gay rights.” 
-Barth, Overby, and Huffmon (2009)- 
 
“It is useful to distinguish between allies who are motivated mainly by their personal 
relationships and those who are motivated mainly by their political values.”  
–Gregory Herek (2011)- 
 
1. Introduction 
Harvey Milk, one of the first openly gay elected officials, is famously quoted as saying, 
“If they know us, they don’t vote against us!” This quote speaks to more than a basic belief 
about the possible influence of being out as a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBTQ) 
person. It has come to reflect the central strategy of the modern LGBTQ political movement, 
as well as the underlying assumption of much of political science’s existing literature on 
LGBTQ politics. Conventional wisdom in both modern scholarship and activism on LGBTQ 
politics relies on this extension of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), or the idea that 
                                                
2 Many thanks to the Interdisciplinary Workshop in American Politics (IWAP) for feedback on early 
drafts of this chapter, and to Chris Skovron and Hakeem Jefferson for many conversations (often over 
darts) that helped me clarify the friends and allies framework and argument that guides the chapter.  
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contact with LGBTQ people is the primary determinant of attitudes toward LGBTQ people 
and issues. That is, if you are a “friend,” you will also be an “ally.”3 This is a testable claim. 
Using a simple exploration of American National Election Studies data, I illustrate that 
the conventional wisdom is not universally applicable: contact is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for LGBTQ-policy support. Anywhere from 40% to 60% of people are unaccounted 
for in this view of the world. Contact also cannot explain the considerable variability in public 
opinion on different LGBTQ issues. Many people support some LGBTQ-friendly policies but 
not others. These findings suggest policy-specific effects. I will show that this variation is 
consistent with a growing literature that examines the limitations of the contact hypothesis.  
If the conventional wisdom – what I call the “friends and allies” framework – cannot 
explain modern attitudes toward LGBTQ people and policies, what else can? Why do people 
support some LGBTQ policies but not others? Why is contact sufficient for changing some 
people’s opinions, but not others?  
 
2. Influences on LGBTQ-Related Attitudes 
For over a century, hostility and prejudice have dominated attitudes toward LGBTQ 
people and issues. Only in the past ten to twenty years have these attitudes shown a sustained 
shift toward more positive opinion, though troubling prejudices persist. Opinions on some 
LGBTQ issues have remarkably and rapidly shifted, while other attitudes remain entrenched 
or at least with troublingly large minorities who continue to hold anti-LGBTQ beliefs. 
For example, Figure 2.1 shows General Social Survey (GSS) data that reveals 
significant shifts in support for civil liberties for gay and lesbians, such as willingness to allow 
an openly gay person speak in public, teach at a college, or keep a gay-authored book in a local 
library.  though troubling remainders of those who would deny rights.  
                                                
3 The term “ally” is one with considerable purchase in LGBTQ communities. It is generally used to 
refer to non-LGBTQ individuals who nonetheless support LGBTQ people and related issues. 
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Figure 2.1: 1973-2014 GSS Polling on Civil Liberties for ‘Homosexuals’
 
 
During the forty years tracked here, average support across these three civil liberties questions 
rose thirty percentage points (from 56% to 86%), while average opposition dropped thirty 
points (from 44% to 14%).  
Similarly, Figure 2.2 shows the “steady trend on gay marriage views” from 1988 to 
2016. This graph further depicts the remarkable opinion change in past years. 
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Figure 2.1: 1988-2016 Aggregated Polling on Gay Marriage
 
(Source: 538.com) 
 
However, other attitudes are slower to change. For example, as shown in Figure 2.3, 
Gallup polling from 1977 to 2016 shows that for the first roughly twenty years the polling time 
frame, roughly half of Americans believed consensual gay sex should be illegal, with even 
higher opposition during the AIDS crisis in the late 1980s and surrounding the 2003 Lawrence 
v. Texas decision overturning the criminalization of sodomy. As recently as 2004, 46% of 
Americans still believed consensual gay sex should be illegal. While that belief has declined in 
the past decade, in 2016 a full 28% of Americans still believe – even after the legalization of 
gay marriage – that gay sex should be illegal.  
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Figure 2.2: 1977-2016 Gallup Polling on Legality of Gay Sex
 
 
Similarly, Figure 2.4 shows that 2010 was the first time a bare majority of Americans 
considered consensual gay sex a morally acceptable act. In 2016, 37% of Americans still 
consider it morally wrong. The General Social Survey further corroborates these findings, 
showing that in 2014, 41% of Americans considered gay sex to be “always wrong” and another 
10% who find it “almost always wrong” or “sometimes wrong.” 
 
Figure 2.3: 2001-2016 Gallup Polling on Morality of Gay Sex
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Since political science began studying LGBTQ politics, roughly thirty years ago, 
researchers have paid significant attention to explaining these attitudes toward LGBTQ people 
and issues, as well as what might change these attitudes.  
 
2.1 Influences on LGBTQ-Related Attitudes 
One of earliest established influences on attitudes toward LGBTQ people and policies 
is gender. As early as 1980, women were found to be more tolerant than men of homosexuality 
(Larsen, Reed & Hoffman 1980) and more supportive of pro-gay policies such as employment 
protections (Herek 1988; 2000; 2002a). These gender gaps persist today. Relatedly, endorsement 
of gender stereotypes and traditional gender roles is associated with more negative attitudes 
toward LGBTQ people and less support for LGBTQ policies (Gaines & Garand 2010; Herek 
1988; Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera 2006).  
Older cohorts are less likely than younger generations to support LGBTQ people and 
policies (Baunach 2012). However, multiple scholars have argued that the significant changes 
in LGBTQ-related attitudes over the past twenty years cannot be explained by generational 
replacement, but rather by a cultural shift in attitudes within all cohorts (Anderson & Fetner 
2008; Baunach 2012).  
Religion and religiosity also play a powerful role in attitudes toward gay people and 
policies. More conservative or evangelical Christian protestant traditions are typically far less 
supportive of gay people and issues, and especially so for those with higher levels of religiosity 
(Adamczyk & Pitt 2009; Baunach 2012; Bramlett 2012; Brewer & Wilcox 2005; Herek 1988; 
Lewis 2003; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006).4 Atheists, agnostics, and the nonreligious are 
generally more supportive (Adamczyk & Pitt 2009; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006). Strand 
(1994), however, argued that measures of moral traditionalism or beliefs in naturalness offered 
                                                
4 Religiosity is most often measured as frequency of attendance at religious services, but can also be 
measured through other ways. Herek (1988), for example, also examines the orthodoxy subscale of the 
Religious Ideology Scale (Putney & Middleton 1961). 
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more explanatory power than religious affiliation. Others similarly employ discussions of 
morality or “values” in their examination of opinions on gay issues (Brewer 2003a,b; Brewer & 
Wilcox 2005; Craig et al 2005; Hillygus & Shields 2005; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006), 
though with generally similar findings: more conservative values – or even the invocation of 
the phrase “moral values” or “family values” – are associated with less support for LGBTQ 
people and issues. 
Conflicting evidence has been offered for racial and ethnic differences in support for 
LGBTQ policies. Some argue that blacks and Latinos are less likely to support LGBTQ people 
and issues than their white counterparts (Baunach 2012; Camp 2008), while others argue anti-
LGBTQ attitudes are just as prevalent among blacks or Latinos as among whites (Herek & 
Capitanio 1995; Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera 2006). Others offer evidence that lower support for 
LGBTQ issues among communities of color are due to other factors. For example, Lewis (2003) 
finds that blacks are less supportive than whites, but shows that these differences drop out 
when controlling for religion (see also Sherkat, De Vries, & Creek 2010). Bramlett (2012) also 
points out that “religious blacks are actually more liberal and Democratic than nonreligious 
blacks,” and further discusses the cross-pressures of black religious affiliation with a 
theological tradition of liberation and civil rights activism (e.g., Calhoun-Brown 2000).  
Finally, partisanship has played a varied role in attitudes toward LGBTQ people and 
issues. Until the mid-to-late 1990s, partisanship played little if any role, as negative attitudes 
toward LGBTQ people and policies were nearly universal (Baunach 2012). Since then, 
“Republicanism has been shown to independently reduce approval of same-sex marriage 
attitudes,” even controlling for other factors such as the higher religiosity of the Republican 
Party compared to the Democratic Party (Baunach 2012, 366; see also Brewer 2003; Sherkat et 
al. 2011).” Since 2015, just prior to the legalization of gay marriage, more and more 
Republicans are coming out in favor of gay marriage; however, partisan differences remain on 
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other LGBTQ issues, most notably transgender-related policies such as bathroom and 
healthcare access (e.g., Gass 2016).  
 
2.2 The Contact Hypothesis 
One of the largest portions of LGBTQ politics literature is on the influence of contact 
with LGBTQ people on heterosexuals’ opinions of LGBTQ people and, by extension, support 
for LGBTQ issues. The contact hypothesis describes this effect, where, under certain 
conditions, coming in to contact with a member of an out-group reduces prejudice toward that 
out-group (Allport 1954). While this theory was originally developed in the context of 
interracial contact and attitudes, scholars across a variety of disciplines have demonstrated its 
influence across many group contexts, including sexuality (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). 
The positive influence of contact with gays and lesbians on heterosexuals’ attitudes 
toward gay people has been thoroughly documented in the literature (e.g., Barth & Perry 2009; 
Bartos, Berger, & Hegarty 2014; Cunningham & Melton 2012; Herek & Capitanio 1996; Lewis 
2011; Morales 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Smith, Axelton, & Saucier 2009). In a meta-
analysis of 41 articles, Smith and colleagues (2009, 189) found that, across the board, 
“individuals who have had more prior or current contact with homosexuals show more positive 
attitudes toward homosexuals” than those without contact.  
In addition to reducing prejudice or negative attitudes, contact can also improve support 
for policy issues. Numerous studies have shown that contact with LGBTQ people is related to 
higher support for issues like same-sex marriage (e.g., Barth, Overby, & Huffmon 2009; Barth 
& Parry 2009; Bramlett 2012; Gaines & Garand 2010; Lewis 2011) and higher likelihood to 
engage in pro-LGBTQ political behaviors such as petition signing (Swank, Woodford, & Lim 
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2013).5 Modern pro-LGBTQ activism, much like the literature discussed here, also relies 
extensively on contact for winning policy support (Stone 2012).6  
Barth and Parry (2009, 47) argue for the critical importance of this finding for efforts 
at persuasion and pro-LGBTQ policy change: “…[A]ll lesbians and gay men — be they coupled 
or not — who are open about their sexuality with family, coworkers, and acquaintances can all 
serve as ‘change agents’ on straights’ attitudes about public matters related to their group.” 
Lewis (2011, 217) makes an even stronger claim: “The [contact] effect holds for every issue, in 
every year, for every type of relationship, and for every demographic, religious, and political 
subgroup.” 
 
3. Friends and Allies 
Conventional wisdom in both scholarship and activism on LGBTQ politics is that 
contact with LGBTQ people is the primary positive influence on attitudes toward LGBTQ 
people and issues. As a result, many research and advocacy efforts work from a general premise 
that only people who know or like gay or trans people will support policies that promote 
LGBTQ rights. That is, if you are a “friend,” you will also be an “ally.” This is a testable claim. 
Using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), an exploratory analysis and 
simple hypothesis testing allows us to test if the conventional wisdom about contact is correct.  
                                                
5 To be clear, much of the literature on contact and LGBTQ issues has thus far focused on the impact 
of contact on support for same-sex marriage, often to the exclusion of other issues (see Barth and Parry 
2009 for an exception). In other words, the impact of contact on support for non-marriage related 
LGBTQ policies is assumed, but less definitively established. 
6 For example, Harvey Milk, one of the earliest openly gay elected officials, was famously quoted as 
saying “If they know us, they don’t vote against us!” More recently, National Coming Out Day has been 
celebrated every October since 1987, following a nearly half-million person march on Washington D.C. 
for gay rights. Many marriage related campaigns relied explicitly on this logic. For example, a 2006 
campaign advertisement from the Alliance for Full Acceptance (AFFA) ran in South Carolina against 
Amendment 1, which proposed to ban both gay marriages and civil unions. It read: “Someone you 
know, someone you love is gay. They need your help in November.” Similarly, “The Breakthrough 
Conversation,” a campaign that emerged after the failure to defeat California’s Proposition 8 in 2008, 
was designed to educate LGBTQ people on how to most effectively communicate with heterosexual 
people about gay marriage, in effect maximizing the influence of contact on opinion change. Likewise, 
the Out to Dinner campaign, founded in 2012, based its efforts heterosexual opinion change on a single 
interaction with a gay or lesbian couple. These are just a few of many such examples. 
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The “friends and allies” conventional wisdom relies upon the logic of the contact 
hypothesis, but in doing so focuses attention only on two types of people, as shown in Table 
2.1: those who are neither friends nor allies (lower right cell), and those who – through their 
contact with LGBTQ people – are or have become allies (upper left cell). It also only considers 
one direction of movement or persuasion, from opposition to support.  
Table 2.1: Conventional Wisdom 
 
 Allies Not Allies 
Friends Friends and allies - 
Not Friends - Neither friends nor allies 
 
This basic visualization also allows us to see that the conventional wisdom overlooks 
two other types of people: friends but not allies (upper right cell), and allies but not friends 
(lower left cell). Table 2.2 includes these new profiles, and further illustrates the additional 
possibilities of movement from one cell to another. For those who seek to create “friends and 
allies,” it is not necessarily true that all people begin as “neither friends nor allies.” These two 
new profiles can also be targets for persuasion, but it is reasonably conceivable that each of 
these profiles might require different persuasive efforts or strategies to be moved to the 
“friends and allies” category. 
Table 2.2: Friends and Allies 
 
 Allies Not Allies 
Friends Friends and allies  Friends but not allies 
Not Friends Allies but not friends Neither friends nor allies 
 
The American National Election Study (ANES) — one of the most reputable, 
methodologically rigorous, and nationally representative surveys on American electoral 
behavior and political attitudes — has relatively little data on LGBTQ politics: one contact 
question, one group thermometer question for gays and lesbians, and four relevant policy 
questions. However, these six questions are useful for a establishing a basic yet rigorous 
examination of the basic question: are friends also allies? 
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Before proceeding with this examination, a second visualization is also useful for 
further understanding important variance in policy attitudes. If homophobia were the primary 
determinant of heterosexuals’ LGBTQ policy preferences, then we would expect that prejudice 
to persist across multiple policy issues: if someone opposes gay marriage because they are 
prejudiced against LGBTQ people, then we would expect them to also oppose gay adoption, or 
job discrimination protections for LGBTQ people, and so on, for the same reason. If this is 
true, then we should also not observe people who oppose some LGBTQ policies but not others. 
For this to occur would imply that some other consideration --- perhaps specific to the policy, 
rather than the LGBTQ association --- is also important in explaining opposition to LGBTQ 
policies. 
The ANES asks about four LGBTQ-related policy questions: job discrimination 
protections, openly serving in the military, adoption rights for gay couples, and legalizing gay 
marriage. These four policy issues generate sixteen unique sets of policy preferences, as shown 
below in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Four Policies and Sixteen Unique Sets of Policy Preferences 
Case Job Disc Military Adoption Marriage 
1 Pro Pro Pro Pro 
2 Pro Pro Pro Anti 
3 Pro Pro Anti Pro 
4 Pro Pro Anti Anti 
5 Pro Anti Pro Pro 
6 Pro Anti Pro Anti 
7 Pro Anti Anti Pro 
8 Pro Anti Anti Anti 
9 Anti Pro Pro Pro 
10 Anti Pro Pro Anti 
11 Anti Pro Anti Pro 
12 Anti Pro Anti Anti 
13 Anti Anti Pro Pro 
14 Anti Anti Pro Anti 
15 Anti Anti Anti Pro 
16 Anti Anti Anti Anti 
 
 The ANES data reveals that a substantial portion of the population does not conform to 
conventional wisdom. As shown in Table 2.4, anywhere from 35% to 53% of people support all 
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four policies, but fewer than 10% oppose all four.7 This leaves a significant segment of 
Americans’ LGBTQ-related policy preferences unexplained. 
Table 2.4: Sixteen Cases  
Type Case Job Disc Military Adoption Marriage n  % 
 
“Pro-gay” 
 
1 Pro Pro Pro Pro 1974 1974 53.4% 
 
3 pro, 
1 anti 
 
(four cases) 
2 Pro Pro Pro Anti 140 
417 11.3% 3 Pro Pro Anti Pro 111 5 Pro Anti Pro Pro 25 
9 Anti Pro Pro Pro 141 
 
 
2 pro, 
2 anti 
 
(six cases) 
4 Pro Pro Anti Anti 376 
488 13.2% 
6 Pro Anti Pro Anti 9 
7 Pro Anti Anti Pro 12 
10 Anti Pro Pro Anti 66 
11 Anti Pro Anti Pro 13 
13 Anti Anti Pro Pro 12 
 
1 pro, 
3 anti 
 
(four cases) 
8 Pro Anti Anti Anti 125 
472 12.8% 12 Anti Pro Anti Anti 328 14 Anti Anti Pro Anti 12 
15 Anti Anti Anti Pro 7 
 
“Anti-gay” 
 16 Anti Anti Anti Anti 346 346 9.4% 
ANES 2012; unweighted; Marriage measure omits civil unions 3,697 100% 
 
This demonstrates important variance in policy attitudes, which I will seek to explain 
in subsequent chapters. For now, I return to the “friends and allies” framework to illuminate 
another of the limitations of conventional wisdom.  
Given the available measures on the ANES, I measure “friendship” using self-reported 
contact with gays and lesbians. I measure “allyship” as stating support for a pro-gay policy. 
                                                
7 The ranges are because in 2012, the ANES gay marriage question offers three options: support for 
legal marriage, opposition to legal marriage, and support for civil unions but not legal marriage. This 
table shows the 16 sets of policy preferences but omits civil unions as a response option, emphasizing 
respondents who have taken a clear position. I replicated this analysis categorizing civil unions as an 
expression of support, and also as an expression of opposition, given its failure to endorse full 
legalization of gay marriage. The overall pattern remains the same: a significant segment of Americans’ 
opinions are unexplained by conventional wisdom. 
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With respect to contact, the ANES 2012 time series question is as follows: “Among your 
immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or close friends, are any of them 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know?” Respondents may only answer “yes” or “no.” 
Overall, approximately 44.4% of respondents reported any contact with LGB individuals, while 
55.6% reported no known contact.8  
With respect to LGBTQ policy questions, the ANES asks about gay marriage, gay 
adoption, job discrimination protections, and serving openly in the military. There are no 
transgender specific questions. If contact with LGBs determines policy preferences, then we 
should not observe people who have contact with LGB people but still oppose LGB-related 
policies. We should also not observe people without contact who nonetheless support these 
policies. However, in the ANES data, we observe both.9 There are a significant number of 
people who are friends but are not allies, and people who are allies but not friends.  
In other words, there are large numbers of people who are entirely overlooked by this 
conventional wisdom. In what follows, I show just how many people, for each policy. 
First, let us examine job discrimination protections for gays and lesbians. In the 2012 
ANES, the question wording was changed. Half the sample received the language 
“homosexuals,” while the other half received “gays and lesbians,” in the following form: “Do 
you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect [homosexuals/gays and lesbians] against job 
discrimination?” I combine these two samples in the reporting below.10 
Among those who took a position (i.e., dropping those who responded “don’t know” or 
refused the question), 76.2% support job discrimination protections for LGBs, while 23.8% 
                                                
8 Surprisingly, this is a decrease from 2008 ANES data, where 53% of respondents reported contact 
with gays or lesbians and 47% reported no contact. Both the 2008 and 2012 data are weighted. 
9 I have replicated these analyses using the feeling thermometer scores in place of contact, and the 
results hold. For brevity of exposition, the following tables report data only using contact. 
10 T-testing showed no significant difference of means corresponding to the wording difference in the 
job discrimination question (Mdiff= -0.003, t= -2.9, p=0.773). 
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oppose.11 If conventional wisdom were universally correct, then these 76.2% of respondents 
would fall into the upper left cell, the 23.8% opposed into the lower right cell, and no one in 
the off-diagonals. This is represented in Table 2.5a. 
Table 2.5a: Conventional Wisdom on Job Discrimination Protections 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
Friends (Contact) 76.2% ? 
Not friends (No Contact) ? 23.8% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
However, as Table 2.5b illustrates, this is not the case. Only about 54% of respondents 
fall into the two typical profiles, with the remaining 46% in the alternate profiles: 7% are 
friends but not allies, and 38.8% are allies but not friends. In the specific case of job 
discrimination protections, conventional wisdom overlooks nearly 45% of respondents. 
Table 2.5b: Actual Distribution on Job Discrimination Protections 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose)  
Friends 37.4% 7% 44.4% 
Not friends 38.8% 16.9% 55.6% 
 76.2% 23.8% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
We can also consider this 45% another way. Consider the category of friends generally: 
7% of respondents are friends but not allies. However, this is 7% of all respondents. If we 
reconsidered this profile relative to the category “friends,” rather than to all respondents, the 
number becomes even more significant. Table 2.5c illustrates these same data, reframed as 
proportions (“Among Friends”), which brings stark attention to the shortcomings of the 
“friends and allies” framework. 
Table 2.5c: Job Discrimination, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Friends 84% 16% 100% 
Not Friends 69.8% 30.4% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
                                                
11 In the “homosexual” sample, 1.6% of respondents (weighted) answered “don’t know” or refused. In 
the “gays and lesbians” sample, 1.7% of responses (weighted) answered “don’t know” or refused. 
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Not only are there people in the off-diagonals, but these cells are heavily populated. 
Among all “friends,” or those who report contact with gays and lesbians (44.4% of the entire 
sample), 16% still remain opposed to job discrimination protections (=7/44.4). Contact was not 
sufficient for creating political support. Among “not friends,” or those who report no contact 
with gays and lesbians (55.6% of the entire sample), nearly 70% (=38.8/55.6) in fact support 
this policy. Contact was not necessary for creating political support. The following tables 
demonstrate the same examination for military service, adoption, and marriage. 
Tables 2.6a and 2.6b show a continuing pattern. Respondents were asked, “Do you 
think [gays and lesbians/homosexuals] should be allowed to service in the United States Armed 
Forces, or don’t you think so?” This question also had a split sample, and I again combined 
the responses and dropped those who refused or responded, “don’t know.”12 Overall, 86.2% of 
respondents expressed support for allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military, 
while 13.8% opposed this. Table 2.6a shows that nearly 50% of respondents are overlooked by 
conventional wisdom.  
Table 2.6a: Military Service 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose)  
Friends 40.7% 3.6% 44.3% 
Not friends 45.6% 10.1% 55.7% 
 86.2% 13.8% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
Table 2.6b shows that while friends do tend by and large to be allies, a small remainder 
(roughly 8%) of those who know a gay or lesbian person do not support this policy. More 
notably, though, is the reappearance of the sizable split amongst “not friends,” where again a 
significant majority (over 80%!) is supportive of this policy despite not having any contact with LGBs. 
                                                
12 T-testing showed no significant difference of means corresponding to the wording difference in the 
military service question (Mdiff= -0.0004, t= -0.05, p=0.962). In the “homosexual” sample, 1.7% of 
respondents (weighted) answered “don’t know” or refused. In the “gays and lesbians” sample, 0.87% of 
respondents (weighted) answered “don’t know” or refused. 
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Of additional note and similar to the job discrimination data, there are notably more “allies 
but not friends” than there are “friends but not allies.” 
Table 2.6b: Military Service, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Friends 92% 8% 100% 
Not friends 81.9% 18.1% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
Regarding adoption, respondents were asked, “Do you think gay or lesbian couples 
should be legally permitted to adopt children?” Approximately 63.2% of all respondents favored 
allowing gay couples to adopt, while about 36.8% opposed, as shown in Table 2.7a.13 Again, 
over 40% of respondents are overlooked by conventional wisdom.  
Table 2.7a: Gay Adoption 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Friends 32.9% 11.1% 43.9% 
Not Friends 30.3% 25.8% 56.1% 
 63.2% 36.8% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table 2.7b: Gay Adoption, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Friends 74.8% 25.2% 100% 
Not Friends 54% 46% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
Table 2.7b shows interesting shifts in the previous patterns. Compared to job 
discrimination and open military service, attitudes on adoption are more split and less 
consistent with conventional wisdom. Over a quarter of those who have contact with gays and 
lesbians remain unsupportive of gay adoption. Conversely, over half of those without contact 
nonetheless support gay adoption. Again, the conventional wisdom cannot explain a significant 
portion of respondents. 
 Tables 2.8a and 2.8b consider the final ANES question on gay policy issues in 2012. 
Respondents were asked, “Which comes closest to your view?” and given the options of “Gay 
                                                
13 3.7% of respondents (weighted) refused to answer or responded, “don’t know.” 
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and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry,” “Gay and lesbian couples should be 
allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry,” and “There should be no legal recognition 
of a gay or lesbian couple’s relationship.”14 As shown in Table 2.8a, roughly 25% of 
respondents opposed marriage, 33.5% supported civil unions but not legal marriage, and 41.5% 
supported legal marriage for gay and lesbian couples. 
Table 2.8a: Gay Marriage 
 Allies 
(Support) 
 
(Civil Unions) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Friends 23.5% 13.4% 7.2% 44.1% 
Not Friends 18% 20.1% 17.8% 55.9% 
 41.5% 33.5% 25% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
From the outset, this illustrates another related weakness of the “friends and allies” 
framework: this is no explicit consideration of individuals who occupy some sort of middle 
ground in their policy preferences, such as civil unions. In that regard, already 33.5% of 
respondents are overlooked by conventional wisdom. When examining marriage support based 
on contact, Table 2.8a shows that nearly 60% of respondents do not fall into one of the two 
expected profiles of the friends and allies framework.  
Table 2.8b: Marriage, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
 
(Civil Unions) 
Not-Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Friends 53.3% 30.4% 16.3% 100% 
Not-Friends 32.2% 36% 31.8% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
Table 2.8b shows that nearly 47% of respondents who know a gay or lesbian person 
nonetheless do not support legal marriage recognition, while over 30% of respondents who did 
not know a gay person nonetheless supported legalizing gay marriage. For both those with and 
without contact with a gay person, roughly a third of respondents expressed some middle 
preference. Again, the influence of contact and the expression of policy preferences are not 
following conventional wisdom. 
                                                
14 1.2% of respondents (weighted) were omitted due to “don’t know” responses or refusal to answer.  
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When using feeling thermometer ratings, rather than contact, the general pattern of 
observing a significant number of respondents in the off-diagonals persists. This is true across 
all four issues. Opinions about job discrimination and military service continue to appear 
distinct from opinions about adoption and marriage. The appendix also displays the same 
examination by partisanship, another strong influence on modern LGBTQ-related policy 
preferences, and the results again hold. 
In sum, the “friends and allies” framework consistently overlooks 40-60% of 
respondents. It seems to work better for explaining the attitudes of friends than it does for 
people who report no contact with LGBs, but there remains widespread variation in support 
for LGBTQ-friendly policies among both those with and without contact. Furthermore, there 
exists significant variation in contact’s influence across different policies, suggesting a policy-
specific interaction.  
 
4. From Contact to Disgust 
What explains the varying influence of contact on LGBTQ-related policy attitudes? 
There is a growing body of research about the limitations of contact to effect change in 
prejudicial attitudes, or the conditions under which contact will actually be effective. The 
above ANES data examination and the following literature both illustrate the need for 
rethinking scholarly approaches to understanding modern attitudes toward LGBTQ people and 
issues. Ultimately, I argue that the study of emotions, and particularly disgust, is critical for 
understanding LGBTQ-related attitudes.  
 There is a growing body of literature on the influence of contact, and particularly the 
specific, sometimes narrow conditions under which contact actually induces opinion change. 
For example, contact’s influence may in fact vary by the depth or context of the relationship. 
Barth, Overby and Huffmon (2009) find that the more proximal a relationship, the more 
influential: the effect of having a close, gay friend is greater than the effect of a gay neighbor 
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or acquaintance. Barth and Parry (2009) go further, finding that the influence of contact is 
context- or policy-specific: when heterosexuals knew a gay couple, they were more likely to 
support marriage equality, but this increased support did not extend to other LGB issues like 
military service. The contact effect was limited to the relevant policy realm.  
Relatedly, Herek (2011, 421) argues that the mere fact of contact may be insufficient for 
producing attitude change, and that “a better indicator may be the extent to which a 
heterosexual has discussed a gay or lesbian friend or relative’s experiences as a sexual 
minority.” In other words, contact is only likely to produce change if there are specific 
behaviors (i.e., communication) associated with it. However, these types of personalized appeals 
or discussions have produced mixed results. Harrison & Michelson (2011) showed they were 
ineffective for fundraising on marriage equality, and policy advocates are now advising LGBTQ 
activists to feature heterosexual allies in their persuasive campaigns rather than LGBTQ 
people themselves (e.g., Erickson 2011). In contrast, Broockman & Kalla (2016) recently 
showed that even a brief conversation that encouraged perspective taking about transgender 
rights produced lasting and meaningful opinion change, though recent work shows that this 
kind of perspective taking can also elicit increased sexual prejudice and disgust reactions 
(Mooijman & Stern 2016). Additionally, Broockman and Kalla’s sample was limited to one 
state and was conducted prior to the current outbreak of “bathroom bills” and heightened 
hostile, national attention to the transgender community, which may lead individuals to be 
less receptive to opinion change. Finally, though contact with gays and lesbians has recently 
been shown to have a positive spillover effect onto attitudes toward transgender people, the 
same study showed that direct contact with transgender people had no effect on transgender-
related attitudes (Flores 2015a). Little other work has yet examined the influence of direct 
contact with transgender people. 
Contact may also be mediated by other relevant factors. For example, Southerners are 
less influenced by contact with gays and lesbians (Overby & Barth 2002; Barth & Overby 
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2003), as are the strongly politically conservative (Skipworth, Garner, & Dettrey 2010). 
Bramlett (2012) also finds that religious affiliation can mediate the influence of contact: 
[P]eople of most religious traditions are more likely to support same-sex marriage when 
they have a close relationship with a gay individual. The effects are the greatest for 
black Protestants and Latino Catholics. However, white Protestants with close 
relationships with gay people are just as opposed to same-sex marriage as those without 
similar contact. (13) 
 
Additionally, Tropp and Pettigrew (2005), in a meta-analysis of contact effects across a variety 
of group contexts, found that the relationship between contact and reduced prejudice was 
weaker for members of minority groups than for majority group members (e.g., contact would 
be less influential for people of color than for whites).15  
In short, the influence of contact is mediated by a number of contextual, behavioral, or 
individual characteristics. Indeed, it seems that recent literature is increasingly addressing or 
uncovering conditions that contact must meet in order to actually lead to opinion change. 
Among these articles that interrogate contact’s limitations, rather than taking its effect as a 
given, the authors return to similar theme or unsettled question: 
While others have found that different types of contact with gays and lesbians can have 
different effects on attitudes about gay rights issues (e.g. Barth and Parry 2009), this 
study has shown that interpersonal contact will have a different effect on different 
individuals. (Skipworth et al 2010, 902) 
 
Why does contact with gays and lesbians lead some individuals to move their attitudes 
in the direction of support [for gay issues], while for others contact has little or no 
effect? (Gaines & Garand 2010, 564) 
 
Herek (2011, 420) summarizes neatly: “…a survey question that asks simply whether the 
respondent knows any lesbians or gay men may be a less reliable predictor of sexual prejudice 
now than was once the case.” 
Why is contact sufficient for some but not for others? What might other alternative 
approaches to understanding modern LGBTQ-related attitudes be? Despite this recent 
attention to the limitations of contact hypothesis in LGBTQ politics, the literature still has yet 
                                                
15 This point is of particular interest for future research on attitudes within the LGBTQ community, 
i.e., the attitudes of gays and lesbians toward transgender people. 
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to pursue alternative (to contact) measures for understanding modern opinion on LGBTQ 
attitudes, and is only just recently considering what alternative persuasive strategies to contact 
might be (e.g., Broockman & Kalla 2016; Harrison & Michelson 2016).  
The limits of the “friends and allies” framework and the contact hypothesis more 
generally also illustrate a broader shortcoming of this current understanding of LGBTQ-
related attitudes. Though contact has clearly and historically had a powerful influence on 
attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues, both modern ANES data and a growing literature 
show that there is simply more to these attitudes than the simple fact of whether or not an 
individual happens to know a gay or lesbian person. As Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) argue, 
“The traditional conception of prejudice—as a general attitude or evaluation—can 
problematically obscure the rich texturing of emotions that people feel toward different 
groups.” I argue that the influence of emotions – particularly disgust – is critical in 
understanding modern (and historical) attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues in America. 
Disgust is an emotion with potentially powerful political implications. Scholars in 
psychology, political science, and other fields have demonstrated that feeling disgust leads to 
harsher moral judgments, increased prejudices, avoidant and distancing behavior, and 
“resistance to rational argument” (Cunningham et al 2013; Dasgupta et al 2009; Inbar et al 
2009; Olatunji 2008; Terrizzi et al 2010). The avoidant behavior is particularly relevant to 
LGBTQ politics, given that one of the central strategies of the gay movement has been the use 
of contact (Stone 2012) to reduce prejudice toward LGBTQ people. For example, Lewis (2011, 
232) discusses some of the diverse effects of contact among different demographic groups: 
“Knowing LGBs has significantly larger effects for liberals and moderates than for 
conservatives, for Democrats than for Republicans, for mainline Protestants than for 
evangelicals, and for women than for men.” But all these groups for whom contact is less 
effective also are more prone to feeling disgust in the first place (Balzer & Jacobs 2011; Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom 2009) – which I argue explains the limited influence of contact in the first 
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place.16 Disgust reactions limit the efficacy of contact: if an individual considers gay people 
disgusting, then coming into contact with a gay or lesbian person may only stoke prejudicial 
attitudes rather than reduce them. 
In other words, I will argue that disgust contributes to prejudicial attitudes toward out 
groups, including LGBTQ people, and deters the very behaviors (e.g., contact) often relied 
upon to combat these negative attitudes. Additionally, disgust has been used to pass legislation 
and encode anti-LGBTQ prejudice into political and social institutions (e.g., Canaday 2011; 
Foucault 1978; Nussbaum 2004; Rubin 1984). This illustrates how disgust operates both as a 
psychological phenomenon that structures interpersonal interactions, and as a sociopolitical 
norm that is taught, learned, reinforced, and embedded in cultures and institutions. In this 
way, disgust is a political value of its own, and as Gregory Herek (2011) argues, “It is useful to 
distinguish between allies who are motivated mainly by their personal relationships and those 
who are motivated mainly by their political values.” 
                                                
16 Literature generally suggests that women are more disgust sensitive than men, but more recent 
literature suggests that this is due to women simply being more willing to report their emotional 
reactions; men and women’s physiological responses to disgusting stimuli are typically consistent, even 
if their self-reports of the emotion differ (see Balzer & Jacobs 2011). 
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Chapter 3: 
Disgust: A Hegemonic Emotion17 
 
“Law, then, does not just describe existing emotional norms;  
it is itself normative, playing a dynamic and educational role.” 
-Martha Nussbaum (2004, 12)- 
 
“Thus, discerning what is disgusting is not wholly dissimilar from discerning that which 
society deems abnormal, inappropriate, immoral, or simply inferior.” 
-Laura Beth Citrin (2004, 5)- 
 
1. Introduction  
Conventional wisdom, which argues contact with LGBTQ people is the predominant 
predictor of LGBTQ-related attitudes, cannot explain the attitudes and preferences of a 
substantial proportion of the population. I argue that emotional responses to LGBTQ people 
and issues are critical for understanding both the historical experiences of LGBTQ people in 
America and the modern political tensions facing the LGBTQ movement. In particular, I 
argue that the emotion of disgust has long structured social and political responses to LGBTQ 
people and policies in America, and continues to be a dominant factor in modern attitudes 
toward gay and transgender people and political issues.  
                                                
17 Many thanks to Angela Carter, Raechel Tiffe, Dara Strolovitch, and Bonnie Washick for their 
guidance and feedback on multiple drafts of this chapter.  
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From the history of homosexuality as a diagnosable disease, to HIV/AIDS and fears of 
potential disease transmission, to modern day “culture wars” and fear of “moral 
contamination” or corruption, the language of contagion has been and continues to be 
employed in political rhetoric to evoke and perpetuate disgust reactions toward LGBTQ people 
and issues among the public. Disgust is often referred to as a disease-avoidance mechanism, 
and so associations with disease and language invoking contamination are implicit, if not 
explicit signals of disgust. This is politically consequential, because disgust is associated with 
harsher moral judgments, avoidant and distancing behavior, and “resistance to rational 
argument” (Cunningham et al 2013; Dasgupta et al 2009; Inbar et al 2009; Olatunji 2008; 
Terrizzi et al 2010). This has important implications for the possibility of persuasion among 
those who feel disgust toward LGBTQ people. 
Furthermore, one of the central strategies of the contemporary gay movement is the use 
of contact (Stone 2012), based on the belief that contact with a member of an out-group can 
reduce prejudice toward that out-group (Allport 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Knowing that 
many contagions are transmitted through person-to-person contact, then the language of 
“contact” in this context takes on new meaning: contact provides an opportunity for the 
transmission of pro-LGBTQ beliefs. However, if people find LGBTQ people disgusting, they 
are likely to avoid any type of contact. In short, disgust contributes to prejudicial attitudes 
toward LGBTQ people and deters the very behaviors often relied upon to combat these 
negative attitudes. 
 I also offer a new understanding of disgust not just as an individually experienced 
emotion, but also as a socio-political ideology that is learned, reinforced, and embedded in 
American culture, politics, and institutions. In this way, I refer to disgust as an emotion that is 
used to communicate and reify existing hegemonic norms about sexuality, gender, and politics. 
Recognizing disgust as such is important because it highlights that since disgust is learned and 
manipulated, it can also be unlearned and interrupted.  
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
2. Disgust: An Expression of Social Norms 
 
“Although disgust evolved as a food-related emotion, 
it was well suited for use as an emotion of social rejection.” 
-Schnall et al (2008, 1097)- 
2.1 Existing definitions 
Disgust is an emotion. One of the foremost philosophers of disgust, Martha Nussbaum 
(2004, 88–89), argues: “Disgust concerns the borders of the body: it focuses on the prospect 
that a problematic substance may be incorporated into the self.” Miller (2004, 5) describes 
disgust as “fundamentally about protecting and maintaining the self,” even beyond the 
boundaries of the physical body. Both these definitions focus on the role of the emotion as it 
relates to and is experienced by the individual. This focus on disgust as an emotion of 
protection against contamination in the individual body carries across disciplines and 
literatures. 
Many scholars argue that emotions serve evolutionary functions (Ekman 1992; 
Hutcherson & Gross 2011; Lazarus 1991; Scherer 2000). Scholars in this literature describe the 
evolutionary purpose of disgust as protecting the individual from harmful contamination, such 
as spoiled food (Angyal 1941; Darwin 1872). This protection primarily takes the form of 
distance: disgust compels us to distance ourselves from the offending stimuli (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley 2000). This distance can occur through facial expressions or involuntary actions, as 
disgust’s characteristic pinched lips and wrinkled nose literally restrict oral access and pull the 
nose away from the source, while retching or vomiting attempt to expel a disgusting object 
away from the body. Schnall et al (2008, 1106) describe how disgust “can trigger nausea, throat 
clenching, and the very physical process of food expulsion to protect the body from harmful 
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contaminants.” This distance can also occur through both subconscious and intentional 
behavioral choices, such as avoiding contact with objects, experiences, individuals, or groups 
that one finds disgusting. This avoidance protects the individual by helping them evade 
potential sickness, disease, or harm. In this view, disgust is understood as a literal tool for 
survival, and is often referred to as a disease-avoidance mechanism (e.g. Faulkner et al 2004; 
Navarette & Fessler 2006; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case 2009).  
Related, often overlapping bodies of literature argue that emotions, such as disgust, also 
serve adaptive purposes in modern life and social interactions. While disgust’s evolutionary 
function was to reject potentially contaminated foods or objects, its modern function is to reject 
potentially contaminated people or groups (e.g., Schnall et al 2008). The contamination here 
may come in the form of perceived threats that are physical (such as an actual disease) or 
social or moral (such as different languages or values). Schaller (2006) refers to disgust’s 
relationship to social rejection and ingroup/outgroup attitudes as part of the “behavioral 
immune system” (BIS), which Terrizzi, Shook, and Ventis (2013, 100) review as follows: 
The BIS has implications for social interactions and intergroup attitudes. As long as 
humans have lived in groups, they have shared diseases. Other people, especially 
outgroup members who may harbor novel pathogens, are potential sources of infectious 
disease. As such, Schaller and Duncan (2007) have argued that the BIS should 
encourage individuals to prefer ingroup members over outgroup members. Indeed, 
researchers have demonstrated that the BIS as indexed by [perceived vulnerability to 
disease] is correlated with negative attitudes toward outgroups, including individuals 
who are disabled, obese, or foreign (Park, Faulkner, & Schaller 2003; Faulkner et al 
2004; Navarrete & Fessler 2006; Park, Schaller, & Crandall 2006). Likewise, disgust 
sensitivity has been correlated with prejudice toward homosexuals using both explicit 
and implicit measures (Inbar et al 2009; Olatunji 2008; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis 
2010). Moreover, activating the BIS (e.g., priming disease-threat) increase negative 
attitudes toward outgroups and increases positive attitudes toward the ingroup 
(Faulkner et al 2004; Navarrete & Fessler 2006). Together, these results suggest that 
BIS strength and activation of the BIS encourage individuals to exhibit positivity 
toward ingroup members and negativity toward outgroup members. 
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In this view, disgust’s evolutionary purpose of rejecting contaminated foods has adapted to the 
social purpose of rejecting contaminated people or groups.18 The operation of protecting the 
individual has expanded from the actual body to the broader notion of the self. Additionally, 
the threat has expanded from spoiled food to spoiled identities (e.g., Goffman 1963), and from 
real to perceived: the mere imagination or perception of potential contamination is sufficient 
for eliciting disgust (e.g., Elliott & Radomsky 2012).19 
For example, many scholars who study disgust in the context of immigration discuss 
two forms of contamination: both the physical form, such as diseases being carried across 
political borders, and the more symbolic, namely the perception of “cultural contamination” or 
different values being carried across – and infecting – moral and social borders. In both cases, 
the “threat” can be real or perceived.20 
These shifts to the social highlight an important element of disgust (and indeed, any 
emotion): that it is socially specific and constructed. While disgust reactions are generally 
consistent across people and cultures (Morales & Wu 2013, 73), what triggers these reactions is 
not. For example, there is significant variation in what food is regarded as either disgusting or 
a delicacy across various cultures. Time may also influence what or whom a specific society 
perceives as disgusting: slavery was once regarded as a normal practice but now is generally 
regarded as reprehensible and repulsive. All these variations in emotional norms highlight the 
socially constructed nature of emotions, including what triggers them in the first place. 
                                                
18 This is not to say that modern day prejudice and disgust toward LGBTQ people and other groups is a 
“survival tool,” necessary for survival, or justifiable. Rather, this is simply to say that this emotion – not 
the prejudice(s) it bolsters – has, according to scholars, historically worked in service of self-protection. 
19 This is especially relevant for politics, as merely suggesting that a group is dangerous, diseased, or 
somehow contaminated may elicit disgust among the public. I will return to this point later. 
20 Anti-immigrant rhetoric routinely cites concern for potential disease transmission and contamination 
of American language, jobs, and values. Even when these “threats” are “real,” such as the presence of 
the Ebola virus in 2014, the response far outweighs the actual risk of disease transmission (virtually 
zero during the Ebola outbreak) or any other contamination. 
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That disgust is socially constructed highlights that it is taught, learned, and reinforced. 
In the next sections, I turn to the critical importance of this point for understanding the power 
and operation of disgust in modern American politics. 
 
2.2 My definition 
Current literature generally argues that disgust operates to protect the individual — 
whether the actual body or the broader notion of the self — from contamination or harm, 
whether real or perceived. Though these various fields of scholarship take different approaches 
to studying or theorizing disgust, one common element is a focus on disgust as an individual-
level experience or phenomenon. Certainly these literatures conceptualize disgust as a basic, 
common emotion shared across humanity, with significant impacts on group-level interactions, 
but they still imagine and study disgust as something contained, felt within the individual, that 
compels individuals to expression and action in specific ways.  
I argue, however, emotions are hegemonic: while they are an individually experienced 
psychological phenomenon, they also operate as both an expression and reification of existing 
dominant cultural norms and values. Disgust serves as a marker of a relationship to power (e.g. 
Cohen 1997), or rather a lack of power: as Citrin (2004, 5) argues, “discerning what is 
disgusting is not wholly dissimilar from discerning that which society deems abnormal, 
inappropriate, immoral, or simply inferior.” When disgust is used to demarcate social out-
groups, this validates and perpetuates a status quo that positions the out-group as inferior and 
with disproportionately fewer rights and resources. Knowing the powerful influence of 
emotions on political attitudes and behaviors, this also obstructs the potential for change in 
public opinion and policymaking. 
That disgust operates as an expression of dominant norms and values is particularly 
important to recognize because the literature on disgust has disproportionately focused on the 
evolutionary, biological elements or functions of disgust, often to the exclusion of the relevant 
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social context. For example, conceptions of disgust that rely exclusively on an evolutionary 
function of rejecting disgusting food (Darwin 1872) would overlook that disgusting food in one 
community might be a delicacy in another. Recognizing the socially constructed nature of 
disgust and other emotions moves the focus from the individual (i.e., the person feeling 
disgust) to the social and structural (the institutions that teach what is and is not disgusting). 
This shift from the individual to the structural is also important because it suggests different 
interventions and approaches for opinion change, advocacy, and scholarship. An individual-
level understanding will likely focus on individual level strategies (e.g., contact), whereas a 
structural-level understanding would more likely beget structural level strategies (e.g., .e. 
changing incentive structures, or what is culturally believed about what or who is disgusting). 
These structural level strategies could be more effective in the long term. 
Recognizing disgust (and emotions more generally) as an expression of dominant 
ideology also highlights the heightened difficulty of persuasion. Disgust already makes 
persuasion difficult (Olatunji 2008), but when an individual’s disgust reaction is constantly 
reinforced on a social and structural level, persuasion is even less likely. We often experience 
disgust as a seemingly natural occurrence; it is thought to be natural, preexisting current social 
structures and identities – and to an extent it is. Scholars describe disgust as one of the core 
human emotions, consistent in its expression (even if not its targets or triggers) across cultures 
and time (Morales & Wu 2013) and serving evolutionary purposes (e.g., Darwin 1872; Ekman 
1992). Citrin (2004), however, argues that disgust reactions also seem natural due to their 
internalization: “these moralizing emotions, particularly disgust, facilitate a psychological 
process in which social norms … are internalized by individual society members, making these 
norms feel natural and right” (3, emphasis in original).  
Disgust’s “naturalness” is then taken in turn as a sign of its natural “truth.” For 
example, bioethicist Leon Kass (1997; 2002) argues for the “wisdom of repugnance,” or the idea 
that disgust operates as an inherently truthful signal of that which should not be transgressed. 
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The instinctive recoil and feeling of repulsion, he argues, reveals an underlying truth about 
the disgusting object being observed or considered: 
We intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we 
rightfully hold dear. Repugnance, here as elsewhere, revolts against the excesses of 
human willfulness, warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably profound. Indeed, 
in this age in which everything is held to be permissible so long as it is freely done, in 
which our given human nature no longer commands respect, in which our bodies are 
regarded as mere instruments of our autonomous rational wills, repugnance may be the 
only voice left that speaks up to defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are 
the souls that have forgotten how to shudder. (Kass 1997, 20) 
 
Kass concludes, therefore, that disgust is a reasonable, even preferred basis for making law and 
structuring society. William Miller (1997) further argues that the more things a society finds 
disgusting, the more “evolved” the society. Arguments such as these routinely cite the 
physiological experience and evolutionary nature of disgust, positing that this “naturalness” 
and intensity should be a signal to us of the truth-value of this emotion. 
The expression of this emotion both reflects and reinscribes the normative values that 
have produced or determined this object, act, or person to be (perceived as) disgusting. In 
saying, “This disgusts me,” the speaker is saying “I have been taught this is disgusting,” and in 
this speech act they are also teaching the audience that this ought to be perceived as 
disgusting. Much like reciting the pledge of allegiance or the national anthem in public, the 
recitation reveals that we have been asked to memorize a script that reflects certain values and 
perform it on command at socially appropriate times. The performance itself then continues 
the cycle of communicating to others that these are “our” values, and that others ought to hold 
and express these values as well.  
Citrin refers to this as “emotional socialization,” or the shaping, teaching, and general 
social transference of both the experience and expression of emotions (4). She further argues 
that “the expression of disgust (and other moralizing emotions) toward bodies that transgress 
social norms may not only be a consequence of the transgression itself but may actually play a 
role in the internalization of and continued conformity to these norms, in effect constructing a 
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particular body that is morally appropriate” (2004, 3). Disgust marks certain behaviors or 
people as transgressive, which communicates to both the observer and the transgressor that the 
disgusting element is unacceptable according to social norms. This then reinforces that belief 
in both the observer and the transgressor, effectively coercing both parties to conform to these 
norms or else face continued demarcation as transgressive.21 
In this way, disgust operates as an ideology: it communicates to us both what is and 
what ought to be, and because it is also an individually felt or experienced emotion with 
intensely strong physiological components, it is already, literally, internalized. This only 
strengthens the perception of its presumed truth-value. As a result, the values attached to 
disgust reactions also become internalized and perceived to be natural. This leads individuals 
experiencing this emotion to police both others and themselves in accordance with what is 
perceived to be disgusting by existing social norms.  
 
2.3 Why does this matter? 
That disgust is hegemonic is important to recognize for multiple reasons. First, it 
reveals that disgust can be used to influence many policy domains. Second, the intense 
physiological experience of this individual emotion combined with the intense socialization of 
hegemonic values about what ought to evoke disgust means that opinion change may be 
difficult when an individual feels disgust. However, that disgust can be socialized and socially 
constructed nonetheless means that unlearning this reaction, or at least diffusing its political 
consequences, is possible. 
 
 
                                                
21 The impact of disgust on the perceived transgressor can be powerful. See, for example, literature in 
psychology or on the influence of minority stress on LGBTQ communities (e.g., Berg, Munthe-Kass, & 
Ross 2015), or feminist and queer studies for theoretical engagements with shame (e.g., Halperin & 
Traub 2009; Moore 2004) and unhappiness (e.g., Ahmed 2010). 
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 2.3.1 Hegemonic Disgust Can Influence Many Groups or Policy Domains 
Understanding disgust as a tool of hegemony reveals even further the power of this 
emotion. Considerable scholarship has demonstrated the influence of disgust on individual-
level moral judgments, prejudice, interpersonal behaviors, and policy preferences in some areas 
such as immigration (Casey 2014; Faulkner et al 2004; Navarette & Fessler 2006), welfare 
(Hancock 2004), and LGBTQ issues. But understanding that disgust is also a tool used to 
express and reify existing cultural norms means that it can be invoked against many types of 
people or in many arenas, and to potentially great effect.  
As discussed above, when an object or behavior is perceived as disgusting, that disgust 
is often used to justify avoiding, rejecting, or otherwise drawing boundaries around it (Kass 
2002; Miller 1998). Hancock (2004) identifies two key components of disgust in politics, one of 
which is that disgust begins with an object or action that an individual finds offensive. This 
offense leads the individual on a search for other attributes: it “turns our attention… toward 
the subject in a search for evidence to justify such a reaction” (9). This focuses the negative 
feeling on the offending person who committed the act, forming connections between the 
visceral reaction and the out-group member. Thus the disgust at an action or object transforms 
into disgust at the person who committed the action or is somehow affiliated with the object. 
What started as a disgusting act can often transform the actor into a disgusting person.  
When people or entire groups are imagined to be disgusting or contaminants, they will 
be treated as such: something to be isolated, separated, possibly even eradicated for the safety 
of others.22 The very concept of a “behavioral immune system” (Schaller 2006) describes the 
ways in which actions typically used for preserving the boundaries of the individual’s body and 
physiological health are transformed and repurposed to police the boundaries of desirable 
social and moral health – and often to police others, potentially to great prejudicial effect. The 
                                                
22 See, for example, the responses to immigrants and anyone even peripherally related to the Ebola 
outbreak in 2014 (e.g., Casey 2015).  
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immune system is turned outward and acts to keep people and groups perceived as contagious, 
contaminants, or otherwise undesirable from coming any closer or putting the individual in 
(perceived) harm’s way. We feel disgust and then push others away to protect ourselves. In this 
way, disgust facilitates the transformation of others into Others, of people who are different 
into a “Them,” separate from the “Us.” This has important political implications.  
In every policy domain, hegemonic ideology has (by definition) influenced the current 
status quo and also shapes relevant and viable policy alternatives. For example, Social Security 
was established as an expression of existing cultural norms, particularly in the context of the 
Great Depression, that our society should take care of its workers and elderly. Now, those same 
norms also foreclose the likelihood of substantive change to the system. This is observable in 
public opinion toward virtually any proposed reform to Social Security, as well as in the 
electoral (dis)incentives for legislators. I argue that disgust can be used as an expression or tool 
of these norms, even here in the context of a policy that does not appear to be particularly 
sexual or otherwise disgust-eliciting. Social Security does not benefit a disliked out-group; 
rather, seniors are generally held in high esteem (e.g., “The Greatest Generation”) and hold 
considerable political power. Nonetheless, one could easily imagine a campaign that invokes 
the rhetoric of disgust to effect or prevent change: “Candidate X’s proposal to increase the 
retirement age is simply disgusting in its effort to strip life-long workers of their right to their 
hard-earned benefits,” or “Representative Y’s bill that would increase social security taxes 
makes me sick. She wants to take even more money away from today’s workers!” In these 
ways, disgust is potentially manipulable for many policy arenas. This is consistent with other 
literature on the use of emotion in politics, such as Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir (2000) who 
describe the political tactic of using visual appeals (i.e., campaign ads) to elicit an emotion and 
transfer that emotion to a neutral object (i.e., an unknown political candidate). Emotions can 
be and are elicited and used to achieve specific political purposes; disgust is no exception.   
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  2.3.2 Implications for Persuasion 
A second reason to expect disgust to influence politics is its implications for persuasion. 
Disgust is a deeply physiological emotion. Hancock’s (2004) second key component is that 
disgust is an instinctive response, a gut reaction, “somehow out of the hands of the perceiver” 
(10). Scholars have argued that it is perhaps the most embodied of all emotions: Schnall et al 
(2008, 1106) described how “disgust is often experienced as a particularly visceral feeling, 
possibly because it can trigger nausea, throat clenching, and the very physical process of food 
expulsion to protect the body from harmful contaminants.” They went on to argue, “Although 
emotions generally involve a physical, embodied component, we suspect that the strong 
physical basis might be even more pronounced for disgust.”  
An important implication of disgust’s deep embodiment is that appeals to reason could 
be less successful than in other contexts. Persuasion attempts based on logic, reason, or just 
generally cognitive-focused arguments may be unsuccessful when the audience is feeling such 
a visceral, gut-level, emotional response. Indeed, Olatunji (2008) argues that feeling disgust 
makes one “resistant to rational argument.” Therefore, on an individual level, feeling disgust 
may impede the possibility of persuasion. However, understanding disgust expressions as 
indicative of existing social norms, this suggests that opinion change may be additionally 
difficult beyond just individual-level resistance. Disgust reflects cultural norms, and media, 
elected officials, laws, our social networks and more are constantly reinforcing those cultural 
norms. In other words, persuasive efforts are not just working against individuals’ personal 
resistance or disgust reactions; these persuasive efforts are also combating a larger society that 
teaches and reinforces these individual disgust reactions in the first place.  
The individual, physiological component of disgust makes persuasion difficult enough; 
that disgust is also ideological makes it even more difficult. To the extent that the American 
political process relies on reasoned argument and deliberation, this research suggests that those 
who feel disgust may be much more difficult for LGBTQ advocates to engage. 
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Finally, and perhaps most important: if disgust is socially constructed, taught, and 
reinforced (e.g., Citrin 2004), then that means it can also be deconstructed, interrupted, and 
unlearned. As discussed above, what is perceived or constructed as disgusting varies across 
time, cultures, and contexts. This means that, though disgust is a predominant feature of 
history of LGBTQ people and politics in America and is still powerful today, its influence 
moving forward can be dramatically lessened. This is also true beyond the LGBTQ context. 
 
3. Disgust in LGBTQ Politics 
3.1 Disgust’s Particular Importance for LGBTQ Politics 
I argue that disgust, as an expression of existing cultural values, can be used to great 
political effect across many issues. However, for multiple reasons, I expect disgust to have 
particularly large effects in the domain of LGBTQ politics and policy. 
First, disgust is intimately connected to sex and sexuality. As Rubin (1984) argues, 
“Western cultures generally consider sex to be a dangerous, destructive, negative force. …It 
may be redeemed if performed within marriage for procreative purposes and if the pleasurable 
aspects are not enjoyed too much.”23 Any sex act that transgresses this “charmed circle” of 
socially acceptable parameters are stigmatized and taboo – and taboo or unusual sex is often 
cited as a primary elicitor of disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin 1994). As Angyal (1941, 394) 
argues, “The more intimate the contact, the stronger the [disgust] reaction.” Indeed, a growing 
body of research confirms a link between sex, sexuality, and disgust reactions. Mosher and 
O’Grady (1979), for example, showed that exposure to gay pornography elicited disgust in 
heterosexuals, whereas heterosexual pornography did not. More recent studies also show that 
disgust reactions were common in response to gay and lesbian people, particularly in intimate 
or sexual contexts (Bishop 2015; Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Doan et al 2014). Given that 
                                                
23 Even in 2015, arguments against gay marriage often invoke procreation as the purpose of sex and 
marriage. See the oral arguments presented at the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).  
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LGBTQ people, as an out-group, are primarily defined by their sexual identities, it seems 
likely, if not all but certain, that disgust would play an influential role in gay politics.24 
Discussions of LGBTQ issues could prompt thoughts of sex and sexuality, and by extension 
disgust reactions. Indeed this is exactly how Martha Nussbaum (2004) describes what she calls 
“projective disgust,” or the disgust that some people feel upon imagining gay sex acts. She 
argues that individuals, particularly those who are uncomfortable with their own bodies, 
sexuality, and “animality,” project their own self-oriented disgust onto individuals or groups 
who bring up those feelings of shame, disgust, or vulnerability in them. “In this way,” she 
argues (2010), “the uncomfortable people displace their discomfort onto others, who are then 
targeted for various forms of social discrimination.” 
Second, disgust is also deeply concerned with bodies. Scholars of disgust argue that 
perceived mutilations and other “body envelope violations” are strong triggers of disgust 
(Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley 2000). This makes disgust of particular relevance to transgender 
and gender non-conforming communities. These reactions may also be triggered by thoughts of 
actual or perceived/assumed changes made by trans people to their physical bodies or social 
identities. Many critiques leveled at trans people refer to these interventions (e.g. surgery, 
hormones) as “mutilations” of one’s body. Other criticisms imply that medical and related 
interventions are simply superficial and unnecessary alterations to one’s “true” or 
unchangeable self. For example, disgust is being signaled when transgender people’s gender-
affirming healthcare is referred to as “elective mutilation.” This use of language calls specific 
attention to the object of disgust (gender transgressions, particularly on a physical/bodily level) 
                                                
24 Generally, “transgender” should not be defined by reference to sexual identity, but rather to gender 
identity. However, many people are unaware of how transgender identities differ from LGB identities. 
While 65% of Americans report that they have a close friend or family member who is gay (and the 
number is likely higher for knowing anyone who is gay), barely 9% of Americans report that they know 
someone who is transgender (Jones Cox, & Navarro-Rivera 2014). To the extent that contact mediates 
understanding of LGB(T) identities, this gap in contact likely reflects a gap in understanding. 
Additionally, Murib (2015) shows how the evolution of “transgender” as a political identity, nested 
within the LGB movement, obscured important distinctions between sexual orientation and gender 
identity, as well as within the category “transgender” itself.  
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felt toward transgender people.25 Indeed, many negative characterizations of trans people focus 
on the physical interventions and presumed changes made to the body itself. Additionally, 
given the historical stereotyping of sexuality with gender deviance, violations (by anyone) of 
gendered norms may also elicit disgust. These reactions may be triggered by acts of non-
compliance, such as gender-atypical dress, behavior, or desire – regardless of whether an 
individual identifies as transgender.  
Third, disgust is perhaps most relevant to LGBTQ politics because of the behavior it 
produces. It compels individuals to distance themselves from the offending stimuli, as a 
method of protection from contamination or harm (Rozin et al 2000). On a basic level, this 
means simply that upon smelling spoiled milk, one might turn their face or push the carton 
away to get out of reach of this unpleasant odor: disgust produces a desire for and then an 
action to create distance from the offensive object. On an interpersonal level, this effect is 
politically significant. For example, in one study, inducing disgust among politically 
conservative participants was related to increased avoidance of contact with gays and lesbians 
(Terrizzi et al 2010). This is significant given the demonstrated ability of contact to influence 
opinion (e.g., Allport 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). While this avoidant behavior is 
characteristic of disgust generally, this is particularly important for the LGBTQ political 
movement due to the LGBTQ movement’s heavy reliance on contact as a central strategy for 
persuasion (Stone 2012). This implication is especially pronounced given that conservatives 
make up the significant majority of those who remain opposed to gay marriage and other 
LGBTQ issues (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera 2014; McCarthy 2014), but also have been 
shown to be more easily disgusted than liberals on average (Inbar et al 2009). 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Schilt and Westbrook (2009) also connect this to maintenance of heterosexuality. 
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4. Disgust in U.S. LGBTQ History 
As I have argued, there are particular reasons to anticipate disgust’s relevance to 
LGBTQ politics. These expectations are borne out, and indeed are pervasive, in the history of 
LGBTQ people in America. Disgust and its related language of contamination, contagion, 
disease and perversion figure centrally in this history. What started as the medical, 
psychological condition of homosexuality (and, relatedly, gender non-conformity) transformed 
into the social, moral contaminant that is ubiquitous in modern politics. These affective 
legacies continue to structure LGBTQ politics in America today. 
 
4.1 A Medical & Psychological Condition 
In the late 19th century, as Victorian era morals became deeply entrenched in Western 
culture and medicine, long-existing but previously less-troubling behaviors, including same-sex 
desires and sex acts, became increasingly stigmatized (Foucault [1978] 1990). Prior to this, 
sexuality did not operate as a category of identity; sex acts of course occurred, but were not the 
basis for social or political identities. As this stigmatization and moralization intensified, a 
name was given to these now deviant behaviors: homosexuality.26 Summarizing Foucault, 
queer theorist Jagose (1997, 9) writes: 
Foucault argues that although same-sex sex acts were condemned in both religious and 
civil law before 1870, they were regarded as temptations to which anyone might 
succumb. Sinful and illegal, those forbidden acts were not understood to constitute a 
certain kind of individual. After 1870 same-sex sex acts began to be read as evidence of 
a particular type of person about whom explanatory narratives began to be formed: ‘The 
sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.’ 
 
These “explanatory narratives” about homosexuality and homosexuals were, from the start, 
rooted in language of Victorian ideals of cleanliness, purity, (im)morality, and the perceived 
contagiousness of moral and physical corruption. Over time, these narratives about 
                                                
26 Foucault ([1978] 1990) dates the invention of homosexuality to 1870. The first known uses of the word 
heterosexual or heterosexuality were not until 1892 (Katz 1990). In this way, homosexuality existed 
before heterosexuality, and both are purely modern inventions (Katz 1990).  
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homosexuality became embedded in notions of health, medicine, morality, and citizenship, and 
they shaped law and culture.  
Sexologists of the late 1800s first examined sexual desire and behaviors from medical 
and psychological perspectives. Their work helped establish the belief that human sexuality is 
both natural and, for some of these researchers, naturally heterosexual (Seidman 2011, 3). 
Early sexologists sometimes referred to homosexuality as “sexual inversion” (e.g., Ellis 1897) – 
something literally twisted within the individual. Richard von Krafft-Ebing, credited with 
establishing the field of sexology, in particular argued that the sole purpose of human sexuality 
was procreation, and any act not in this service was perverse: “With opportunity for the natural 
satisfaction of the sexual instinct, every expression of it that does not correspond with the 
purpose of nature—i.e., propagation,—must be regarded as perverse” (1892, 79).27 This argument 
remains familiar and continues to be invoked even at the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015 
(Obergefell v. Hodges). Given sexology’s establishment of heterosexuality as “natural,” this 
explicitly positions homosexuality as “unnatural” – also language that persists in modern 
political rhetoric. Thus, this early (pseudo)scientific approach to the study of sexuality 
established same-sex sex acts as abnormal, perverse, and unnatural.  
The discipline of sexology also established sexuality as a domain of medicine, health, 
and psychology, and this continued into and throughout the 20th century. Sigmund Freud, 
perhaps the most notable psychologist of the 20th century, asserted that sexuality was more 
about pleasure than reproduction, in contrast with some earlier sexologists. Though Freud 
described homosexuality as a natural result of both inborn qualities and childhood 
experiences, he nonetheless argued that the preferred, “healthy” form of sexuality was “genital-
centered, intercourse-oriented heterosexuality based on love and monogamy” (Seidman 2011, 
                                                
27 Though sexologists Havelock Ellis and (especially) Magnus Hirschfield offered a more positive view 
of gay and transgender people, they still contributed to the study of sexuality through psychology, 
medicine, and health perspectives.  
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4). This continued the construction of homosexuality as unhealthy and mentally abnormal, an 
existing but undesirable condition.  
Homosexuality was “treated” using psychotherapy, electroshock therapy (both to the 
brain and to the genitals), conversion or “reparative” therapy, aversion therapy, 
institutionalization, and even lobotimization, among other methods (for a fuller list and 
discussion, see Kutchins & Kirk 1997; also Drescher 2010; Richards 1993; Silverstein 1996).28 
Many of the treatments illustrate the conflation of gender non-conformity with sexual non-
conformity. For example, one common treatment was hormone therapy: men were 
administered testosterone or androgen in order to “restore” a properly gendered hormonal 
balance and thus properly gendered sexual behavior (Kutchins & Kirk 1997).29 As Canaday 
(2009, 11) notes, “It was that perverts wanted to be penetrated like women, rather than the fact 
that they had sex with men, that made them perverse.” Thus, homosexuality was a literal 
disease that was diagnosable, treatable, and believed in many cases to be recoverable if not 
entirely curable. Indeed, in 1952, homosexuality was officially classified in the American 
Psychological Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I).30 This 
medicalization, pathologization, and related responses show the extent to which homosexuality 
and gender nonconformity were viewed as a disease.  
 
4.2 The Political & Moral Turn 
The mid-twentieth century, however, marked an important shift in the American 
construction of and relationship to homosexuality. From its inception around 1870 to the 
                                                
28 Interestingly, “aversion therapy” describes a practice wherein individuals (patients) are taught to be 
disgusted by some stimulus, in an effort to change their behavior related to that stimulus, i.e., breaking 
an addiction or, in this case, ceasing homosexual behavior or desires. This again highlights the basic 
point of this chapter, that disgust is employed to teach and reify certain social norms – and if it can be 
learned, then it can also be unlearned. 
29 Alternately, “cross-sex” hormones were sometimes used as a punitive form of chemical castration to 
reduce the individual’s (homo)sexual desires, as in the 1952 case of Alan Turing, the British computer 
scientist and logician who broke the German Enigma during World War II. 
30 Bayer (1987) and Kutchins & Kirk (1997) trace the removal of homosexuality from the DSM in 1973. 
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1940s, homosexuality was largely under the purview of medicine and psychology. However, in 
the time surrounding World War II, homosexuality became an integral element of citizenship 
and a contested category in politics, economics, culture, and morality. During this time, the 
conception of homosexuality shifted from a physical and/or psychological disease to a moral 
and social one.  
American political development scholar Richard Valelly (2012) argues, “Until the 
middle of the twentieth century, sexual orientation was simply not widely and deeply 
politicized in the United States. But abruptly, in a period of a decade and a half (roughly 1940-
1955), national political and bureaucratic actors created a national sexuality regime that has 
taken 60 years of LGBTQ struggle to partly reverse” (Valelly 2012, 313). By the mid-twentieth 
century, same-sex sex acts, often referred to as “crimes against nature,” were already 
criminalized in every state in the nation (Eskridge 2008).31,32 Canaday (2009) traces a detailed 
history of the policing of sexual and gender non-conformity at the federal level, and particularly 
in the developing American bureaucracy in the twentieth century. She shows that sodomy and 
gender non-conforming bodies became particularly scrutinized by the state, characterized as 
disgusting or indicative of disease and moral corruption, and likely to become a “public 
charge” – unwilling or unable, due to their perversity, to support themselves and contribute to 
society. These characterizations, Canaday argues, played decisive roles in determining who was 
allowed access to economic benefits, military service, and indeed the American state itself (via 
immigration policy).  
This attention to homosexuality in the military became increasingly relevant during 
World War II, which “resulted in the first major effort to define and examine homosexuality 
as a ‘problem’… Overall this wartime effort created an understanding of the homosexual not 
                                                
31 Interestingly, until the 19th century, sodomy was also referred to in Anglo-American texts as 
“buggery,” a term that “was originally used to slander heretical groups that were believed to originate 
from [Bulgaria]” (AGLP 2012). Given disgust’s influence in fears of unknown others, this again 
highlights the role of disgust in even the earliest labels and understandings of same-sex sex acts. 
32 Eskridge (2008) provides a richly detailed history of sodomy laws in America. 
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only as a military ‘problem’ but also as a problem posing a danger to national interests and 
security” (Fejes 2008, 13-14).33 In other words, homosexuality became a newly political (i.e., 
rather than medical) problem for the federal government, and this further reinforced the 
regulation of sexuality in the already burgeoning American bureaucracy (Canaday 2009).  
The government bureaucracy was not the only one to turn its attention to the 
surveillance of homosexuality. Institutions of art and culture 
did so as well. In fact, so dangerous was the specter of 
homosexuality that from 1930 to 1968, the Motion Picture 
Production Code banned any representation of homosexuality 
in film. Will Hays, the first president of the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (MMPDA, now the 
MPAA), in an effort “to improve the image of the motion 
picture industry… introduced the Production Code, a 
document designed to help the industry regulate itself by 
following certain moral principles and guidelines” (Oscars.org 
2016). Now famous for its influence on film, subversion, and 
culture (e.g., Russo [1981] 1987), the Hays Code’s move to ban 
homosexuality in film was also blatantly tied to and invoked disgust in its proscriptions. 
Calling to mind Krafft-Ebing’s description of homosexuality, Rule II.4 of the Production Code 
states “Sex perversion or any inference to it is forbidden.” Rule II.7 further states, “Sex 
hygiene and venereal diseases are not subjects for motion pictures,” highlighting the continued 
connection between forbidden sex and disease. Other sections of the code are entitled 
“Vulgarity,” “Obscenity,” and “Repellent Subjects,” all further highlighting the role of disgust 
in guiding these “moral principles.”  
                                                
33 See also Bérubé (1990) for a history of gay men and women in the military during World War II.  
Figure 3.4:  
The Motion Picture 
Production Code, 1930-1955  
(Oscars.org 2016) 
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Shifting economic forces also facilitated this shift from perceiving homosexuality as a 
medical condition to a moral and social contaminant. D’Emilio (1993) argues that the radical 
restructuring of the American economy during the World War II era allowed for the 
emergence of a gay identity. As capitalism flourished and the economy shifted from an 
agrarian, family-unit-centered structure to an increasingly industrial, wage-labor-centered 
structure, this produced new opportunities for individual identities outside of the family to 
emerge. Both the economy and sexuality, D’Emilio argued, shifted from mainly (re)productive 
purposes to more independently-focused and pleasure-driven endeavors.  
Capitalism has gradually undermined the material basis of the nuclear family by taking 
away the economic functions that cemented the ties between family members… On the 
other hand, the ideology of capitalist society has enshrined the family as the source of 
love, affection, and emotional security, the place where our need for stable, intimate 
human relationships is satisfied. …Thus, while capitalism has knocked the material 
foundation away from family life, lesbians, gay men, and heterosexual feminists have 
become the scapegoats for the social instability of the system. (D’Emilio 1993, 473) 
 
This shift is, in part, how homosexuality came to be perceived as explicitly “anti-family,” a 
commonly used refrain in modern American politics.34 It also illustrates the shift from 
conceiving of homosexuality as a psychological problem to a moral contaminant that 
threatened the American family and society.  
 From the 1950s to the 1970s, this understanding of homosexuality as a contagious 
threat to the social and moral fabric of the American nation-state only intensified. For 
example, McCarthyism viewed homosexuality as a contagious element that would lead an 
individual to betray his or her nation, “a weakness that opened the door to Communist 
subversion” (Fejes 2008, 9; see also Johnson (2004) for a thorough history of this “Lavender 
Scare”). Furthermore, the Kinsey reports (1948; 1953) heightened American attention to the 
surprising prevalence of homosexual behavior, which in turn led the public to realize they 
were “no longer sure how to recognize a homosexual” (Fejes 2008, 14). As a result, 
                                                
34 See, for example, the following anti-LGBTQ organizations, as characterized by the Southern Poverty 
Law Center: the American Family Association, the Family Research Council, the Family Research 
Institute, and Focus on the Family. 
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“Homosexuality, like communism, was frequently referred to as a disease and invasion; both 
were seen as infections that were not locatable under the boundaries of ethnicity, dress, 
language, or religion” (Field 2005, 8). 
This pervasive but clandestine condition led to heightened scrutiny and vigilance on 
the part of anti-gay forces in their efforts to police the boundaries of acceptable expressions of 
gender and sexuality. Through the 1960s and 1970s, government and law officials rigorously 
enforced existing anti-sodomy laws, continued McCarthy-style review of government employees 
for “sexual perversion,” and commonly raided gay and lesbian establishments (Eskridge 2008; 
Mallory, Hasenbush, & Sears 2015). The most common targets and victims of these efforts 
were the most visible or identifiable members of the LGBTQ community: typically transgender 
or gender non-conforming people, and especially people of color. For example, police often 
arrested butch women during bar raids for not wearing a minimum of three pieces of 
“feminine” clothing (Mogul, Ritchie, & Whitlock 2012). These efforts to limit or control 
LGBTQ people and their expressions in public sectors and spaces (i.e., government, places of 
business, public meeting places for sex) highlighted the growing understanding of 
homosexuality as a specifically public, social threat. 
At the same time, a nascent homophile and gay rights movement was building, 
pressuring local governments and organizations for equal treatment, political rights, and 
redress to social discrimination. The 1966 Compton Cafeteria Riots and the 1969 Stonewall 
Riots marked the first times LGBTQ people fought back against police brutality and state 
surveillance, both times led by gender non-conforming and transgender people of color 
(Stryker 2008). In 1972, the first gay rights ordinances were passed in East Lansing and Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, and over the next four years another 27 cities and counties would enact some 
similar form of nondiscrimination law (Fejes 2008, 53). By 1973, gay advocates had also 
successfully pressured the American Psychological Association to remove homosexuality as a 
disorder from the DSM (Bayer 1987; Kutchins & Kirk 1997), and in 1977, Harvey Milk became 
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one of the first openly gay elected officials in the United States. The movement was slowly 
gaining traction around the country. 
However, responses to these events illustrate the persistence of disgust and stigma even 
in the face of early progress and growing LGBTQ visibility. Police and state regulation 
continued, if not intensified (Mogul, Ritchie, & Whitlock 2012), and Harvey Milk was 
assassinated only eleven months after he took office, just months after he sponsored a 
successful gay rights ordinance for the city of San Francisco (Shilts 1982).35 Though the APA 
removed homosexuality from the DSM, they simultaneously added “gender dysphoria,” a 
category that effectively characterized gender non-conformity as a psychological disorder 
(Drescher 2010; Kutchins & Kirk 1997).36 This category continues to dictate transgender 
people’s access to gender-affirming healthcare, resources, and state recognition to this day. 
Other efforts around the country to promote legal rights for gay people were met with 
moral and political outrage, most notably the rise of Anita Bryant’s “Save Our Children” 
campaign in response to Miami-Dade County’s gay non-discrimination ordinance (Fejes 2008). 
Anita Bryant’s rhetoric and other similar campaigns around the country also relied on disgust, 
conceptions of homosexuality as anti-family, and fears of gay men in particular as predators of 
both children’s bodies and morality. Fejes (2008) argues that the 1978 Miami ordinance was 
particularly instrumental in catapulting gay rights into the national spotlight. Of equal 
importance, the specific terms of this debate – Anita Bryant’s terms – also went national. This 
concretized the “moral panic” surrounding gay rights and LGBTQ progress that has structured 
LGBTQ political efforts (e.g., Stone 2012) to this day. 
                                                
35 His assassin, Dan White, was also an elected member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, and 
was the only Supervisor who voted against Milk’s 1978 gay rights ordinance (Shilts 1982). 
36 As Judith Butler argues, “The ‘diagnosis’ can operate in several ways, but one way it can and does 
operate, especially in the hands of those who are transphobic, is as an instrument of pathologization. To 
be diagnosed with gender identity disorder is to be found, in some way, to be ill, sick, wrong, out of 
order, abnormal, and to suffer a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the diagnosis being given at 
all.” (275) 
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The events of the 1970s illustrated and cemented the mid-twentieth century shift from 
understanding homosexuality and gender non-conformity as a psychological, medical condition 
to a social, moral threat to the nation. However, the lingering associations between 
homosexuality and disease were soon to be reactivated in the 1980s.  
  
4.3 HIV/AIDS & The Reification of Disease 
On June 5, 1981, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention first reported five 
cases of a rare lung infection in young gay men in California. This was the first official report 
of what would become known as the AIDS epidemic (AIDS.gov 2015).37 Unlike prior 
conceptions of homosexuality as a psychological or social disease, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
involved an actual, physical disease with actual risk of contagion or contamination. As 
knowledge emerged that HIV/AIDS was primarily afflicting the gay community, the 
association between homosexuality and disease only grew stronger.  
As news of the disease spread and the number of its victims climbed, a panic spread 
across the nation. For nearly three years, the source, cause, and method of transmission of the 
disease was unknown (AIDS.gov 2015), and so for three long years the public remained 
similarly uncertain of how to avoid transmission or potential contagions. However, what was 
known was that the disease was primarily affecting gay male and intravenous drug-using 
communities. Indeed, one of the early names for the disease was actually “gay-related immune 
deficiency,” or GRID. This bolstered fears of and prejudice toward the gay community (e.g., 
Herek 2002), and further acted as “proof” of the social, moral, and now physical threat 
supposedly posed by (homo)sexual deviance.38 Even as knowledge about HIV/AIDS grew, 
                                                
37 For a history of this time, see Shilts ([1987] 2007). See also Gould (2009) for a history of ACT UP, the 
LGBTQ community’s fight against AIDS, and the influence and use of emotions in this struggle. 
38 This is consistent with the more general pattern that disease outbreaks increase anxiety, prejudice 
toward outgroups, and support for restrictive and punitive policies (e.g., Albertson & Gadarian 2015). 
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many in the public continued to view the disease as a form of “divine punishment” intended 
specifically for the gay community and their “immoral sexual behavior,” as seen in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: 1987-2007 Pew Findings on American Beliefs that  
“AIDS Might Be God’s Punishment for Immoral Sexual Behavior” 
 
(Source: Pew 2007) 
 
By 2013, this belief had further declined to 14% of all Americans, though slightly 
higher (20-25%) among some religious denominations (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera 2014). 
However, even in 2014, 65% of Americans believe that people living with HIV or AIDS in the 
U.S. became “infected because of irresponsible personal behavior,” rather than through no 
fault of their own (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera 2014). By contrast, only 41% of Americans 
think that people with HIV or AIDS in developing countries contracted the disease through 
irresponsible behavior. Furthermore, “[t]here are few differences on this issue among 
Americans from different political, religious, racial backgrounds” (46). This disparity shows the 
lingering connotations in America of blaming HIV on an individual’s sexual behavior. 
From its outset, then, HIV/AIDS has been understood as a disease associated with the 
gay community. However, this occurred in a way that is relatively unique to disease affliction: 
few, if any, other diseases are as closely associated with and stigmatizing of the population they 
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primarily afflict.39 For example, breast cancer affects mainly women but generally does not 
result in prejudicial attitudes toward women, let alone widespread belief that women deserved 
cancer simply because they are women. In a closer analogy, even other sexually transmitted 
infections, though often stigmatizing, typically do not result in the loss of employment or 
housing. Rather, the preexisting understanding of homosexuality through a lens of disease, 
pathology, and disgust framed and dictated this response to HIV/AIDS. The public already viewed 
the gay community as disgusting, and American society had generally regarded homosexuality 
as some variant of a disease or condition for a century by this time. As a result, the connection 
between the gay community and this disease transformed quickly in the public’s mind to a 
specifically gay disease. This association with disgust also sheds light on the fact that the 
public and the government alike engaged in a committed pattern of avoidance – a behavior 
disgust is known to produce – of both the HIV epidemic and the community it was most 
affecting. Indeed, it was 1987 before President Reagan even used the word AIDS in public, by 
which point over 25,000 people had already died in the United States alone (amfAR.org 2016). 
In short, while homosexuality had historically been viewed as disgusting and in turns 
both a psychological and a social disease, HIV/AIDS reified this connection for the modern 
era, as a literal, physical, potentially fatal disease became primarily associated with the gay male 
community. These fears and associations with disease show the continued, powerful impact of 
disgust, and they also continue today in numerous forms, such as the Federal Drug 
Administration’s continued prohibitions on blood donations from gay men and the ongoing 
criminalization in many states of the sexual behavior of people with HIV (e.g., Hoppe 2014).40 
                                                
39 The CDC shows that, as recently as 2014, gay and bisexual men, particularly men of color, are the 
U.S. populations most affected by HIV (CDC.gov 2016). HIV/AIDS is also still a critically important 
issue and political priority for many in the LGBTQ community, though there are generational 
differences in prioritization (Egan & Sherrill 2005). 
40 Until December 2015, the Federal Drug Administration still banned men who have sex with men 
from donating blood. However, the current policy only allows men who have sex with men to donate 
blood if they have abstained from sex for at least one year. Additionally, transgender people are 
universally incorrectly coded according to the sex they were assigned at birth. The FDA believes 
(incorrectly) that this allows for the tracking of specific types of sex (i.e. penises having sex with other 
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4.4 Lessons From History/Looking Forward 
From the beginning of homosexuality, disgust has operated as an expression of 
dominant social norms and beliefs, exerting powerful influence over the very definitions and 
understandings of sexuality and gender non-conformity, as well as the experience of LGBTQ 
people in America. The conflation of sexual deviance with gender deviance illustrates the 
enmeshing of sexual orientation and gender identity, even prior to the modern terms of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. Sexology and early psychology established 
homosexuality and gender non-conformity as medical conditions or diseases. In the twentieth 
century, the development of capitalism and wage labor and its impact on the American family 
unit helped transform understandings of homosexuality from a medical, psychological disease, 
to a social and moral one. This also illustrates how homosexuality came to mean “anti-family” 
and to threaten the social and moral fabric of the United States in the modern era. Responses 
to HIV/AIDS in the 1980s were all but pre-determined, due to this century-old association 
between homosexuality, disease, and disgust. This history continues to structure responses to 
LGBTQ people and issues today. 
That disgust is a deeply embodied, individually experienced emotion also makes disgust 
reactions seem natural, inherently true, and less subject to questioning. Furthermore, when 
something is labeled a disease, this increases disgust and fear reactions (e.g., Herek 2002) due 
to disgust’s connection to self-protection and disease-avoidance behaviors. This connection to 
protecting the self helps explain why people who oppose gay rights often articulate a discourse 
of perceived harm (to marriage, to the family, to America, etc). If one believes that gay people 
are disgusting and to be avoided, then any move toward gay acceptance or rights means that 
                                                                                                                                                       
penises), as part of their ongoing fears of HIV/AIDS transmission (Cathleen Hipps, Director of 
Collections, American Red Cross, Great Lakes and Southeast Michigan Blood Services Region, in 
discussion with the author, May 2016). Both these practices contradict existing best practices in 
medicine, including the recommendations of the American Medical Association (AMA 2016). 
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avoidance is less likely and that the imagined harm is increasingly imminent. This is 
confirmed in recent work showing a direct link between disgust sensitivity and support for 
specifically (self) protectionist policies (Kam & Estes 2016). 
Importantly, the process of labeling acts or people as disgusting is mutually 
constitutive, in two ways. The first way is between the object and the observer: for example, the 
object of homosexuality (or the homosexual) was labeled a disease because observers perceived 
it to be disgusting, but this labeling only increased the perception that the homosexual was 
disgusting. The second way is between individuals and structures: individual-level feelings and 
experiences collect and manifest to a social and structural level. For example, as individual 
prejudices aggregate into public opinion, legislators then create policies that institutionalize 
these prejudices (e.g., sodomy laws). These structural, institutional expressions then reinforce 
and reinscribe individual level prejudices. In a more elegant explanation, Canaday (2009) 
shows how homosexuality played a critical role in the production of the modern American 
state, which also played a critical role in the production of sexuality:  
…Homosexuality went from a total nonentity to a commonly understood category in the 
same years that the federal government went from a fledgling to a full-service 
bureaucracy. That timing helps to explain why the American bureaucracy was so much 
more homophobic than its corollaries in western Europe, where bureaucracies reached 
their modern form well before sexologists began talking and writing about sexual 
perversion. Homosexuality was a novel concern in the years that the American 
bureaucracy took shape, and so it was etched deeply into federal institutions, giving us 
a state that not only structures but is itself structured by sexuality. (258)  
 
When the social level response is even further integrated into every sphere of society, such as 
medicine (i.e., the DSM) and citizenship (i.e., the family, the state; Brandzel 2005; Canaday 
2009; Valelly 2012), this facilitates the transmission of these beliefs and reactions from one 
generation to the next and from one sphere of life to another. In this way, disgust works both 
to label and reinforce existing social norms, in an ongoing cycle of emotional socialization and 
expression, and the mutual constitution of individual beliefs and American law and culture. 
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However, because disgust has historically structured policy making does not require 
that it continue to do so. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum offers an important counterpoint to 
Miller (1997), Kass (1997; 2002), and others who argue for the legitimacy of disgust as a basis 
for law making. She argues that because disgust is felt with such intensity and has such 
extreme effects on the body and mind, this is precisely why it cannot be trusted as a reliable 
indicator of where law ought to proceed (in sharp distinction to Miller and Kass, who argue 
this is exactly why it should be used for guiding law).  
I concur with Nussbaum that disgust is not a reliable indicator of where law ought to 
proceed, but I further argue that disgust is nonetheless a reliable indicator of the predominant 
or hegemonic values of a society. Disgust should not lead to laws that prohibit or restrict the 
perceived-to-be-disgusting act or person, but rather to an investigation of why this act or person 
is perceived as such. Given disgust’s basis in cultural values and the historical pattern of 
discriminating against that which we find disgusting, the only inherent truth-value disgust 
actually has is in telling us what is valued and what is dismissed by a society, and perhaps also 
what work lies ahead for dismantling prejudice. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Reading these diverse literatures together (e.g., psychology, feminist and queer theory, 
American political development), we see that disgust operates not just as a psychological 
phenomenon, but also as a cultural practice (Ahmed 2004), as a sociopolitical norm that is 
learned, reinforced, and embedded in cultures and institutions. Importantly, this recognition 
calls attention to the fact that disgust can also be unlearned.  
The roles of disgust, disease, and contamination in LGBTQ history are also integral to 
understanding the modern tensions facing the LGBTQ movement. These affective legacies 
continue to structure LGBTQ politics in America today, entrenching negative attitudes and 
making opinion change difficult. In the following chapters, I return to the individual level 
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analysis, as this is how political science generally begins to measure public opinion. I will 
show the continued existence of disgust in attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues (i.e., that 
disgust is not isolated to LGBTQ history, but rather continues today), as well as the differing 
impact of disgust on different subgroups of the LGBTQ community. 
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Chapter 4:  
Does LGBTQ Politics Trigger Disgust?41 
 
1. Introduction 
Emotions play a critical role in politics. Notable attention is paid to the impact on 
politics of anger (Banks & Valentino 2012; Valentino et al 2011), anxiety (Albertson & 
Gadarian 2015; Huddy et al 2005; Valentino et al 2008), fear (Brader 2005; Lerner et al 2003), 
and more. Less such attention, at least in political science, is paid to disgust (for notable 
exceptions see Clifford & Wendell 2016; Hancock 2004; Kam & Estes 2016). 
Existing research generally finds that feeling disgusted leads to harsher moral 
judgments, heightened prejudice toward out groups, and aversive or avoidant behaviors 
(Cunningham et al 2013; Dasgupta et al 2009; Inbar et al 2009; Olatunji 2008; Smith et al 
2011; Terrizzi et al 2010). These studies, particularly in psychology, largely focus on inducing 
disgust among participants using nonpolitical primes, such as a bad smell or dirty 
environment, and then asking about political opinions. The disgust elicited in these scenarios 
is referred to as an incidental emotion, because the emotion is not caused by or related to the 
topic of interest (in these studies, political opinions). Rather, the emotion was caused by 
something unrelated, such as the bad smell or dirty environment. Much of the research on 
disgust’s impact on LGBTQ attitudes shares this approach, showing that inducing disgust leads 
                                                
41 Thank you to Richard Anderson, Jenn Chudy, Hakeem Jefferson, and Trevor Johnston for their 
guidance on various drafts of this chapter. 
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to less support for policies like gay marriage and lower expressions of warmth toward LGBTQ 
people.  
In this chapter, I present a different approach with more immediate political 
implications. I use fictional news stories about an LGBTQ policy to examine whether these 
simple stories alone can elicit disgust – without any other potential prime. Given the 
arguments I presented in the previous chapter, namely that disgust is intimately connected to 
sex, sexuality, and bodies, I expect that LGBTQ political issues are likely to directly elicit 
disgust, without any primes, bad smells, or dirty environments – that disgust in the LGBTQ 
context is not incidental, but rather integral: directly related to and caused by the topic itself. 
Put another way, while existing literature shows the impact of disgust as an independent 
variable on LGBTQ-related attitudes, in this chapter I examine disgust as an outcome elicited 
directly by LGBTQ political issues. Existing literature reveals the significant impact of disgust 
on political attitudes, policy preferences, and behaviors. If simply reading or thinking about an 
LGBTQ political issue is sufficient to cause or elicit disgust, then these established 
consequences for opinion, persuasion, and behavior are more likely to occur any time an 
LGBTQ political issue is considered.  
 
2. Literature 
2.1 Emotions & Group Attitudes 
Feelings and emotions toward others are an everyday part of life. Many emotional 
reactions to others are not strictly about them as individuals, but also as responses to the 
groups those individuals are perceived to belong to, such as racial, gender, or economic groups 
(e.g. Tajfel & Turner 1979).42 These emotional responses are particularly important in 
structuring beliefs and motivating behaviors, including in the political realm. For example, if a 
                                                
42 The individual’s own group membership(s) and that membership’s relative importance also shape 
these emotional reactions to others (e.g., Jardina 2014; Mackie & Smith 2014; Tajfel & Turner 1979). 
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person likes or feels warmly toward a particular group, she is more likely to support a policy 
that benefits members of that group; if she dislikes the group, then she is more likely to 
oppose such a policy (Conover 1988; Feldman & Huddy 2005; Nelson & Kinder 1996; Small & 
Lerner 2008).  
However, different groups elicit different emotions. Whites, for example, may feel 
anger (Banks & Valentino 2012), resentment (Kinder & Sanders 1996), or sympathy (Chudy 
2016) toward blacks, compared to anxiety about Latinos or perceived immigrants (Brader et al 
2008; Valentino et al 2013). Many people feel resentment toward the rich and sympathy toward 
the poor (Piston 2014), though Hancock (2004) illustrates the disgust felt toward welfare 
recipients. These distinctions are important because these specific emotions motivate different 
behaviors and political outcomes. If a person feels anger, she is more likely to support punitive 
policies, while fear increases support for precautionary ones (Lerner et al 2003). Valentino et al 
(2008) find that anxiety can increase information seeking, while anger can deter it. Positive 
emotions like enthusiasm can stimulate participation and likelihood to vote (Brader 2005). 
Little work, however, has focused on the specific emotions elicited by LGBTQ people. 
 
2.2 Emotions & LGBTQ Attitudes 
The earliest LGBTQ work in political science discussed heterosexuals’ attitudes toward 
homosexuals as a group and homosexuality more generally, often by reporting basic polling 
data without analysis of related emotional reactions to lesbian and gay people (e.g., DeBoer 
1978).43 Contemporaneous work in psychology illustrated significant relationships between 
negative attitudes toward homosexuality and endorsement of other attitudes such as 
authoritarianism, sexual conservatism, or gender stereotypes (Dunbar et al 1973; MacDonald & 
Games 1974), but again without related emotional investigation.  
                                                
43 These types of poll or trend reporting still occur in recent literature (e.g., Schafer & Shaw 2009; Yang 
1997), while others both report and analyze trends (e.g., Andersen & Fetner 2008; Baunach 2012).  
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Common in these early articles were presentations of the remarkably hostile attitudes 
toward homosexuality, LGB people (transgender people would not be considered for many 
years to come), or even remotely gay-friendly policies. There was rarely discussion of the 
emotions underlying these beliefs or policy positions. De Boer (1978), for example, drew from 
U.S. and European polling about beliefs regarding LGB civil rights and families: more than 
75% of Americans believed that homosexual men should not be allowed to work as judges, 
teachers, or ministers, while 77% believed that homosexuals should never be allowed to adopt 
children. But there were no polling questions or discussion of the emotional components 
surrounding these attitudes. Studies in the 1980s developed scales of heterosexuals’ attitudes 
toward LGB people (e.g., Larsen et al 1980; Kite & Deaux 1986), but they too continued to 
focus more on the influence of other belief structures, such as authoritarianism or religion, 
rather than emotional substrates.  
However, Herek’s (1984; 1988) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gays (ATLG) Scale 
explicitly introduced emotional components – namely disgust – and also distinguished between 
lesbians and gay men, rather than referring to homosexuality or homosexuals in general. 
Notably, Herek showed that attitudes toward gay women were typically warmer than toward 
gay men, a pattern that persists today (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010; Herek 2002; Massey 
2009). Indeed, Herek’s contribution is one of the formative contributions to the field of public 
opinion on LGBTQ people and issues: many modern measurements of attitudes toward 
LGBTQ people include questions from or are based on Herek’s ATLG scale. Herek describes 
the variety of contexts beyond the United States where his scale has been adapted for use and 
remains a powerful tool for researchers: 
The ATLG was developed for administration to English-speaking adult heterosexuals in 
the United States. It has also been used in research conducted in England (Hegarty, 
2002) and Canada (Mohipp & Morry, 2004), and translated versions have been 
administered in the Netherlands (Meerendonk, Eisinga, & Felling, 2003), Singapore 
(Detenber et al., 2007), Brazil (DeSouza, Solberg, & Elder, 2007), Chile (Cardenas & 
Barrientos, 2008; Nierman, Thompson, Bryan, & Mahaffey, 2007), and Turkey (Gelbal 
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& Duyan, 2006). In addition, a Spanish-language version was created for a study of 
California adults of Mexican descent (Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera, 2006). [Herek 2016] 
 
The far-reaching utility of Herek’s measure demonstrates the importance of capturing both 
emotional responses and policy beliefs, as well as the intersections of attitudes toward sexuality 
and gender. 
Despite this success and utility, Herek’s scale is rarely used in political science 
scholarship on attitudes toward LGBTQ people (save for Herek himself (2002)). Political 
science literature generally does not employ such attitude scales when considering 
heterosexuals’ opinions of gay or transgender people. Some scholars employ a single or several 
questions about homosexuality (e.g., Andersen & Fetner 2008; Doan & Haider-Markel 2010; 
Lewis 2003), but which specific questions and how many are used vary from scholar to scholar. 
Many simply report LGBTQ-related policy preferences as a proxy for attitudes toward LGBTQ 
people (e.g., Lewis 2003), which assumes a reasoning or motivation beyond what the data 
necessarily reveals. 
In political science, there are currently few examinations of emotional components of 
attitudes toward LGBTQ people. The most commonly used affective measure is a simple 
feeling thermometer, which researchers generally use to make arguments such as, 
“…individuals’ affect toward gays and lesbians has a highly positive and significant effect on 
attitudes toward same-sex marriage” (Gaines & Garand 2010, 560). Other work confirms this 
overall finding, that people who offer warmer ratings of gays and lesbians as a group tend to be 
more supportive of gay and lesbian rights (e.g., Barth & Overby 2003; Brewer 2003a). 
However, the feeling thermometer is a blunt measure, as it cannot distinguish between 
discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, hope, fear, and so on. And again, these distinctions 
are important because these specific emotions motivate different behaviors and political 
outcomes. Indeed, Cottrell et al (2010) show that, across multiple policy areas (i.e., 
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immigration, terrorism, disaster relief, LGBTQ rights), specific emotions were more predictive 
of policy attitudes than was general prejudice or affect alone.  
 
2.3 Disgust & LGBTQ Attitudes 
Reflecting on social science scholarship on homophobia, Herek (2004, 10) argues that 
that disgust is “central to heterosexuals’ negative emotional responses to homosexuality.” As 
argued in the previous chapter, disgust has played an important role in attitudes toward 
LGBTQ people and related policies in American history. These disgust reactions to LGBTQ 
people persist today (Cottrell & Neuberg 2005), especially in intimate or sexual contexts 
(Bishop 2015; Doan et al 2014; Mosher & O’Grady 1979). 
Though political science has thus far examined discrete emotional responses to LGBTQ 
people and policies in a limited way, scholars in psychology have more thoroughly explored 
the influence of emotion on LGBTQ-related attitudes. Given the focus of this project on 
disgust, I discuss here only the literature relevant to disgust’s impact on political attitudes, 
especially in an LGBTQ context.  
Existing literature generally examines disgust’s influence in at least one of three ways. 
One standard psychological measure of disgust is the “DS-R,” or the Disgust Sensitivity-
Revised scale (Haidt et al 1994). This is a 25-item questionnaire of self-reported responses to, 
or ratings of, the disgustingness of hypothetical scenarios, and it measures an individual’s 
overall sensitivity to disgust. Note that this is not the same as actually being disgusted; rather, 
this sensitivity measure captures an individual’s propensity toward being disgusted. It shows 
that some individuals are more or less susceptible or likely to feel disgust, given a potentially 
disgusting scenario. A more recently developed measure, the Three Domain Disgust Scale 
(TDDS) (Tybur et al 2009; Olatunji et al 2012), also examines disgust sensitivity and 
additionally refines the general sensitivity assessment into three categories of potential disgust 
elicitors. Finally, many studies actually induce disgust among participants using a foul odor, 
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graphic imagery, by asking the participant to reflect on a time they felt disgust, or conducting 
the study in an unclean environment (see Landy & Goodwin 2015 for a review). Using the DS-
R, TDDS, or inducing disgust, scholars have illustrated a strong connection between disgust, 
moral judgments, prejudice and attitudes about out groups (including LGBTQ people), policy 
preferences, and behaviors.  
This literature shows that, generally, people who feel disgusted or are more easily 
disgusted make harsher moral judgments (Cameron et al 2013; Eskine et al 2011; Horberg et al 
2009; Schnall et al 2008; though for exceptions see David & Olatunji 2011; Landy & Goodwin 
2015). Feeling disgust also leads people to express more negative or prejudicial attitudes toward 
out groups (Faulkner et al 2004; Hodson & Costello 2007; Inbar et al 2009; Naverette et al 
2006). These effects extend to heightened prejudice toward LGBTQ people specifically 
(Cunningham et al 2013; Dasgupta et al 2009; Inbar et al 2012; Inbar et al 2009; Olatunji 
2008; Terrizzi et al 2010).  
Additionally, disgust has significant impacts on political ideology, policy preferences, 
and politically relevant behaviors. Generally, disgust sensitivity is also shown to correspond to 
heightened conservatism (for a review, see Terrizzi et al 2013) and even conservative vote 
choice (Inbar et al 2012). More specifically, disgust plays an important role in what Clifford 
and Wendell (2016) term “purity attitudes,” or new and emerging issues related to food and 
public health for which there are no clear partisan cues. They find that disgust sensitivity 
predicts support for organic foods, required labeling of genetically modified foods, and 
endorsement of anti-vaccination beliefs. Kam and Estes (2016) find that disgust is “distinct 
from simple out-group hostility,” and predicts support for policies perceived to “protect citizens 
from physical, moral, or imaginary contamination,” such as food regulation and immigration 
restrictions. The impact of disgust on immigration policy preferences has also been thoroughly 
explored, showing that disgust sensitivity predicts stricter immigration preferences if not 
outright prohibitions (Brenner & Inbar 2014; Faulkner et al 2004; though for exception see 
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Inbar et al 2009). In the LGBTQ context, Cottrell and colleagues (2010) found that disgust, but 
not anger or fear, predicted attitudes toward gay rights. This is a repeated finding throughout 
this literature, that disgust toward gays and lesbians corresponds with decreased support for 
issues like gay marriage (Balzer & Jacobs 2011; Cunningham et al 2013; Dasgupta et al 2009; 
Inbar et al 2009; Olatunji 2008; Smith et al 2011; Terrizzi et al 2010).  
Additionally, disgust influences politically relevant behaviors. Disgust compels 
individuals to withdraw, avoid, or distance themselves from an offending stimulus, as a 
method of protection from perceived contamination or harm (Haidt 2003; Mackie et al 2000; 
Rozin et al 2000). In the political context, this means that feeling disgust leads to avoidance of 
contact with gays and lesbians, especially among conservatives (Terrizzi et al 2010). This is 
relevant because of the LGBTQ movement’s reliance on contact as a central persuasive strategy 
(Stone 2012): if the LGBTQ movement seeks to improve attitudes toward LGBTQ people by 
making contact with unsupportive individuals, but these individuals prefer to avoid contact 
due to disgust-related reactions, this will severely limit the usefulness of this strategy moving 
forward. This is especially important given that conservatives make up the significant majority 
of those who remain opposed to gay marriage and other LGBTQ issues (Jones et al 2014; 
McCarthy 2014), but also have been shown to be more easily disgusted than liberals on average 
(Inbar et al 2009). 
 
2.4 My Contribution 
This chapter is distinct from and contributes to the existing literature in two ways. 
First, I examine integral disgust – that is, whether LGBTQ topics can directly trigger disgust, 
rather than triggering disgust in another way – and its impact on LGBTQ-related policy 
support. Second, I examine the interaction of disgust with different LGBTQ-related policy 
issues. 
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The difference between incidental and integral emotions (e.g. Schwarz 2012) is 
important. Incidental emotions refer to those that an individual may be feeling at a particular 
time, but are unrelated to the present moment. Integral emotions, however, are caused by the 
immediate situation or object at hand. As discussed above, existing literature illustrates a 
strong connection between incidental disgust and opinions toward LGBTQ people and issues: 
researchers induce disgust amongst participants using sensory experiences (a foul odor, 
grotesque images, or other (non-political) elicitors), and then ask participants about LGBTQ 
issues. They show that upon feeling a non-politically-induced disgust reaction, individuals are 
more likely to express conservative political preferences, make harsher moral judgments, and 
express heightened degrees of prejudice toward others. However, I argue that the connection 
between disgust and LGBTQ politics is integral: given disgust’s intimate connection to bodies, 
sex, and sexuality, as discussed in the previous chapter, I expect that the mere policy issues 
themselves can elicit disgust. In other words, while existing literature often considers disgust 
as an influence on LGBTQ-related political attitudes, I argue that LGBTQ political issues are 
also a cause of disgust. 
This distinction is important because it concerns the scope of the influence of disgust. 
The former work considers the implications of experiencing disgust, without commenting on 
how widespread or common this may be. My work considers the actual cause of disgust, as well 
as for whom and for how many people LGBTQ-related disgust matters. If the very subject of 
gay people or politics causes disgust, this intensifies the emotion’s potential consequences for 
public opinion, policy formation, and persuasion.  
Given that previous literature has established the influence of incidental disgust, I 
focus my design on integral disgust. Other work has shown that merely thinking or reading 
about elicitors can produce disgust (e.g., Jones & Fitness 2008; Royzman et al 2008). 
Therefore, I use fictional news stories about an LGBTQ policy to examine whether these 
simple stories alone can elicit disgust – without any other potential prime. Additionally, 
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recalling the previous chapter’s argument that emotional responses will interact with policy 
content to produce unique reactions, I vary the specific policy issue presented to respondents in 
the following experiment. Based on the above literature, I hypothesize the following.  
(1) LGBTQ-related news stories will elicit disgust. 
(2) Disgust will decrease support for LGBTQ policy issues. 
(3) These effects will vary across different LGBTQ policy issues.  
 
3. Methods 
To examine these hypotheses, I conducted an original survey experiment using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This experiment was designed to simulate a routine experience – 
reading a news story online – that might lead an individual to think briefly about LGBTQ 
people or issues. I designed an intentionally low-information and low-threat presentation to 
provide a difficult test for the central hypothesis: does LGBTQ politics itself elicit disgust? Can 
disgust be elicited by even the mere mention of an LGBTQ-related policy? 
 
3.1 Design  
The survey was hosted on Qualtrics and subjects were recruited via MTurk. The survey 
was described as “a short survey about news stories and memory.” At intake, subjects were 
informed that the study concerned “people’s memory about certain policies in American 
politics today.” These references to memory were used to encourage attention to the survey and 
the news story in particular. After giving their informed consent to participate in the study, 
subjects answered a brief pre-treatment consisting of age, party identification, and ideology. 
They were then randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions. 
All conditions contained a short fictional news story about an unnamed state’s 
legislature considering a proposed bill. All stories were intentionally written as generically as 
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possible, providing little information beyond identifying the issue.44 They were also written as 
non-threateningly as possible, to elicit responses only to the issue itself, separate from potential 
threat. Overall, the stories were sparsely descriptive of the bill’s content, offered only a vague 
timeline for a potential vote, and did not describe any likely success or failure or the bill. 
Subjects were required to view the news story for at least fifteen seconds before advancing, 
again to encourage attention to the treatment.  
The control condition described a proposed bill prohibiting texting-while-driving. I use 
this non-LGBTQ political issue to differentiate between disgust toward LGBTQ politics 
specifically and toward politics generally. The bills in the treatment conditions discussed one of 
the following LGBTQ-related policies: employment nondiscrimination, same-sex marriage, 
same-sex adoption, and transgender healthcare. All were framed as pro-LGBTQ bills. The text 
of each story is included in the appendix, with the full text of the gay marriage condition 
shown in Figure 4.1 as an example. 
Figure 4.1: Gay Marriage Treatment Story 
 
3.2 Measures 
In the post-treatment battery, subjects were asked about their emotional responses to 
the issue in the news article, their feelings toward a variety of social and political groups, 
opinions on LGBTQ-related policy issues, and finally a series of demographic questions.  
                                                
44 The average length was 116 words. The precise text of each is included in the appendix. 
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Following the news story, respondents were prompted: “Now we would like to ask you 
about some of the feelings you may have about the issue in the article you just read. The 
following questions will ask you how the issue in the article makes you feel.” They were then 
asked to self-report their reactions across a range of negative emotions. The emotions were 
presented in alphabetical order to all participants. For each emotion, a respondent could 
choose: “not ___ at all,” “a little ___ ,” “somewhat ___,” “very ___,” or “extremely ___.”45 
I asked about multiple negative emotions in order to distinguish between disgust and 
other potential negative reactions, such as anger and anxiety. To account for the possibility 
that respondents used different language or labels for their emotions, I also asked about three 
related terms for anger (angry, furious, irritated), anxiety (anxious, fearful, worried), and 
disgust (disgusted, revolted, sick). This resulted in nine questions relating to negative 
emotions.46 In what follows, I present results using both the single self-report of “disgusted,” as 
well as a “disgust index” that combines the responses of the three disgust-related terms. The 
choice between the self-report and the index does not affect the main findings, but I present 
models using both methods for transparency. 
Respondents in each condition were also asked to evaluate all LGBTQ-related policies 
used in the study: employment nondiscrimination, gay marriage, gay adoption, and transgender 
healthcare. Moreover, I asked the employment nondiscrimination policy question twice: once 
about protections for LGB people only, and once about protections for transgender people only. 
For each policy question, response options ranged from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” 
 
                                                
45 Following Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000), the questions used to gauge emotional reactions 
were unipolar rather than bipolar: that is, subjects were asked to report their experience of each 
emotion individually (“How happy does that make you feel?”), rather than of one emotion relative to 
another (“Does that make you feel happy, sad, or neither?”). Marcus and colleagues argue that unipolar 
response options are preferable because otherwise subjects are forced to collapse multiple emotional 
responses into a single, overly simplistic answer (162). 
46 Respondents were also asked about six positive emotions: happy, hopeful, optimistic, overjoyed, 
proud, and sympathetic. Due to this project’s focus on disgust and negative attitudes, I will not report 
on these positive emotions here. This is an area for future research. 
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3.3 Sample  
Participants in this study were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an 
online labor market that is increasingly popular for data collection in academic research. 
MTurk samples have been shown to be more representative and diverse than the typical 
undergraduate convenience sample (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz 2012; Krupnikov & Levine 
2014). MTurk workers are still generally younger, more educated, and more liberal than the 
general population (Levay et al 2016; Paolacci & Chandler 2014). However, given that each of 
these demographics are more supportive of LGBTQ people and issues (e.g., Barth & Parry 
2009), it is less likely that MTurk workers will demonstrate the negative attitudes or emotions 
at the center of this project. In other words, using MTurk provides a more difficult test for 
these hypotheses. Can disgust toward LGBTQ people be elicited even among such a supportive 
sample? If disgust can be elicited under these difficult conditions and in the context of an 
inconsequential, anonymous online survey, then the implications of disgust for the higher-
stakes context of modern politics and a less-LGBTQ friendly population are significant. 
The survey ran August 26-27, 2014 (prior to the Supreme Court’s decision legalizing 
gay marriage in 2015). Subjects were offered $0.50 for their participation. Average completion 
time was approximately nine minutes. Of the 1,028 who took the survey, 23 requested to have 
their data removed from the study. The following results are based on the remaining 1,005 
participants. Participants represented 47 states and the pool was approximately 59% male, 76% 
non-Hispanic white, and 55% non-religious (agnostic, atheist, “nothing in particular”).47 The 
median income category was $25,000-$34,999, and nearly 58% had an associate’s degree or 
higher. Roughly 60% of participants identified as Democrats, 23% as Republicans, and 17% as 
independents. Ideologically, 56% identified as liberal, and 22% each as independent or 
conservative. 
                                                
47 South Dakota, Wyoming, and Alaska were unrepresented. 
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Approximately 59% of subjects reported knowing someone who is gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual, while only 9% reported knowing anyone who identifies as transgender. These self-
reports are roughly consistent with recent, nationally representative data from the Public 
Religion Research Institute, which found that 65% of Americans have a close friend or family 
member who is LGB, but only 9% have a transgender friend or family member (Jones et al 
2014). To the extent that contact mediates attitudes toward LGBTQ people, the 
representativeness of this sample on this particular dimension is helpful for drawing 
conclusions about broader populations. 
 
4. Analysis 
The findings reveal that (1) some LGBTQ news stories elicit disgust; (2) individuals 
who are disgusted are much less supportive of LGBTQ policy issues; and (3) these effects vary 
by policy issue. I also find that Republicans report more disgust than Democrats, and that 
disgusted Republicans experience larger drops in support for LGBTQ policies than do 
disgusted Democrats. 
 
4.1 Eliciting Disgust 
Table 4.1 reports the percent of respondents in each condition who reported any level of 
disgust in response to the news story they read. In the control condition, approximately 19% of 
subjects reported any level of disgust (that is, responded “a little disgusted,” “somewhat 
disgusted,” “very disgusted,” or “extremely disgusted;” excluding those who answered “not 
disgusted at all”). The nondiscrimination and adoption conditions elicited similar and even 
slightly lower reports. However, over 25% of respondents in the gay marriage condition, and 
33.5% of respondents in the transgender healthcare condition, reported disgust. This provides 
some (mixed) evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, that stories about LGBTQ policies elicit 
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disgust more disgust than non-LGBTQ policies. It also suggests that disgust varies by policy 
issue (i.e., Hypothesis 3). 
Table 4.1: Disgust Report by Condition 
Condition % Reporting Any Disgust 
Control (Texting & Driving) 19.0% 
Nondiscrimination 18.9% 
Gay marriage 25.4% 
Gay adoption 17.4% 
Transgender healthcare 33.5% 
 
In Table 4.2, I account for relevant demographic influences on disgust and LGBTQ-
related attitudes. Women tend to be more supportive than men of both LGBTQ people (Herek 
2002) and LGBTQ policies (Brewer 2003), and are also more disgust sensitive on average 
(Balzer & Jacobs 2011). The Religious Right has historically opposed the gay movement and 
LGBTQ-friendly policies (Bull & Gallagher 1996). Bramlett (2012) shows that the influence of 
religion on LGBTQ-related attitudes varies by one’s denomination. Contact with LGBTQ 
people tends to increase support for LGBTQ policies (e.g. Barth et al 2009; Flores 2015), 
though not universally (Skipworth et al 2010).  
In Table 4.2, I use both a logit model and an ordinary least squares regression model to 
examine whether LGBTQ news stories elicit disgust among respondents, controlling for 
relevant demographic factors. The logit analysis (Model 1) examines reporting disgust as a 
binary outcome (reporting no disgust or any level of disgust at all). The ordinary least squares 
regression (Model 2) examines reporting disgust along its full range of variance: not disgusted 
at all, a little disgusted, somewhat disgusted, very disgusted, or extremely disgusted.  
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Table 4.2: Treatment Effects on Reporting Disgust 
 
Variable 
Model 1 
Logit (0/1) 
Model 2 
Ordinary Least 
Squares Regression 
All LGBT 
Treatments 
0.367* 
(0.22) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
Republican 
 
1.069*** 
(.19) 
0.126*** 
(0.02) 
White -0.245 
(.26) 
-0.004 
(.02) 
Black -0.281 
(.37) 
0.001 
(.03) 
Latino -0.201 
(.37) 
-0.004 
(.03) 
Female -0.419** 
(.18) 
-0.018 
(.01) 
Age 0.188 
(.35) 
0.020 
(.03) 
Education -0.523 
(.36) 
-0.043 
(.03) 
Non-Religious -0.720*** 
(.19) 
-0.058*** 
(.02) 
Born Again 0.907*** 
(.24) 
0.118*** 
(.02) 
LGB Contact -0.455*** 
(.17) 
-0.044*** 
(.01) 
   
Constant -0.837** 
(0.38) 
0.127*** 
(0.03) 
   
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.139 
(Pseudo) 
0.182 
0.173 
N 974 974 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
Table 4.2 shows a slight but statistically significant impact of LGBTQ stories on overall 
reporting of disgust (Model 1), but not on the mean score of disgust (Model 2): in the logit 
model only, respondents in the LGBTQ conditions were more likely to report disgust than 
respondents in the control condition. These results were overshadowed by the influence of 
partisanship, contact with LGB people, and religious (non)affiliation – but they demonstrate 
that even the weak stimulus of a generic news story about an LGBTQ policy still is enough to 
elicit disgust. 
 
 
 
 
77 
Figure 4.2 examines the possibility that other negative emotions are also elicited by 
these stories, or by LGBTQ politics in general. The figure shows the extent to which LGBTQ 
stories elicit each negative emotion about which respondents were asked. The categories are 
sorted by size and direction: the further to the right, the larger the increase in reporting of 
that emotion. 
Figure 4.2: Percent Change in Mean Scores of Negative Emotions 
Reported in LGBT Conditions Compared to Control 
 
The figure shows that, compared to reading a story about texting while driving, reading an 
LGBTQ-related news story increased average reports of disgust by 26.2%, revulsion by 31.5%, 
and sickness by 54.5%. These were by far the largest increases, and they are statistically 
significant differences.48 
                                                
48 I replicated this analysis for each individual LGBTQ condition, rather than combining those 
conditions as in Figure 2. In every case, while the particular order of the negative emotions may 
slightly vary, the three disgust-related terms are consistently the furthest to the right: disgust, revulsion, 
and sickness are the largest increases in every condition. This suggests that disgust is the primary 
negative emotion being elicited by these LGBTQ news stories. 
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4.2 Policy Impact 
Recall that participants read a news story, reported their emotional responses, and then 
were asked about their support for various LGBTQ policies. While Table 4.1 shows disgust in 
response to the news story, Table 4.3 shows the difference in support for LGBTQ policies 
between those who were disgusted and not disgusted.49 
Table 4.3: Differences in Support for LGBTQ Policies 
Among Disgusted and Non-Disgusted Respondents 
Policy  % of Respondents Who Supported Policy Difference Not Disgusted Disgusted 
LGB nondiscrimination 96% 73% -23% 
Transgender nondiscrimination 95% 66% -29% 
Gay marriage 93% 52% -41% 
Gay adoption 92.5% 50% -42.5% 
Transgender healthcare 74% 31% -43% 
Average 90.1% 54.5% -35.6% 
 
For respondents who said they were “not disgusted at all” by their respective news 
story, most supported each policy. Respondents who felt disgusted were less likely to support 
each policy, with only 50% supporting gay adoption and less than a third supporting 
transgender healthcare. Indeed, there is a 23–43 percentage point difference in policy support 
between respondents who were disgusted and those who were not, with an average difference 
of about 35.6 percentage points. This provides initial evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, that 
those who are disgusted will be less supportive of LGBTQ policies. We also see evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 3, that disgust’s influence will vary by policy: the smallest difference 
here is for nondiscrimination, and the largest difference is for transgender healthcare. 
Turning again to other potential demographic influences, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show 
further evidence supporting Hypothesis 2, that disgust decreases support for LGBTQ-related 
policies. Table 4.4 shows the results of a linear regression analysis examining disgust and other 
                                                
49 Support includes those who said they strongly support or somewhat support the policy. I excluded 
those who said they neither support nor oppose the policy, and I also excluded these neutral 
respondents from the denominator. The numbers should be interpreted as, for example: of all 
respondents who both took a position on gay adoption and said they were not disgusted at all, 92.5% 
supported adoption. Of those who both took a position on this policy and said they were disgusted to 
any degree, only 50% supported it. 
 
 
 
 
79 
influences on support for LGBTQ policies. In these models, all variables are scaled zero to one 
to improve comparability.50 Model 1 considers all respondents, and Models 2 and 3 consider 
Democrats or Republicans only, respectively. Table 4.5 shows the same models, but uses an 
additional robustness test to show that the findings are not an artifact of a single word choice: 
I combine the responses of “disgusted,” “revolted,” and “sick” into a disgust index (Table 4.5), 
rather than using the single self-report alone. The findings using the disgust index are 
comparable to, and sometimes even stronger than, using only the single self-report. 
                                                
50 “White” is a binary variable, marking white respondents (~74%). “Female” marking female-identified 
participants (~41%). “Age” contains the same age groups used in the survey instrument: 18-24, 25-29, 
30-39, 40-49, 50-64, and 65 or over. Zero represents the youngest age group, and one represents the 
highest age group. “Education” reflects these levels: some high school, no diploma; high school 
graduate or equivalent (GED); some college, no degree; associate’s degree; bachelor’s degree; some 
graduate school, no graduate degree; some advanced degree (Master’s, professional, or doctorate). Zero 
means “some high school, no diploma,” while one means “some advanced degree.” “Born again” is a 
binary variable, marking the respondents who identified as born again (~13%). “LGB contact” is a 
binary variable, marking respondents who reported that they knew an LGB person (~59%). 
 
 
 
 
80 
Table 4.4: Disgust’s Influence on Support for LGBTQ Policies (“LGBTQ Index”) 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust -0.432*** 
(0.03) 
-0.350*** 
(0.04) 
-0.393*** 
(0.05) 
White 0.024 
(0.02) 
0.045** 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
Black -0.002 
(.03) 
0.012 
(.03) 
-0.064 
(.11) 
Latino -0.017 
(.03) 
-0.001 
(.02) 
-0.108 
(.08) 
Female 0.052*** 
(0.01) 
0.043*** 
(0.01) 
0.072** 
(0.03) 
Age -0.148*** 
(0.03) 
-0.084*** 
(0.03) 
-0.251*** 
(0.06) 
Education 0.082*** 
(0.03) 
0.069** 
(0.03) 
0.113* 
(0.06) 
Non-Religious 0.064*** 
(.01) 
0.050*** 
(.01) 
0.025 
(.04) 
Born Again -0.160*** 
(0.02) 
-0.187*** 
(0.03) 
-0.054 
(0.04) 
LGB Contact 0.094*** 
(0.01) 
0.082*** 
(0.01) 
0.091*** 
(0.03) 
    
Constant .694*** 
(0.03) 
0.730*** 
(0.03) 
0.592*** 
(0.08) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.420 
0.414 
0.317 
0.305 
0.430 
0.403 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
In every model of Table 4.4, self-reported disgust is a statistically significant influence 
on LGBTQ-related policy preferences, with a large and negative coefficient indicating that 
experiencing disgust decreases support for LGBTQ policy preferences. Consistent with existing 
literature, the influence of gender, education, age, religion, and having contact with LGB 
people were also significant influences on support for LGBTQ policies. Women, respondents 
with more education, and respondents who reported having contact with LGBs were more 
supportive, while older respondents were less supportive. White respondents were slightly 
more supportive, but this effect drops out for Republicans, as there were very few non-white 
Republicans (n=33) in this sample. The effects of (non)religious affiliation also drops out for 
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Republicans. However, these effects are all considerably smaller than disgust. Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that the effect of disgust is as large as it is after accounting for these alternative 
explanations. 
Table 4.5 shows the same analysis, this time using the disgust index. In Table 4.4, 
“Disgust” is measured using the single question self-report only, and is scaled zero to one. Zero 
reflects no disgust, while one reflects the highest level of reported disgust (“extremely 
disgusted”). In Table 4.5, “Disgust Index” combines the reports of “disgusted,” “revolted,” and 
“sick.” A score of zero therefore means a respondent answered that they were not disgusted, 
revolted, or sick at all. A score of one means they selected “extremely” for all three emotions. 
This produces more variation within the measure, and acts as an additional test that the 
findings are not an artifact of word choice. 
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Table 4.5: Disgust Index’s Influence on Support for LGBTQ Policies (“LGBTQ Index”) 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust Index -0.546*** 
(0.04) 
-0.512*** 
(0.06) 
-0.460*** 
(0.05) 
White 0.022 
(0.02) 
0.048** 
(0.02) 
-0.023 
(0.06) 
Black -0.001 
(.03) 
0.021 
(.02) 
-0.108 
(.11) 
Latino -0.021 
(.03) 
-0.0003 
(.03) 
-0.128 
(.08) 
Female 0.052*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.073** 
(0.03) 
Age -0.142*** 
(0.03) 
-0.085*** 
(0.03) 
-0.249*** 
(0.06) 
Education 0.082*** 
(0.03) 
0.071*** 
(0.03) 
0.117* 
(0.06) 
Non-Religious 0.063*** 
(.01) 
0.047*** 
(.01) 
0.024 
(.04) 
Born Again -0.150*** 
(0.02) 
-0.171*** 
(0.03) 
-0.059* 
(0.04) 
LGB Contact 0.087*** 
(0.01) 
0.078*** 
(0.01) 
0.078*** 
(0.03) 
    
Constant .697*** 
(0.03) 
0.731*** 
(0.03) 
0.619*** 
(0.08) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.432 
0.426 
0.340 
0.328 
0.431 
0.405 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
In the appendix, I replicated these analyses for each individual LGBTQ policy, rather 
than combining them into a policy index as in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The patterns remained 
consistent across all specifications: for each policy, the effect of disgust (or the disgust index) 
remained the largest magnitude and statistically significant, even when controlling for other 
influences. Again, while demographic variables remain significant across models, the effect of 
disgust remains the largest and persists across parties.  
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4.3 Partisan Differences 
One finding that emerged were noticeable partisan differences in reporting disgust, as 
well as the impact of that disgust on LGBTQ policy support. 
Table 4.6: Differences Between Partisans in Reported Disgust 
(Respondents From LGBTQ Conditions Only) 
Degree of Disgust Democrats Republicans 
Not at all 85.8% 49.7% 
A little 8.0% 18.6% 
Somewhat 4.5% 14.8% 
Very 1.4% 7.1% 
Extremely 0.2% 9.8% 
 
Table 4.6 uses only respondents from LGBTQ conditions to distinguish disgust that is 
specifically related to LGBTQ policies, rather than disgust elicited from the control story. 
Nearly 86% of Democrats reported that they were “not disgusted at all” after reading a news 
story about an LGBTQ policy. Barely 50% of Republicans reported this. Just over 50% of 
Republicans reported some degree of disgust after reading an LGBTQ news story, compared to 
only 24.3% of Republicans in the control condition. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 further examine whether there are partisan differences in drops in 
support for LGBTQ policies. Figure 4.3 shows the decrease in support for LGBTQ policies 
among Democrats. On average, disgusted Democrats have a mean score of support for LGBTQ 
policies that is 26.3% lower than non-disgusted Democrats. Figure 4.4 shows that, for 
Republicans, the difference is much larger: disgusted Republicans average 47 percentage points 
less support for LGBTQ policies than do non-disgusted Republicans. Most of this drop in 
support is driven by marriage, adoption, and transgender healthcare. Disgusted Republicans’ 
drop in support for nondiscrimination protections are comparable to disgusted Democrats’ drop 
in support.  
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5. Discussion 
Disgust emerges as a significant response to (some) LGBTQ news stories. These stories 
do not elicit other negative emotions as strongly as they elicit disgust and the disgust-related 
terms, revulsion and sickness. Disgust also emerges as a strongly negative influence on support 
for LGBTQ policies. Individuals who reported higher levels of disgust were, on average across 
policies, 36% points less supportive of LGBTQ policies. The largest drops in support were for 
transgender healthcare and gay marriage. The smallest drops were in response to 
nondiscrimination policies, though the effect is larger when transgender people were the 
beneficiaries rather than LGB people. These effects persist even when controlling for contact, 
partisanship, gender, religion, age, and more. 
Beyond these hypotheses, I also show that Republicans reported more disgust than 
Democrats, and that Republicans experienced larger drops in support for LGBTQ policies 
when feeling disgusted. Many more Republicans than Democrats reported disgust – just over 
50% of Republicans, compared to roughly 15% of Democrats (Table 4.6). This is consistent 
with existing research that shows a partisan bias in disgust’s influence (Inbar et al 2009). The 
data also reveal another partisan bias in disgust: disgusted Republicans reported significantly 
larger decreases in endorsement of LGBTQ policies (47 percentage points), compared to 
disgusted Democrats (26 points; Figures 4.3 and 4.4). 
However, it is important to note that while Republicans report higher frequencies of 
feeling disgust and larger drops in policy support, the implications of disgust remain relevant 
for Democrats as well. Among Democrats who do report disgust (~15% of Democrats), there 
are statistically significant drops in support for LGBTQ policies, even when controlling for 
gender, age, education, contact with LGB people, and more. Disgusted Democrats average 26 
percentage points less support for LGBTQ policies than non-disgusted Democrats (Figure 4.3). 
The largest drop in support among Democrats is for transgender healthcare (~33 points).  
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In short, once disgust is felt, policy support significantly declines, for members of either party. 
This drop is particularly pronounced for gay marriage and transgender healthcare. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Previous research shows that disgust contributes to negative attitudes toward LGBTQ 
people and undermines the very strategies often relied upon to combat these negative attitudes. 
However, these studies typically artificially induce incidental disgust in a laboratory setting, 
and then ask about attitudes toward LGBTQ people or issues. This project simulates a more 
common experience of reading news online, and also demonstrates that the very topic of 
LGBTQ politics itself elicits disgust. By showing that LGBTQ-related phenomena trigger 
disgust and that that support for LGBTQ politics is affected by this emotion, this research 
broadens the set of ways in which disgust can affect both individual-level opinion formation 
and LGBTQ political campaigns or social movement strategies.  
In particular, I show that (1) stories about (some) LGBTQ policies can and do actually 
cause disgust, and (2) this disgust significantly decreases support for LGBTQ policies. This 
experiment also (3) illustrates the policy-specific effects or interactions of this emotion. These 
effects persist even controlling for other influences like gender, religion, and contact with LGB 
people. These results hold for both Democrats and Republicans, though the effects are 
particularly strong among Republicans. 
That these results occurred should give pause to those anticipating that, after policy 
achievements like national marriage equality, future LGBTQ advocacy efforts will come easily. 
Rather, as LGBTQ advocates (and opponents) turn from marriage equality to other issues like 
transgender rights, disgust will likely be more difficult to avoid. This is already coming to bear 
in the first year following marriage equality, as more than 200 anti-LGBTQ bills have been 
introduced in states around the country, many targeting transgender people and issues such as 
bathroom access. Continued success for the LGBTQ movement will require understanding that 
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disgust influences many beliefs and opinions, even among friends of LGBTQ people, and that 
new strategies based on engaging and confronting this difficult emotion will be vital. 
In the next chapter, I turn to closer examination of what might explain the concurrent 
success of gay marriage and the struggle of transgender rights and visibility. Namely, I 
examine potential differences between responses to specific policies and responses to specific 
subgroups within the LGBTQ community – that is, whether these disgust reactions are due to 
policy content or the perceived beneficiary of the policy. 
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Chapter 5: 
Variations in Disgust Toward Subgroups51 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter established that disgust reactions to LGBTQ people and issues 
persist in modern politics and that disgust interacts differently with different policies. This 
chapter examines whether disgust reactions also vary toward different members of the LGBTQ 
community. The results show that disgust toward LGBTQ people is not homogenous or 
“equally” felt. Just as disgust has policy-specific interactions, it also has (sub)group-specific 
interactions. In particular, disgust has a larger impact on transgender people, and trans women 
in particular than on gay men, with sharper drops in support for transgender policy issues.  
 
2. Emotions, Subgroups, and Public Opinion 
Policy support is often influenced by an individual’s feelings toward the perceived 
beneficiaries of the policy (e.g., Feldman & Huddy 2005; Schram & Soss 2003). Disgust is an 
important emotion that influences attitudes toward LGBTQ people and policy issues. Given 
that the LGBTQ community is not a single group, but rather a collection of subgroups, it is 
possible that individuals will have unique reactions to gay men relative to lesbians, or to 
transgender people relative to gay people.  
                                                
51 I thank Jesse Chandler, Jenn Chudy, Ashley Jardina, and Andrew Proctor for their guidance or 
assistance on various aspects of this chapter, particularly regarding the re-contacting and picture pre-
testing discussed in the methods section. 
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In general, men and women differ in their attitudes toward LGBTQ people and issues. 
Women on average feel more warmly or positively than men toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
people (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010; Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2008; Herek 2002a; 2002b; 
Herek & Capitanio 1995; LaMar & Kite 1998; Larsen, Reed & Hoffman 1980). Women also 
tend to be more supportive than men of gay-friendly policies (Brewer 2003b; Herek 2002a). 
Men and women also differ in their attitudes toward lesbians and toward gay men. In 
the context of evaluating gay and lesbian candidates for political office, women are less likely 
than men to attribute negative traits to lesbians, though women and men offer similarly 
negative evaluations of gay men (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010; Golebiowska 2001; Haider-
Markel 2010).52 Similarly, women are less likely than men to consider lesbian candidates less 
competent than heterosexuals, but women and men both believe that gay male candidates are 
less competent (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010) in general than heterosexual candidates. In 
other words, men and women both respond more negatively to gay men than to gay women 
(Herek 2002a), but women respond more favorably than men to gay women specifically.  
This is consistent with the theory of subgrouping or subtyping (e.g., Richards & 
Hewstone 2001), or the idea of “individuals’ cognitively meaningful differentiation of social 
groups or their decomposition of those groups into defined sub-categories” (McConnaughy & 
White 2011). This research shows distinctly different attitudes toward black men than toward 
black women, for example (McConnaughy & White 2011). Given the categorical distinctions 
between gay and transgender people (i.e., sexual orientation and gender identity are different 
categories), it is also reasonable to expect divergent attitudes toward each group, despite their 
political alignment. 
There is considerably less research examining attitudes toward transgender people, let 
alone differing attitudes toward gay and transgender people. However, available research shows 
                                                
52 For more literature on LGBTQ candidates for political office, see: Casey & Reynolds 2015; Doan & 
Haider-Markel 2010; Haider-Markel 2010; Herrick & Thomas 1999; 2002; Reynolds 2013.  
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interesting and provocative contradictions. For example, heterosexuals rate transgender people 
considerably lower on a feeling thermometer than they rate gays and lesbians (Norton & 
Herek 2012), and states are much more hesitant to pass transgender-inclusive discrimination 
laws than gay anti-discrimination protections (Taylor et al 2012). However, nearly 80% of 
Americans in every state support job discrimination protections for transgender people (Flores, 
Herman, & Mallory 2015), and more than two-thirds are able to (roughly) accurately define 
what being transgender means (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera 2014). A brief conversation that 
encourages perspective taking reduces prejudice toward transgender people (Broockman & 
Kalla 2016), but perspective taking can also elicit increased sexual prejudice and disgust 
reactions (Mooijman & Stern 2016). These conflicting findings suggest that attitudes toward 
transgender people and issues are far from settled, and susceptible to considerable movement 
depending on information, framing, and persuasive efforts in the near future. 
Examining how attitudes differ toward subgroups is important. As Huffaker and Kwon 
(2016) argue, “research examining sexual prejudice [should] include attitudes toward diverse 
subgroups within the larger LGBTQ community, in order to facilitate development of 
underlying constructs and identify unique contributing factors.” Furthermore, as Golebiowska 
(2001) argues, “The question is also worth pursuing because of the overlap in group 
memberships defined by sexual orientation and gender (existence of both male and female 
homosexuality, that is). Scrutiny of this topic, for this reason, promises not only to advance our 
knowledge of the role of sexual orientation in political evaluation but also to contribute to the 
literature on gender in politics” (538).  
Given this literature on divergent attitudes toward men and women, as well as toward 
gay people and transgender people, I hypothesize the following: 
(1) Overall, disgust toward gay people will be lower than toward transgender people. 
(2) Among the four subgroups, disgust toward transgender woman will be highest. 
(3) Among the four subgroups, disgust toward lesbians will be lowest. 
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Though it might seem at first as though, given more positive attitudes toward lesbians than 
gay men, that attitudes toward trans women would similarly be more positive than attitudes 
toward trans men, in fact the reverse is to be expected. Respondents inclined to negative or 
prejudicial attitudes toward transgender people are unlikely to recognize the legitimacy of trans 
women as women.  
 Building on findings from Chapter 4, where the largest reports of disgust and drops in 
support were in response to a transgender-related policy, I expect this experiment to show 
similar differences in the impact of disgust on different subgroups of the LGBTQ community: 
namely, I expect more frequent and stronger disgust reactions to transgender people, and less 
support for transgender issues as a result.  
For this experiment, I use pictures to prime attitudes toward specific subgroups. Using 
images to examine attitudes toward specific groups is well established in the literature on 
group attitudes. Images are effective at eliciting emotions (e.g., Banks & Valentino 2012). For 
example, Brader (2005) shows how campaign ads use images and music to manipulate 
emotional responses and voter behavior. Images also elicit stronger emotional reactions than 
text alone. Visual imagery does a great deal of work to communicate race, gender, and other 
group-based cues and prime existing attitudes toward those groups. News stories with images of 
minority group members can prime attitudes toward those minority groups (Hancock 2004; 
Mendelberg 2001; Valentino 1999). For example, Iyengar and Kinder ([1987] 2010) show how 
the same news story about unemployment depicting either a white or black person led to 
drastically different beliefs about the importance of unemployment as a national issue; white 
viewers considered it nearly twenty points less important when they saw an unemployed black 
person than when they saw an unemployed white person. Over time, these stories create 
“scripts,” such that racialized and gendered attitudes can be evoked even without imagery or 
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explicit cues (e.g., Gilliam & Iyengar 2000). Similarly, the “script” that associates LGBTQ 
people with disgust is well established (Chapter 3) and easy to evoke (Chapter 4). 
Additionally, ads and images evoking negative emotions are more memorable (Bradley, 
Angelini, & Lee 2007; Lang 1991; Newhagen & Reeves 1991). Disgust-evoking images in 
particular catch and hold attention longer than images that evoke other emotions (van Hooff et 
al 2013). Taken together, this means that imagery that evokes disgust is more likely to be 
remembered and for a longer amount of time. Furthermore, knowing that disgust heightens 
prejudice, increases the severity of moral judgments, alters policy preferences, and increases 
avoidant behaviors, these means that even images or news stories of gay and transgender 
people can alter attitudes not just in the immediate moment, but over the long term.  
 
3. Methods 
To examine these hypotheses, I conducted another survey experiment using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), this time involving an increased recruitment of Republicans to 
improve the partisan representation of the sample. This experiment extended and modified the 
design used in Chapter 4. While the previous experiment analyzed disgust reactions to 
different LGBTQ policy issues, this experiment held the policy issue constant in order to 
analyze responses to different groups within the LGBTQ community, namely gay or lesbian 
people and transgender people.53 This experiment also examined the intersection of these 
attitudes with gender: gay men, gay or lesbian women, transgender men, and transgender 
women were all considered separately. Attitudes toward each of these groups were primed by 
including a picture of and quote from a man or woman, identified in the news story as either 
gay or transgender.  
                                                
53 Due to research budget constraints, I omitted conditions examining attitudes toward bisexual people. 
Theoretically, however, I expect that disgust reactions toward bisexual people would be more similar to 
reactions toward gays and lesbians, rather than toward transgender people. I would also expect 
gendered differences toward bisexual men versus bisexual women. Herek (2002c) examines attitudes 
toward bisexual men and women in greater detail.  
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The previous chapter established that people still feel disgust toward LGBTQ people 
and issues, and that this disgust continues to influence policy support. This chapter builds 
from this knowledge and asks: does disgust vary in response to different subgroups of the 
LGBTQ community? Are attitudes different toward gay people than toward transgender people, 
as well as toward men than toward women?  
 
3.1 Design 
The survey was hosted on Qualtrics and subjects were recruited via MTurk.54 On 
MTurk, the survey was described as “Give us your opinion about issues in the news.” Within 
the survey itself, subjects were informed that the study “will give us a better sense of how 
voters think about important issues in American politics today. You will be asked to read a 
news story and tell us your honest opinions.”  
The first two questions screened for age and partisanship. I screened for age to ensure a 
voting-age population, and for partisanship to ensure a more representative sample than in the 
previous experiment; I discuss this further in the “Sample” section below. Subjects were then 
asked to give informed consent to participate in the study. After this, participants answered two 
distractor questions and were then randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions. 
All conditions contained the same a short fictional news story about an unnamed state’s 
legislature considering a proposed nondiscrimination bill; this was the same news story used in 
Chapter 4. I extended the design used in Chapter 4 by adding a picture of the emphasized 
subgroup in the treatment conditions, consistent with the aforementioned literature on 
priming group attitudes using imagery.  
In the treatment conditions, the proposed bill prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
either sexual orientation or gender identity. The picture was of either a man or a woman, and 
                                                
54 The University of Michigan’s Institutional Review Board determined this study, ID HUM00116235, 
to be exempt from oversight. 
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the picture’s caption identified the person as either gay or transgender.55 Thus, these two 
pictures combined with the two possible captions produced four conditions emphasizing a gay 
man, gay woman, transgender man, or a transgender woman as a likely beneficiary. I also 
added a quote to the news story from the pictured individual, explaining their support for the 
proposed bill and identifying the person again as either gay or transgender. Both these 
additions emphasized a particular subgroup as a likely beneficiary of the bill in order to prime 
attitudes toward that specific subgroup, rather than LGBTQ people as a whole. An attention 
check immediately following each story confirmed this priming succeeded, as 90% to over 95% 
of respondents in each condition successfully identified the appropriate subgroup as the likely 
beneficiary of the proposed bill.56 
The control condition described a proposed bill prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of age. Senior citizens were emphasized as the primary beneficiary.57 The image depicted a 
generic state capitol building with an American flag, and no quote was added. Because this 
                                                
55 Pre-testing showed the two pictures to be similar or indistinguishable on attractiveness, 
trustworthiness, and perceived age, while also being significantly different on perceived gender, 
femininity, and masculinity in stereotype-consistent ways (i.e., the man was perceived to be male and 
also both more masculine and less feminine than the woman). For a full explanation of the picture pre-
testing and selection process, see the appendix. This pre-testing process was included in the IRB 
exemption for the larger experiment (UM study ID HUM00116235). Many thanks to Ashley Jardina 
and Jennifer Chudy for their thoughts and advice on this process. 
56 The question read: “People often think that some policies give benefits to certain people, while others 
lose out. What about you? Thinking back to the story you just read, who do you think will benefit most 
from the policy mentioned in the story?” Response options were “Veterans,” “Christians,” “People with 
disabilities,” “Someone else” (with a text box to write in their answer, and the emphasized subgroup 
within that condition. The order of these response options was randomized. Respondents who did not 
select the emphasized subgroup were not excluded from analysis, as (1) attention checks such as these 
only capture attention during a brief snapshot, and (2) the question was worded in such a way that 
answers could reasonably vary. For example, some respondents wrote that they believed lawyers would 
mainly benefit from such laws. Responses such as these do not necessarily indicate that a respondent 
was inattentive or that the subgroup priming was ineffective, but rather only that the survey question 
was written with more room for opinion than as a strictly fact-based attention check.  
57 For the control, I selected age discrimination and emphasized senior citizens or “the elderly” as the 
primary beneficiaries because this is a group that would feasibly still require legal protection against 
discrimination but is also a generally well-regarded, “conventional” social group (e.g., Lambert & 
Chasteen 1997). This preserves the feasibility of the proposed bill, keeps the policy issue consistent, and 
allows for an examination of emotional reactions to a “conventional” group compared to more 
transgressive or stigmatized groups. Additionally, I decided against a control that was simply an 
LGBTQ nondiscrimination policy with no added emphasis on any subgroup, because the previous 
chapter’s nondiscrimination condition already examined that. 
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experiment’s design uses images, I needed to use the same pictures across conditions to 
minimize changes in the experimental stimulus. However, the pictures selected were not of 
elderly individuals, and so would not credibly depict beneficiaries of a policy described as 
meant to benefit senior citizens. Still, it was still important to include a picture in the control 
in order to reduce the likelihood that any differences between the control and treatments were 
due to the introduction of (any) imagery, rather than due to who is depicted in that imagery. 
Therefore, rather than a picture of a senior citizen, I used the state capitol image.  
The text and imagery of each story is included in the appendix, with the lesbian and 
transgender woman conditions shown below in Figure 5.1 as examples. 
Figure 5.1: Lesbian & Transgender Women Conditions 
  
  
Following the story and the attention check, all respondents were asked the same 
battery of questions regarding fifteen emotional responses as was used in Chapter 3. If 
respondents selected that they felt any degree of disgust, they were asked to expand upon that 
answer in an open-ended text box. Participants were then asked about their hypothetical 
reaction to a gay or transgender person moving in next door (as a proxy for contact avoidance), 
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feeling thermometer ratings of different age groups, partisan groups, and subgroups of the 
LGBTQ community, and finally a series of questions about LGBT-related policy preferences. 
The survey ended with a brief series of demographic questions.  
 
3.2 Measures 
The emotional response battery included the same fifteen emotions as the previous 
chapter. Respondents were prompted, “Think back again to the story you just read, and who 
you think will benefit from the policy mentioned. The following questions will ask you how 
you feel when you think about this. When you think of this issue, how much do you feel each 
of these emotions?” For each emotion, respondents could choose “not at all,” “a little,” 
“somewhat,” “very,” or “extremely.” The fifteen emotions were presented in alphabetical order, 
as follows: angry, anxious, disgusted, fearful, furious, happy, hopeful, irritated, optimistic, 
overjoyed, proud, revolted, sick, sympathetic, and worried.  
Respondents were also asked to rate fourteen different social groups using a feeling 
thermometer. These groups were: Republicans, Democrats, gay men, lesbians, bisexual men, 
bisexual women, transgender men, transgender women, heterosexual men, heterosexual 
women, Millennials, Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent Generation. The age groups 
were included to mirror the control condition’s focus.   
All respondents were asked an expanded set of policy questions. They were asked 
whether they favor or oppose: job discrimination protections for gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
people; job discrimination protections for transgender people; “bathroom bills” that require 
transgender people to use facilities based on their assigned sex at birth; allowing business 
owners to refuse service to LGB on the basis of religious objection; allowing business owners to 
refuse service to transgender people on the basis of religious objection; gay adoption; gay 
marriage; and transgender inclusive healthcare policies. This expanded battery includes four 
explicitly transgender-focused policies and four policies focused on LGB people, which allows 
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for closer analysis of potentially differing impact of disgust on gay people and policies, 
compared to transgender people and policies. 
 
3.3 Sample 
This survey ran July 10-20, 2016, and subjects were offered $1.50 for their participation. 
This survey was open for a longer amount of time than the previous experiment due to 
improved recruitment methods.  
Across multiple modes of implementation, early responders to surveys tend to be 
substantively different than peers who respond later in the data collection period, and longer 
fielding times allow for sample demographics to approach more representative means (Aviv et 
al 2002; Casey et al 2016; Ebersole et al 2015; Sigman et al 2014). 
Additionally, in March-April 2015, I conducted a large-scale (n=9,770) demographic 
survey on MTurk in order to (1) locate under-represented populations in this survey pool, such 
as conservatives or people of color, and (2) determine whether there are any effects on sample 
demographics based on the time of day, day of week, or other temporal considerations that a 
survey is posted (see Casey et al 2016). To improve the partisan representativeness of this 
experiment, I contacted workers who (in the 2015 survey) identified as Republican and/or 
conservative to invite them to participate in this study.58 Realizing that this likely also 
increased the whiteness of the sample, I also contacted and invited workers who (in the 2015 
survey) identified as non-white to participate in this study.59  
The sample for this experiment was n=2,334. I employed a larger sample for this 
experiment to improve overall power, representativeness, and the ability to analyze differences 
                                                
58 I am deeply indebted and thankful to Andrew Proctor, Princeton University, for his guidance in the 
re-contacting process, and to Jesse Chandler (University of Michigan & Mathematica Research) for his 
guidance in the 2015 demographic survey. 
59 For a more detailed explanation of the 2015 demographic survey and its findings, see Casey et al 
2016. For a more thorough discussion of this experiment’s recruitment process, see the appendix. The 
2015 survey had only demographic questions and contained no substantive questions (e.g., policy 
preferences) related to the content of this experiment. 
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within groups. All 50 states were represented. Table 5.1 reports the overall demographics of the 
sample, and illustrates the considerably improved representativeness of the sample compared to 
the previous chapter. The proportion of men and women is more balanced, as is the partisan 
representation. Interestingly, reports of contact with both LGB and transgender people have 
considerably increased since the previous experiment in 2014.  Table 5.2 shows the 
demographic balance across all conditions. 
Table 5.1: Demographic Means60 
 Experiment 1 n=1,005 
Experiment 2 
n=2,334 
Age 
(years) 25-29 37 
Gender 59% men 41% women 
48.5% men 
51.5% women 
Partisanship 
23% Repub 
17% Indep 
60% Dem 
41.9% Repub 
11.1% Indep 
47.1% Dem 
Non-Hispanic Whites 71% 66.4% 
Black 7.8% 11% 
Latino 8.2% 8.9% 
Non-Religious 
(Agnostic, Atheist, or 
“Nothing in Particular”) 
55% 41.2% 
Born Again 13.4% 23.2% 
Education 
(% Bachelor’s 
or higher) 
48.1% 51.7% 
Income $25,000-$34,999 $45,000-$49,999 
Sexuality 
(% Heterosexual) 88.3% 91% 
LGB Contact 59% 89% 
Trans Contact 9% 31.6% 
 
 
                                                
60 Some category differences are different due to improved questionnaire design. In this second 
experiment, I used more numerous and specific response options for income (26 categories compared to 
10), and I captured age as an open-ended numeric response rather than grouped into categories a priori. 
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Table 5.2: Demographic Means Across Conditions 
   Conditions 
 Overall sample n=2,334 
Control 
n=466 
Gay men 
n=466 
Lesbians 
n=471 
Trans men 
n=465 
Trans women 
n=466 
Age 
(years) 37 36.6 37.3 37.4 36.7 37.3 
Gender 48.5% men 51.5% women 
46.1% men 
53.9% women 
50.3% men 
49.7% women 
47% men 
53% women 
49.8% men 
50.2% women 
49.2% men 
50.8% women 
Partisanship 
41.9% Repub 
11.1% Indep 
47.1% Dem 
40.8% Repub 
11% Indep 
48.2% Dem 
41.6% Repub 
11.7% Indep 
46.8% Dem 
38.9% Repub 
13.3% Indep 
47.7% Dem 
44.6% Repub 
8.8% Indep 
46.6% Dem 
44.1% Repub 
10.1% Indep 
45.8% Dem 
Ideology 
40.2% Cons 
19.9% Mod 
39.8% Lib 
38% Cons 
18% Mod 
44% Lib 
39.9% Cons 
21.3% Mod 
38.8% Lib 
40% Cons 
22.3% Mod 
37.7% Lib 
43.1% Cons 
17.2% Mod 
39.7% Lib 
40.2% Cons 
20.7% Mod 
39.1% Lib 
Non-Hispanic 
Whites 66.4% 65.9% 66.9% 65.2% 69.2% 67.8% 
Black 11% 12.4% 12% 11.9% 8.0% 9.4% 
Latino 8.9% 9.5% 7.1% 8.1% 9.5% 9.9% 
Non-Religious 
(Atheist, Agnostic, 
or “Nothing in 
Particular”) 
41.2% 43% 43.8% 40.5% 39.4% 39.3% 
Born Again 23.2% 21.5% 22.5% 22.9% 25.4% 23.7% 
Education 
(% Bachelor’s  
or higher) 
51.7%  51.1% 49.7% 53.1% 51.4% 53.1% 
Income $45,000-$49,999 $45,000-$49,999 $45,000-$49,999 $45,000-$49,999 $45,000-$49,999 $45,000-$49,999 
Sexuality 
(% Heterosexual) 91% 89.5% 94.1% 90.4% 89.8% 91.4% 
LGB Contact 89% 89.5% 87.3% 89.5% 90.7% 87.9% 
Trans Contact 31.6% 33% 26.2% 35% 32.5% 31.3% 
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4. Analysis 
The findings reveal that, consistent with hypotheses, disgust reactions were (1) notably 
higher in response to transgender people than to gays and lesbians, (2) highest in response to 
transgender women61, and (3) lowest in response to gay women. This is true for both reporting 
any degree of disgust (binary outcome) or the mean score or average intensity of disgust 
(continuous variable). Similarly, significant differences in policy support and comfort with a 
gay or transgender neighbor further demonstrate the diversity of attitudes toward different 
subgroups of the LGBTQ community. 
 
4.1 Eliciting Disgust by Subgroup 
Because the experiment presented the same policy issue across all conditions and only 
varied in its emphasis on a particular beneficiary, any variation in average respondent attitudes 
is reasonably attributed to the change in the stimulus. In other words, reactions to the news 
story are a proxy for reactions to or attitudes toward the group represented in the news story.  
Table 5.3 presents the differences in reports of disgust across each condition, showing 
both the overall averages of reporting any degree of disgust (constructed as a binary variable 
comparing “not at all” responses to the combined responses of “a little,” “somewhat,” “very,” 
and “extremely” disgusted) and the mean score of disgust (scaled zero to one, where zero means 
“not at all” and one means “extremely.”)  
                                                
61 This assumes that respondents were able to correctly understand transgender men and women as 
distinct from one another. While I did not explicitly test for this understanding, I relied on the image 
in the news story to further communicate the current gender presentation and identity of the 
speaker/subgroup being represented. That is, I also relied on the picture to support the respondent’s 
comprehension of a transwoman as female-presenting and a transman as male-presenting. (I recognize 
this overlooks genderqueer and other non-binary presenting people of trans experience. This is meant 
as a starting point only, and future research should examine more directly public opinion toward a 
wider variety of gender identities and expressions.) 
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Table 5.3: Disgust Report by Condition 
Condition 
(Emphasized beneficiary) 
% Reporting  
Any Disgust 
Mean Disgust Score 
(0=None, 1=Extremely) 
Control (Seniors) 15.3% 0.058 
All LG/T Conditions 27.8% 0.141 
Gay men 27.8% 0.133 
Lesbians 24.3% 0.115 
Transgender men 29.2% 0.154 
Transgender women 29.9% 0.162 
 
Compared to the control, an average of over twelve percentage points more respondents in the 
gay or transgender conditions reported any degree of disgust (Mdiff=0.124, t=5.5, p=0.000), an 
over 80% increase. Additionally, the mean score – how intensely that disgust was felt – in the 
treatment conditions nearly tripled compared to the control (Mdiff=0.083, t=6.4, p=0.000). 
Table 5.3 also confirms distinct disgust reactions to each subgroup. As expected, disgust 
reactions were notably higher in response to transgender people than to gays and lesbians, 
both for overall levels of reporting any disgust (Mdiff=0.035, t=1.7, p=0.089) and the mean score 
or intensity of that reported disgust (Mdiff=0.034, t=2.7, p=0.006).  
Disgust reactions were the lowest in response to gay women, for both any reported 
disgust (Mdiff=-0.047, t=-2.0, p=0.048) and the mean disgust score (Mdiff=-0.034, t=-2.4, p=0.017).  
Disgust reactions were the highest in response to transgender women, though difference of 
means testing was only significant for the mean score (Mdiff=0.028, t=1.9, p=0.052), not for 
overall reporting (Mdiff=0.028, t=1.2, p=0.241).  
Notably, disgust reactions toward gay men were reported with nearly identical 
frequency to overall LGBTQ reports, and disgust reactions to gay women were lower than 
overall reports. This suggests that measures that ask about the LGBTQ community are likely 
revealing attitudes toward gay and lesbian people specifically, and likely obscuring attitudes 
toward transgender people. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 display t-test or difference of means statistics for both measures of 
disgust. Statistically significant differences are bolded. “Mdiff” denotes the difference in disgust 
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means. Positive values of “Mdiff” denote that the row group resulted in more frequent reports 
(Table 5.4) or higher scores (Table 5.5) of disgust than the column group.62  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that all the treatment conditions, both individually and 
collectively, elicit more disgust than the control (Column 1). They also show that respondents 
report disgust toward transgender people significantly more often (Table 5.4) and significantly 
higher in intensity (Table 5.5) than they do toward gays and lesbians (Row 7, Column 2-3).  
Table 5.4: Difference of Means Testing for % Reporting Any Disgust (Binary) 
 (1) Control 
(2) 
Gay men 
(3) 
Lesbians 
(4) 
Trans men 
(5) 
Trans women 
(1) 
Control -     
(2) 
Gay men 
Mdiff=0.125 
t=4.7, p=0.000 -    
(3) 
Lesbians 
Mdiff=0.089 
t=3.4, p=0.001 
Mdiff= -0.036 
t= -1.2,p=0.215 -   
(4) Trans 
men 
Mdiff=0.139 
t=5.1, p=0.000 
Mdiff=0.014 
t=0.5, p=0.639 
Mdiff=0.050 
t=1.7, p=0.087 -  
(5) Trans 
women 
Mdiff=0.146 
t=5.4,p=0.000 
Mdiff=0.021 
t=0.7, p=0.486 
Mdiff=0.057 
t=1.9,p=0.053 
Mdiff=0.007 
t=0.2,p=0.818 - 
(6) All 
LGT63 
Mdiff=0.124 
t=5.5, p=0.000 
Mdiff=0.001, 
t=0.02,p=0.981 
Mdiff=0.047, 
t=2.0,p=0.048 
Mdiff=0.019, 
t=0.8,p=0.426 
Mdiff= -0.028, 
t= -1.2, p=0.241 
(7) Trans 
people 
Mdiff=0.142, 
t=5.8, p=0.000 Mdiff=0.035, t=1.7, p=0.089 - 
Significant differences are bolded. If Mdiff >0, then row treatment triggered more disgust 
 than column treatment (e.g., gay men elicited more disgust than control). 
                                                
62 For example, Table 5.4 shows that respondents in the news story emphasizing gay men reported 
disgust significantly more frequently than respondents who read the control story, and the difference 
between these two means was 0.125 (on a scale of zero to one). Conversely, respondents in the news 
story emphasizing lesbians reported disgust significantly more frequently than those in the control 
(Row 3, Column 1), but less often than those who read the gay male story (Row 3, Column 2). However, 
these latter differences were insignificant. 
63 “All LGT” in Column 1 means all four treatment conditions compared to the control. In Columns 2-
5, it means the column condition compared to the remaining treatment conditions, e.g., comparing  
disgust reports in the gay male condition to disgust reports in the lesbian, transgender male, and 
transgender female conditions. This examines the uniqueness and statistical significance of reports in 
response to each subgroup, relative to the other LGBTQ subgroups.  
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Table 5.5: Difference of Means Testing for Mean Score of Disgust (Continuous, 0-1) 
 (1) Control 
(2) 
Gay men 
(3) 
Lesbians 
(4) 
Trans men 
(5) 
Trans women 
(1) 
Control -     
(2)  
Gay men 
Mdiff= 0.074, 
t=5.4,p=0.000 -    
(3) 
Lesbians 
Mdiff= 0.057, 
t=4.3,p=0.000 
Mdiff= -0.017, 
t= -1.1,p=0.293 -   
(4) Trans 
men 
Mdiff= 0.096, 
t=6.4,p=0.000 
Mdiff= 0.022, 
t=1.2, p=0.221 
Mdiff=0.039, 
t=2.3, p=0.002 -  
(5) Trans 
women 
Mdiff=0.104, 
t=6.7,p=0.000 
Mdiff=0.030, 
t=1.6, p=0.104 
Mdiff=0.047, 
t=2.6,p=0.009 
Mdiff= 0.008, 
t=0.4,p=0.677 - 
(6)  
All LGT 
Mdiff=0.083, 
t=6.4,p=0.000 
Mdiff=0.011, 
t=0.8, p=0.444 
Mdiff=0.034, 
t=2.4, p=0.017 
Mdiff= -0.018, 
t=-1.2,p=0.221 
Mdiff= -0.028, 
t=-1.9,p=0.052 
(7) Trans 
people 
Mdiff=0.100 
t=7.0,p=0.000 Mdiff=0.034, t=2.7, p=0.006 - 
Significant differences are bolded. If Mdiff >0, then row treatment triggered more disgust 
 than column treatment (e.g., gay men elicited more disgust than control). 
 
Importantly, these tables also show that the gap between attitudes toward transgender 
and gay people is driven by attitudes toward lesbians: disgust toward gay men is statistically 
indistinguishable from disgust toward other subgroups (Column 2), but disgust toward lesbians 
is significantly lower than other groups (Column 3).  
 
4.2 Controlling for Other Factors 
As previously discussed, demographic characteristics such as gender, religion, 
partisanship, and contact, among others, have all been demonstrated to influence attitudes 
toward LGBTQ people. Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 control for these relevant demographic factors, 
and they show that disgust persists in response to LG/T people but is particularly strong in 
response to transgender people, even when accounting for these other influences. 
As before, these tables examine disgust as both a binary and continuous variable, using 
logit and ordinary least squares (OLS) models, respectively. Table 5.6 models disgust based on 
being in any LG/T condition and pertinent demographic variables. Table 5.7 uses only logit 
models to examine the specific effects of each treatment condition on reporting any degree of 
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disgust (no disgust compared to any nonzero level of disgust). Table 5.8 uses OLS to model 
treatment effects on reporting disgust as a continuous variable along its full range of variance 
(not at all, a little, somewhat, very, or extremely). All variables are coded from zero to one to 
improve inference and comparability. 
Table 5.6: Treatment Effects on Reporting Disgust 
 
Variable 
Model 1 
Logit (0/1) 
Model 2 
OLS (0-1) 
All LG/T 
Treatments 
0.748*** 
(.15) 
0.075*** 
(.01) 
Republican 1.013*** (.12) 
0.088*** 
(.01) 
White -0.028 (.17) 
0.013 
(.02) 
Black 0.353* (.22) 
0.024 
(.02) 
Latino -0.404 (.25) 
-0.015 
(.02) 
Female -0.393*** (.11) 
-0.020* 
(.01) 
Age -0.221 (.18) 
-0.038** 
(.018) 
Education -0.018 (.22) 
-0.005 
(.02) 
Non-Religious -0.591*** (.13) 
-0.058*** 
(.01) 
Born Again 0.577*** (.12) 
0.084*** 
(.01) 
LGB Contact -0.359** (.16) 
-0.053*** 
(.02) 
Trans Contact 0.029 (.12) 
-0.007 
(.01) 
   
Constant -1.575*** (.29) 
0.097*** 
(.03) 
   
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.109 
(Pseudo) 
0.124 
0.120 
   
N 2,270 2,270 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
Table 5.6 shows that, compared to respondents in the control condition, respondents in 
any of the treatment conditions were significantly more likely to report any degree of disgust 
(Model 1) and a higher level of disgust (Model 2). Identifying as Republican or born again also 
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increased these reports, while identifying as female or non-religious significantly decreased 
these reports. Knowing a gay or lesbian person also decreased disgust reports, but reported 
contact with transgender people was insignificant. In the logit model, identifying as Black 
increased reports of disgust, but this effect drops out in Model 2. In the OLS model, older age 
was associated with decreased disgust; this is seemingly a contradictory observation, but recall 
that the comparison group is age-based discrimination. 
Table 5.7 shows the effects of each specific condition on reports of any disgust.  
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Table 5.7: Treatment Effects on Reporting Any Disgust (Logit) 
 
Variable 
Model 1 
All LG/T  
Model 2 
Gay men 
Model 3 
Lesbians 
Model 4 
Trans men 
Model 5 
Trans women 
All LG/T 
Treatments 
0.748*** 
(.15) - - - - 
Gay men - 0.734*** 
(.17) - - - 
Lesbians - - 0.543*** (.17) - - 
Trans men - - - 0.772*** (.17) - 
Trans women - - - - 0.851*** (.17) 
Republican 1.013*** (.12) 
0.643*** 
(.19) 
0.453** 
(.20) 
0.866*** 
(.20) 
0.736*** 
(.19) 
White -0.028 (.17) 
-0.215 
(.27) 
-0.174 
(.26) 
0.229 
(.30) 
-0.095 
(.28) 
Black 0.353* (.22) 
0.261 
(.33) 
0.307 
(.32) 
0.509 
(.37) 
0.538 
(.35) 
Latino -0.404 (.25) 
-0.172 
(.39) 
-0.120 
(.38) 
-0.046 
(.40) 
-0.220 
(.39) 
Female -0.393*** (.11) 
-0.419** 
(.18) 
-0.376** 
(.18) 
-0.449** 
(.18) 
-0.438** 
(.17) 
Age -0.221 (.18) 
-0.307 
(.31) 
-0.245 
(.31) 
-0.390 
(.32) 
-0.590* 
(.31) 
Education -0.018 (.22) 
-0.231 
(.36) 
0.202 
(.36) 
0.207 
(.35) 
0.122 
(.34) 
Non-Religious -0.591*** (.13) 
-0.396** 
(.20) 
-0.652*** 
(.21) 
-0.353* 
(.20) 
-0.451** 
(.20) 
Born Again 0.577*** (.12) 
0.467** 
(.21) 
0.257 
(.21) 
0.386* 
(.20) 
0.346* 
(.20) 
LGB Contact -0.359** (.16) 
-0.415* 
(.24) 
-0.0004 
(.27) 
0.036 
(.29) 
0.180 
(.27) 
Trans Contact 0.029 (.12) - - 
0.179 
(.19) 
0.137 
(.19) 
Constant -1.575*** (.29) 
-1.045** 
(.42) 
-1.489*** 
(.43) 
-2.168*** 
(.46) 
-1.962*** 
(.44) 
      
Pseudo 
R-Squared 0.109 0.073 0.051 0.085 0.082 
N 2,270 907 917 902 904 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Model 1 is the same as Model 1 in Table 5.6, presented again for ease of comparison. 
Models 2-5 compare the condition to the control (hence the smaller n).64 Models 2 and 3 do 
not include the trans contact variable because the conditions were about gays or lesbians. 
Models 4 and 5 include the LGB contact despite being about trans people because, in this 
sample, having contact with a trans person is highly correlated with contact with LGB people: 
over 98% of respondents who reported knowing a trans person also knew a gay or lesbian 
person. Including both contact variables determines whether there is a unique influence of 
transgender contact. I replicated Models 4 and 5 omitting LGB contact and using only 
transgender contact, but the results were the same: transgender contact remained insignificant.  
Table 5.7 shows that each treatment condition had a statistically significant effect on 
overall reports of disgust, even when controlling for other factors. The largest coefficient was 
in Model 5 for transgender women, and the smallest coefficient was Model 3 for lesbians. The 
influence of identifying as Republican, female, or non-religious persisted across all conditions. 
Republicans were more likely to report disgust in response to every gay, lesbian, or transgender 
story (compared to the control), whereas women and the non-religious were less likely. Being 
born again significantly increased reports of disgust, except in response to lesbians. Contact 
was only significant in reducing disgust reactions to gay men, but not lesbians or transgender 
people. There was no evidence of racial influence in any treatment condition.  
Table 5.8 replicates this analysis using OLS regression and examining disgust reports as 
a continuous variable, scaled zero to one. The overall results are generally similar: each 
treatment condition had a statistically significant impact on the mean score of reported disgust.  
 
                                                
64 I replicated these analyses comparing the particular treatment condition to all the remaining 
treatments (e.g., gay men vs lesbian, trans men, and trans women). This replication revealed that 
reading the gay or lesbian news stories had an insignificant effect on reporting disgust in the logit 
model, but a significant effect in the OLS model. Only Lesbians and transwomen were significant in 
the OLS model. This is consistent with the patterns suggested in the differences of means testing in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 5.8: Treatment Effects on Reporting Disgust (OLS) 
 
Variable 
Model 1 
All LGBTQ  
Model 2 
Gay men 
Model 3 
Lesbians 
Model 4 
Trans men 
Model 5 
Trans women 
All LGBT 
Treatments 
0.075*** 
(.01) - - - - 
Gay men - 0.070*** 
(.01) - - - 
Lesbians - - 0.054*** (.01) - - 
Trans men - - - 0.083*** (.01) - 
Trans women - - - - 0.098*** (.02) 
Republican 0.088*** (.01) 
0.034** 
(.03) 
0.021 
(.02) 
0.072*** 
(.02) 
0.067*** 
(.02) 
White 0.013 (.02) 
-0.016 
(.02) 
-0.007 
(.02) 
0.035 
(.02) 
0.029 
(.03) 
Black 0.024 (.02) 
0.001 
(.03) 
0.024 
(.03) 
0.041 
(.03) 
0.053 
(.03) 
Latino -0.015 (.02) 
-0.025 
(.03) 
0.004 
(.03) 
0.018 
(.03) 
-0.004 
(.03) 
Female -0.020* (.01) 
-0.029** 
(.01) 
-0.006 
(.01) 
-0.033** 
(.02) 
-0.025 
(.02) 
Age -0.038** (.018) 
-0.035 
(.02) 
-0.030 
(.02) 
-0.026 
(.03) 
-0.065** 
(.03) 
Education -0.005 (.02) 
-0.015 
(.03) 
0.014 
(.03) 
0.033 
(.03) 
0.004 
(.03) 
Non-Religious -0.058*** (.01) 
-0.045*** 
(.02) 
-0.056*** 
(.02) 
-0.035** 
(.02) 
-0.045** 
(.02) 
Born Again 0.084*** (.01) 
0.065*** 
(.02) 
0.024 
(.02) 
0.067*** 
(.02) 
0.040** 
(.02) 
LGB Contact -0.053*** (.02) 
-0.056* 
(.02) 
-0.024 
(.02) 
0.005 
(.02) 
-0.007 
(.02) 
Trans Contact -0.007 (.01) - - 
0.015 
(.02) 
0.006 
(.02) 
      
Constant 0.097*** (.03) 
0.148*** 
(.04) 
0.097*** 
(.03) 
-0.002 
(.04) 
0.053 
(.04) 
      
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.124 
0.120 
0.094 
0.083 
0.053 
0.041 
0.117 
0.105 
0.102 
0.090 
      
N 2,270 907 917 902 904 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
Being non-religious decreased mean scores of disgust, but all other variables had 
inconsistent effects depending on the emphasized subgroup. Being Republican or born again 
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generally increased mean scores of disgust, except toward lesbians. Identifying as female 
decreased disgust scores in response to gay and transgender men, but had no impact on disgust 
reactions to lesbian and transgender women. Contact reduces disgust scores of gay men, but for 
no other subgroup. Again, there was no evidence of racial influence on disgust reactions 
toward any LG/T group. 
In sum, since the policy issue is held constant across conditions, these responses reveal 
underlying attitudes toward different subgroups. This experiment shows significantly different 
reports of disgust in response to differing subgroups of the LGBTQ community, and 
particularly higher and stronger reports of disgust toward transgender people, relative to gays 
and lesbians. 
 
4.3 Neighbors & Feeling Thermometers 
Following the emotion self-reports, respondents were then asked two hypothetical 
questions about a gay or transgender person moving in next door.65 Being in the treatment 
conditions alone had no overall difference on reported comfort with a gay neighbor 
(Mdiff=0.003, t=0.25, p=0.806) or a transgender neighbor (Mdiff=-0.004, t=-3.01, p=0.764), with 
one exception: respondents who read the news story emphasizing transgender women 
expressed slightly more happiness at the idea of a potential transgender neighbor (Mdiff=-0.033, 
t=-1.94, p=0.052). However, there were significant differences among respondents who were 
disgusted compared to those who were not. Respondents who reported any degree of disgust 
were significantly less interested in a gay neighbor (Mdiff=0.138, t=12.9, p=0.000) or transgender 
neighbor (Mdiff=0.178, t=15.2, p=0.000) moving in next door, compared to respondents who 
                                                
65 Q9.1: “How would feel if a lesbian, gay, or bisexual person, with about the same income and 
education as you, moved next door?” Q9.2: “How would feel if a transgender person, with about the 
same income and education as you, moved next door?” Response options: [I would be very unhappy 
about this./I would be a little unhappy about this./I would be neither happy nor unhappy./I would be a 
little happy about this./I would be very happy about this.] 
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report no disgust. This is consistent with other findings that disgust leads to avoidant 
behaviors.  
However, there was relatively minimal variation in feeling thermometer scores across 
different subgroups or conditions, as shown in Figure 5.2. Despite the considerable and 
statistically significant differences in disgust reactions and comfort with a potential gay or 
transgender neighbor, feeling thermometer ratings varied only minimally across different 
conditions. This further illustrates the relative power of examining discrete emotions such as 
disgust compared to a more blunt instrument like a feeling thermometer. It also suggests that 
using a feeling thermometer to capture affective responses will likely obscure important 
variation in opinion.  
Figure 5.2: Minimal Variation in Feeling Thermometer Scores Across Conditions
 
 
4.4 Policy Impact 
Recall that participants read a news story, reported their emotional responses, and then 
were asked about their support for various LGBTQ policies.  
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Table 5.9 shows overall support for eight LGBTQ policies, separated by those that 
primarily benefit (or disadvantage) LGB people and those that primarily benefit (or 
disadvantage) transgender people. Policies that are generally disadvantageous to LGBTQ 
people are reverse coded so that the number reported represents the proportion of respondents 
who took the pro-LGBTQ position. Table 5.9 shows that on average there is at least 10% more 
support for LGB-targeted policies than for transgender policies, among this sample. 
Table 5.9: Support for LGBTQ Policies Across Conditions 
 
Condition 
Policy  
% of Respondents Who Supported Policy 
Overall sample Control LG/T Conditions 
LGB nondiscrimination 71.3% 73.1% 70.8% 
Gay marriage 65% 67.6% 64.4% 
Gay adoption 64.1% 66.5% 63.5% 
LGB business refusal*  54.7% 52.5% 55.2% 
LGB Policy Average: 63.8% 64.9% 63.5% 
    
Transgender nondiscrimination 65.4% 68.1% 64.7% 
Trans business refusal* 54.1% 53% 54.4% 
Trans healthcare 49.1% 49.9% 48.9% 
Bathroom bills* 41.2% 42.9% 40.8% 
Trans Policy Average: 52.5% 53.5% 52.2% 
*These policy questions are reverse coded, so the number here represents the proportion of respondents who took 
the pro-LGBTQ position (i.e., opposed bathroom bills or refusal of service). 
 
Table 5.10 shows the difference in support for various LGBTQ policies between those 
who were disgusted and not disgusted.66 This shows only respondents who were in the 
treatment conditions, to demonstrate the impact of disgust that is specifically in response to a 
gay, lesbian, or transgender person. 
                                                
66 Support includes those who said they strongly support or somewhat support the policy. I excluded 
those who said they neither support nor oppose the policy, and I also excluded these neutral 
respondents from the denominator. The numbers should be interpreted as, for example: of all 
respondents who both took a position on gay adoption and said they were not disgusted at all, 77.1% 
supported adoption. Of those who both took a position on this policy and said they were disgusted to 
any degree, only 27.7% supported it. (I attribute the notable difference in LGBTQ policy support in this 
chapter, compared to Chapter 3, to the improved representativeness of the sample.) 
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Table 5.10: Differences in Support for LGBTQ Policies 
Among Disgusted and Non-Disgusted Respondents (LG/T Conditions Only) 
Policy  % of Respondents Who Supported Policy Difference Not Disgusted Disgusted 
LGB nondiscrimination 84% 35.7% -48.3% 
Gay marriage 78.6% 26.7% -51.9% 
Gay adoption 77.1% 27.7% -49.4% 
LGB business refusal*  65.7% 27.3% -38.4% 
LGB Average: 76.4% 29.4% -47% 
    
Transgender nondiscrimination 78.5% 28.2% -52.7% 
Trans business refusal* 65% 26.5% -38.5% 
Transgender healthcare 58.8% 22.7% -36.1% 
Bathroom bills* 46.8% 24.9% -21.9% 
Trans Average: 62.3% 25.6% -36.7% 
    
Total Average: 69.3% 27.5% -42% 
*These policy questions are reverse coded, so the number here represents the proportion of respondents who took 
the pro-LGBTQ position (i.e., opposed bathroom bills or refusal of service). 
 
This shows again the gap in support for transgender policies compared to LGB issues, as well 
as the significant impact of disgust on support across all policies. Among respondents who 
reported no disgust, an average of 76.4% supported the gay and lesbian policies, and roughly 
69% supported the transgender policies. Among respondents who reported any degree of 
disgust, the percent of those endorsing pro-LGB positions dropped 47 percentage points to a 
mere average of 29.4%. Support for transgender policies also dramatically decreased, nearly 
37% points to 25.6%. Across all eight policy issues, the difference in support among disgusted 
and not disgusted respondents was roughly 42 points.  
Both Tables 5.9 and 5.10 demonstrate the powerful influence of disgust on policy 
attitudes, the differing baseline support for transgender issues compared to LGB issues, and 
the differing impact of disgust on policy support for trans and LGB issues. 
 
5. Discussion 
As hypothesized, disgust reactions were (1) notably higher in response to transgender 
people than to gays and lesbians, (2) lowest in response to gay women, and (3) highest in 
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response to transgender women. This is true for both reporting any degree of disgust (binary 
outcome) or the mean score or average intensity of disgust (continuous variable).  
Overall, disgust reactions to gays and lesbians were similar to or less than the average 
across all LGBTQ conditions. This suggests that looking at questions that ask about attitudes 
toward the general LGBTQ community likely only reveals attitudes toward gays and lesbians 
specifically, and is likely to obscure attitudes toward transgender people and issues. Similarly, 
the significant differences in disgust reactions to each subgroup (Tables 5.3-5.8), comfort with a 
gay or transgender neighbor, and drops in policy support (Tables 5.9-5.10) demonstrate the 
diversity of attitudes toward different subgroups of the LGBTQ community.  
That said, this photos used in this experiment depicted white people only, and 
therefore the results should be interpreted with caution if generalizing to attitudes toward 
LGBTQ people of color. Relatedly, these results show very little evidence for more negative 
attitudes among people of color compared to white people, an important contrast to those who 
argue that homophobia and sexual prejudice are more prevalent in communities of color. 
 
6. Conclusion 
By holding the policy issue constant and varying the emphasis on different subgroups, 
this design reveals how people differently respond to gay people compared to transgender 
people, independent of the policy content. Attitudes toward transgender people, and 
transgender women in particular, are considerably more negative than toward gays and 
lesbians. Additionally, that participants who reported disgust were significantly less happy 
about a hypothetical gay or transgender neighbor moving next door – a measure that is a proxy 
for contact or avoidance – offers further evidence that the consequences of disgust will make 
contact a difficult task for LGBTQ advocates moving forward. 
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 Finally, it is important to note that this survey ran during a time of heightened 
attention (relative to previous history) to transgender people and particularly bathrooms. This 
may weaken the claim that these attitudes were “independent of policy content.” In other 
words, even though the experiment conditions considered the same policy, it is possible that 
anti-discrimination protections for transgender people are now associated with bathrooms, and 
that the same policy protections when presented as a policy for LGB people is more associated 
with employment or housing. Future research should examine this question. In the next 
chapter, I suggest further ideas and directions for new research based on this project’s findings.  
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Chapter 6:  
Conclusion 
 
1. Reflection 
In the summer this dissertation project drew to a close, just over a year had passed 
since the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage. Sarah McBride, a white trans woman, 
made history when she became the first openly transgender person to speak at a major party’s 
presidential convention, and she is widely expected to run for political office herself in the 
near future. And during the same time, dozens of anti-LGBTQ bills were introduced in states 
and municipalities across the country, including in Michigan, where I lived the past eight 
years as a graduate student and a transgender man, with luckily only few personal experiences 
of transphobia and discrimination. This summer in Orlando, Florida, 49 mostly Latinx 
LGBTQ people and allies, were murdered in a mass shooting at Pulse Nightclub. As of Aug 1, 
2016, there were 17 reported murders of transgender women across the country, on pace to 
break the previous record set just last year. National transgender advocates estimate that the 
average life expectancy for a transgender woman of color to be 32 years.  
These are times of painful progress. Legal declarations of equality are sometimes little 
comfort alongside the untimely loss of a community member, or an experience of personal 
violence or discrimination. The emotional weight of these often conflicting experiences is a 
heavy burden for many in the LGBTQ community, myself included. In this project, I sought 
at least in part to understand how these events, and the attitudes driving them, could coexist 
in the same moment, sometimes in the same person. I followed this emotional weight, and it 
led me to my dissertation.  
 
 
 
116 
In Chapter 2, I examined the predominant explanation for opinion change on LGBTQ 
issues: contact with a gay or lesbian person. What I characterize as the “friends and allies” 
framework proved to be limited in its ability to capture or explain important variation in 
attitudes, namely the attitudes of those who know an LGBTQ person but nonetheless oppose 
policies, as well as those who do not know an LGBTQ person but nonetheless support policies. 
In the 2012 ANES data, 40-60% of respondents fell into these unexplained categories.  
In Chapter 3, I made a case for the relevance of disgust and emotions more generally to 
the study of LGBTQ politics. I argued that emotions are both individually experienced and 
also expressions of existing cultural, social, and political norms. Therefore, disgust reactions 
are not simply an indicator of how an individual feels about an LGBTQ person or issue, but 
also a potential indicator of how that individual’s social context may feel as well. Additionally, 
I traced a history of disgust through 20th century American politics as it related to LGBTQ 
people and issues. I showed that disgust has played a significant role historically, and in 
Chapters 4 and 5 I showed its contemporary role.  
In Chapter 4, I took up the question of whether modern LGBTQ politics directly 
triggers disgust. It does, particularly in response to gay marriage and transgender healthcare. 
This disgust also led to significant decreases in support for every LGBTQ policy that was 
studied: job discrimination, adoption, marriage, and transgender healthcare. In Chapter 5, I 
turned to disgust reactions toward specific subgroups of the LGBTQ community, and I showed 
that disgust is significantly higher in response to transgender people, the highest toward 
transgender women, and the lowest toward lesbians. Though powerful across most model 
specifications, disgust has a particularly disproportionate and negative impact on attitudes 
toward the trans community and support for trans-related policies.  
I conclude here, by discussing the implications of these findings, limitations of the 
project, and directions for future research. 
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2. Implications 
Based on these findings, let us revisit the conventional wisdom discussed in Chapter 1, 
that friends will be allies. Using my own data now, we can compare the usefulness of contact 
and disgust in understanding LGBTQ-related policy preferences. 
For example, Table 6.1 shows the conventional wisdom’s approach to understanding 
policy attitudes, using contact to examine support for gay marriage. This shows that 24.4% of 
respondents are not explained by this approach. Table 6.2, however, shows the same approach 
but replacing contact with any report of disgust. The number of respondents omitted or 
unexplained by this approach is reduced to only 18.9%, which amounts to a 22% reduction 
(from 24.4% to 18.9%) in “unexplainable” opinions. This demonstrates just one of many ways 
that disgust is a useful analytic tool and measure for understanding attitudes toward LGBTQ 
people and issues in America.
Table 6.1: Contact & Gay Marriage 
Allies? 
Friends? Support Oppose  
Contact 70.8% 19.1% 89.9% 
No Contact 5.3% 4.7% 10% 
 76.1% 23.8% 100% 
Source: Dissertation Experiment 2, 2016; n=1,951; 
omitting “neither favor nor oppose” responses 
Table 6.2: Disgust & Gay Marriage 
Allies? 
Friends? Support Oppose 
 
No Disgust 66.7% 9.5% 76.2% 
Disgusted 9.4% 14.4% 23.8% 
 76.1% 23.9% 100% 
Source: Dissertation Experiment 2, 2016; n=1,956; 
omitting “neither favor nor oppose” respons
 
 
Additionally, as Chapter 5 showed, reports of both LGB and transgender contact have 
significantly increased. Indeed, in the 2016 sample, nearly 90% of respondents said they knew 
a gay person and over 30% said they knew a transgender person. As more and more people 
know LGB people, the usefulness of the measure will decline due to the lack of meaningful 
variation. It is possible that in the near future, contact with transgender people will be a 
meaningful measure due to its relative novelty (i.e., that many fewer people know someone 
who is transgender), but both Flores (2015) and my own experiments here show that trans 
contact currently has no independent influence on transgender (or LGB) attitudes. 
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Of course there are other explanations and influences for public opinion on any policy 
issue, and no single variable alone can wholly determine or predict an opinion. However, 
given the academic literature’s focus on the positive influence of contact, as well as the 
multitude of political advocacy and resources devoted to contact-based strategies, it is important 
to call attention to alternative features of public opinion toward LGBTQ people and issues. 
Disgust is clearly one such feature that merits further attention. The findings emphasize the 
strong relationship between religious (non)affiliation, disgust, and LGBTQ attitudes, as well as 
the lack of relationship between an individual’s racial identity and their reported disgust or 
support for LGBTQ policies.  
Disgust is also important for political science to consider beyond LGBTQ politics. 
Disgust has the potential to alter the dynamics of opinion formation, persuasion, behavior, and 
policy-making in any issue domain in which it is triggered. This is of particular importance to 
scholars who study racial politics and immigration, where rhetoric of moral and cultural 
contamination also evokes disgust reactions (Faulkner et al 2004; Hancock 2004). This is also 
important to scholars who study the intersections of racial and sexual politics (Novkov 2008). 
Overall, this project builds a theoretical edifice for thinking about a range of different groups 
and movements, and the broader emotional conditions under which American society extends 
political rights and offers social acceptance to marginalized groups.  
 
3. Limitations & Future Research 
The limitations of this project also point to potential future research. For example, 
although I attempted throughout the project to use racially diverse samples and discuss the 
intersections of racial and sexual attitudes, I did not explicitly or separately analyze the ways in 
which disgust differently impacts LGBTQ people of color. LGBTQ people of color, particularly 
transgender women of color, are uniquely and disproportionately the subjects of homophobic 
and transphobic violence and discrimination (e.g., Grant et al 2011), and disgust has also 
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played a significant role in American racial politics (e.g., Banks & Valentino 2012; Hancock 
2004; Novkov 2008). Though the results of Chapter 5 highlight the acutely negative attitudes 
and disgust reactions toward transgender people and transgender women in particular, the 
photos used only depicted white people and therefore the results are limited in their ability to 
speak to attitudes toward LGBTQ people of color. Future work could, for example, replicate 
this experiment and vary the race of the person depicted, but in general should extend this 
project’s examination of disgust to a variety of racial, economic, and other additional subgroups 
to shed further light on what motivates these negative attitudes, discrimination, and violence. 
Similarly, one of the more beautiful and vibrant elements (in the author’s opinion) of 
the LGBTQ community is its breadth of diversity in gender expression and gender non-
conformity. For example, drag queens and kings, butch dykes, fairies, studs, femmes, 
nonbinary folks, bears, cubs, twinks, genderqueer folks, and countless more gender expressions 
and gendered, sexualized categories – not to mention transgender people themselves, who of 
course represent an equally diverse range of gender expression – all exist within (and beyond) 
the LGBTQ community. This diversity of gender expression, particularly gender non-
conformity, is also central to many negative attitudes toward LGBTQ people (e.g., stereotypes 
of gay men as effeminate, lesbians as hypermasculine, transgender women as “men in dresses,” 
and so on). Golebiowska (1996, 1010) argues, “the extent to which individuals of negatively 
stereotyped political groups will be tolerated depends not only on their group membership, but 
also on the extent to which they fit their group’s stereotype” (see also Golebiowska 2001; 2002). 
Are disgust reactions different in response to a butch lesbian than to a femme lesbian? To a 
transgender person who expresses themselves in more gender-typical ways (i.e., a 
conventionally masculine trans man or a traditionally feminine trans woman) than to a trans 
person who does not or is not interested in “passing” (see e.g., Halberstam 1998; Sycamore 
2011)? This project largely overlooked these questions, and so future research should also 
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examine variation in disgust reactions based on gender non-conformity in contrast with 
gender-typicality, or more generally based on consistency with group stereotypes. 
Other future directions may also include examining the impact of disgust on and 
within LGBTQ communities. Many scholars, advocates, and LGBTQ community members 
have written at great length about the internalization of homophobic and transphobic disgust, 
the transformation into shame, and the subsequent policing of our own behaviors, gender 
expression, sexual desire, and more (e.g., Halperin & Traub 2009; Monette 1992; Yoshino 
2007). Additionally, intra-group disgust and prejudicial attitudes also structure the mental, 
emotional, physical, and sociopolitical health of LGBTQ people. In other words, examining 
the impact of disgust on LGBTQ people themselves, and LGBTQ people’s disgust reactions 
toward other LGBTQ people are both fertile grounds for future work in this area.  
Moving beyond disgust, future research should examine other emotions and their 
influence on LGBTQ politics. Banks and Valentino (2012) describe the trajectory of American 
racial attitudes and politics in America as previously emotionally dominated by disgust, but 
now governed primarily by anger. In particular, following the 2015 legalization of gay marriage 
and as the LGBTQ movement continues to gains political ground, it seems likely that anger 
will play a larger and more relevant role moving forward. Some research has already begun 
investigating the question of whether backlash occurs in response to these policy gains (e.g., 
Bishin et al 2015), but generally this work has focused on policy support and/or feeling 
thermometers, and not on discrete emotional reactions and their potential consequences. 
Additionally, looking to other emotions is key because different policies evoke different 
emotions. Transgender healthcare is likely to elicit a very different set of emotions and 
political obstacles than, for example, gay marriage, if for no other reason than the pre-existing, 
hyper politicization of laws governing healthcare – especially in the post Obamacare age. 
Different policies produce different politics (Lowi 1972; Mucciaroni 2008), and they also 
produce different emotions, each with unique political implications.  
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Finally, this project began as a proposal to create a new measure of modern sexual 
prejudice that was theoretically-grounded, useful for explaining a variety of LGBTQ-related 
attitudes (including seemingly contradictory opinions, as in Chapter 2), and still brief enough 
for public opinion research.67 At the excellent advice of my committee, I focused on only one 
of my proposed elements of modern attitudes: disgust. Future research should continue to 
interrogate other elements that structure sexual prejudice today, such as sexism and gender 
norms, religion and morality, and other emotions. 
 
4. “Not Yet Here” 
As the LGBTQ community and America as a whole finally moves past the marriage 
agenda, many are pausing to reflect on past achievements and failures, and to imagine what 
horizons lay ahead.  
Reflecting on the “friends and allies” framework, I am reminded of John D’Emilio’s 
words: “These myths have limited our political perspective. They have contributed, for 
instance, to an overreliance on a strategy of coming out – if every gay man and lesbian in 
America came out, gay oppression would end – and have allowed us to ignore the 
institutionalized ways in which homophobia and heterosexism are reproduced” (1993, 468). 
There is great value in studying public opinion and individual-level attitudes, because we learn 
how to better understand one another and, where applicable, advocate for positive change. But 
we cannot lose sight of the ways these attitudes have become institutionalized at much deeper 
levels. Pursuing attitude change on an individual level is both necessary and far from enough 
to combat the deep historical entrenchment of homophobia, sexism, racism, and more in the 
American political system. Structural efforts must also be pursued. 
Additionally, the general decline of reported animus toward LGBTQ people and issues 
should not (yet) be interpreted as definitive signs of progress. Certainly hard-won policy gains 
                                                
67 See Massey 2009 for a theoretically rich and powerful instrument… with 70 questions.  
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and substantive belief change have occurred; but many scholars and activists alike (e.g., Wendy 
Brown) offer thorough and compelling critiques of “tolerance” as a signal of depoliticization of 
an issue or group, without corresponding and meaningful change in underlying attitudes 
toward that issue or group. For example, while arguments that homosexuality is genetic or 
inborn were persuasive to many heterosexual Americans and led to positive changes in support 
for gay and lesbian issues (e.g., Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2008; Hegarty 2002), this framework 
may be less likely to succeed in the transgender context. Attribution-based beliefs may actually 
make it more difficult for some people to (initially) accept trans people as being “born that 
way,” when in fact many transgender people were born another way (that is to say, they were 
assigned a sex at birth). Additionally, partisanship and pre-existing sexual prejudice have both 
been shown to mediate the relationship between accepting attribution beliefs in the first place, 
as well as their potential positive influence on policy support (Garretson & Suhay 2015; 
Hegarty & Golden 2008; Smith et al 2011). In other words, the tolerance that resulted from 
attribution-based arguments wasn’t entirely acceptance, but rather a conditional acceptance; a 
contingent belonging. This is one reason among many that there is potentially a more difficult 
road ahead for trans issues than the road gay issues faced in the past. 
The affective legacies of disgust must be confronted if we are to traverse this road 
without losing too many more of us. 
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Appendix A 
Friends & Allies Using Feeling Thermometer 
 
This measures “friendship” using feeling thermometer (FT) scores toward gays and lesbians, 
rather than self-reported contact with gays or lesbians. “Positive” denotes “warm” scores of 51 
or above. “Negative” denotes “cold” scores of 49 or below. This omits respondents who offered 
the neutral rating of “50.” This analysis shows that 17% - 35.1% of respondents are omitted by 
conventional wisdom, even when measuring “friendship” through the affective measure of a 
feeling thermometer rather than direct contact. 
 
Table A1a: Job Discrimination 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose)  
Positive 54.8% 4.4% 59.2% 
Negative 19.1% 21.7% 40.8% 
 73.9% 26.1% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table A1b: Job Discrimination, Among 
Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Positive 92.6% 7.4% 100% 
Negative 46.8% 53.2% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
 
Table A2a: Military Service 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose)  
Positive 56.6% 2.4% 59% 
Negative 27.2% 13.8% 41% 
 83.8% 16.2% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table A2b: Military Service, Among 
Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Positive 95.9% 4.1% 100% 
Negative 66.3% 33.7% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
 
Table A3a: Gay Adoption 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Positive 52.1% 6.7% 58.8% 
Negative 10.3% 30.9% 41.2% 
 62.4% 37.6% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
 
Table A3b: Gay Adoption, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Positive 88.6% 11.4% 100% 
Negative 25% 75% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table A4a: Gay Marriage 
 Allies (Support) 
Civil 
Unions 
Not 
Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Pos. 40.2% 14.4% 4% 58.6% 
Neg. 3.8% 12.9% 24.7% 41.4% 
 44% 27.3% 28.7% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table A4b: Gay Marriage, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Civil 
Unions 
Not-
Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Pos. 68.6% 24.5% 6.8% 100% 
Neg. 9.2% 31.1% 59.7% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting
 
  
 
Appendix B 
Friends & Allies Using Partisanship 
 
Another common variable considered in more recent attitudes toward LGBTQ policy issues is 
partisanship, namely that Democrats are more likely to support LGBTQ policies while 
Republicans are more likely to oppose. The below tables show the same “friends and allies” 
examination comparing LGBTQ policy support with partisanship, rather than contact or 
feeling thermometer scores. Again, this demonstrates that the conventional approaches to 
understanding a primary determinant of LGBTQ-related policy support are insufficient for 
explaining many respondents. As represented by the highlighted cells below, 35% - 51.3% of 
respondents fall into categories not suggested by conventional wisdom. 
 
Table B1a: Job Discrimination 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not 
Allies 
(Oppose)  
Democrats 48.2% 8.2% 56.4% 
Republicans 27.3% 16.4% 43.6% 
 75.5% 24.5% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table B1b: Job Discrimination, Among 
Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Democrats 85.5% 14.5% 100% 
Republicans 62.6% 37.6% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table B2a: Military Service 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not 
Allies 
(Oppose)  
Democrats 50.5% 5.6% 56.1% 
Republicans 33.9% 10% 43.9% 
 84.4% 15.6% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table B2b: Military Service, Among 
Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Democrats 90% 10% 100% 
Republicans 77.2% 22.8% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table B3a: Gay Adoption 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not 
Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Democrats 41% 14.9% 55.9% 
Republicans 20.1% 24% 44.1% 
 61.1% 38.9% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
 
Table B3b: Gay Adoption, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Not Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Democrats 73.3% 26.7% 100% 
Republicans 45.6% 54.4% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table B4a: Gay Marriage 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Civil 
Unions 
Not 
Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Dem 31.3% 14.5% 10.2% 56% 
Rep 8.4% 18.2% 17.4% 44% 
 39.7% 32.7% 27.6% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
Table B4b: Gay Marriage, Among Friends 
 Allies 
(Support) 
Civil 
Unions 
Not-
Allies 
(Oppose) 
 
Dem 55.9% 25.9% 18.2% 100% 
Rep 19.1% 41.4% 39.5% 100% 
Source: ANES 2012, full sample weighting 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix C 
Experiment 1 News Stories 
 
Control (111 words) 
State lawmakers to consider texting-while-driving ban 
SPRINGFIELD -- State lawmakers are considering a bill that would amend the state’s 
distracted driving law to prohibit texting while driving. 
 
Last week’s session of the State House of Representatives began with a discussion of the 
proposed legislation. Currently, state law prohibits teenagers from using hand-held devices at 
all while driving. If the bill passes, it would prohibit texting while driving for all ages. 
 
The bill comes as the country continues to consider questions about distracted driving. The 
House is set to vote on the bill later this month. The Governor has made no statement about 
whether he would sign the bill if it passes. 
 
 
Treatment 1: Nondiscrimination (123 words) 
State lawmakers to consider discrimination protections for gay residents 
SPRINGFIELD -- State lawmakers are considering a bill that would amend the state’s non-
discrimination law to prohibit discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) residents. 
 
Last week’s session of the State House of Representatives began with a discussion of the 
proposed legislation. Currently, state law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, gender, 
and age, among others. If the bill passes, it would add sexual orientation and gender identity 
as protected classes. 
 
The bill comes as the country continues to consider questions about gay rights. The House is 
set to vote on the bill later this month. The Governor has made no statement about whether 
he would sign the bill if it passes. 
 
 
Treatment 2: Gay Marriage (109 words) 
State lawmakers to consider legalizing same-sex marriage 
SPRINGFIELD -- State lawmakers are considering a bill that would legalize gay marriage 
statewide. 
 
Last week’s session of the State House of Representatives began with a discussion of the 
proposed legislation. Currently, state law prohibits gay and lesbian couples from marrying. If 
the bill passes, it would grant same-sex couples the right to marry and receive state benefits 
afforded by marriage. 
 
The bill comes as the country continues to consider questions about gay rights. The House is 
set to vote on the bill later this month. The Governor has made no statement about whether 
he would sign the bill if it passes. 
  
 
 
 
 
126 
 
Treatment 3: Gay Adoption (110 words) 
State lawmakers to consider legalizing same-sex adoption 
SPRINGFIELD -- State lawmakers are considering a bill that would legalize adoption by gay 
and lesbian couples. 
 
Last week’s session of the State House of Representatives began with a discussion of the 
proposed legislation. Currently, state law prohibits gay and lesbian couples from adoption 
children. If the bill passes, it would grant same-sex couples the same rights to adoption as 
heterosexual couples. 
 
The bill comes as the country continues to consider questions about gay rights. The House is 
set to vote on the bill later this month. The Governor has made no statement about whether 
he would sign the bill if it passes. 
 
 
Treatment 4: Transgender healthcare (129 words) 
State lawmakers to consider transgender healthcare coverage 
SPRINGFIELD -- State lawmakers are considering a bill that would provide all state 
employees with access to transgender- related health care services. 
 
Last week’s session of the State House of Representatives began with a discussion of the 
proposed legislation. Currently, the state’s health insurance policy for its own employees does 
not cover medical treatments or care related to gender transition, such as mental healthcare, 
hormone replacement therapy, or surgery. If the bill passes, it would extend this coverage to 
state employees. 
 
The bill comes as the country continues to consider questions about transgender rights. The 
House is set to vote on the bill later this month. The Governor has made no statement about 
whether he would sign the bill if it passes. 
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Table D1: Disgust’s Influence on Support for 
LGB Nondiscrimination Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust -0.379*** 
(0.04) 
-0.313*** 
(.05) 
-0.327*** 
(.07) 
White 0.016 
(.02) 
0.035 
(.02) 
-0.070 
(.09) 
Black 
 
-0.010 
(.03) 
0.009 
(.03) 
-0.178 
(.16) 
Latino 
 
-0.041 
(.03) 
-0.004 
(.03) 
-0.223* 
(.12) 
Female 0.054*** 
(.02) 
0.035** 
(.02) 
0.085* 
(.04) 
Age -0.036 
(.03) 
-0.005 
(.03) 
-0.076 
(.09) 
Education 0.041 
(.03) 
0.044 
(.03) 
0.072 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 
 
0.039** 
(.02) 
0.043** 
(.02) 
0.006 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.085*** 
(.03) 
-0.100*** 
(.03) 
-0.035 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.090*** 
(.02) 
0.085*** 
(.02) 
0.080* 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.768*** 
(.03) 
0.780*** 
(.03) 
0.759*** 
(.12) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.229 
0.221 
0.191 
0.176 
0.190 
0.152 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
Table D2: Disgust Index’s Influence on Support for  
LGB Nondiscrimination Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust Index -0.490*** 
(.04) 
-0.452*** 
(.06) 
-0.407*** 
(.08) 
White 0.014 
(.02) 
0.038 
(.02) 
-0.091 
(.09) 
Black 
 
-0.009 
(.03) 
0.017 
(.03) 
-0.213 
(.16) 
Latino 
 
-0.043 
(.03) 
-0.003 
(.03) 
-0.238** 
(.12) 
Female 0.053*** 
(.02) 
0.035** 
(.02) 
0.085* 
(.04) 
Age -0.030 
(.03) 
-0.006 
(.03) 
-0.071 
(.08) 
Education 0.042 
(.03) 
0.046 
(.03) 
0.075 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 
 
0.038** 
(.02) 
0.041** 
(.02) 
0.003 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.075*** 
(.03) 
-0.085** 
(.03) 
-0.036 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.084*** 
(.02) 
0.082*** 
(.02) 
0.067 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.773*** 
(.03) 
0.780*** 
(.03) 
0.786*** 
(.04) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.242 
0.235 
0.205 
0.192 
0.201 
0.164 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table D3: Disgust’s Influence on Support for  
Transgender Nondiscrimination Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust -0.404*** 
(.04) 
-0.356*** 
(.05) 
-0.312*** 
(.07) 
White -0.019 
(.03) 
0.035 
(.03) 
-0.175* 
(.09) 
Black -0.028 
(.04) 
0.010 
(.03) 
-0.233 
(.16) 
Latino -0.072 
(.04) 
-0.027 
(.03) 
-0.279** 
(.12) 
Female 0.061*** 
(.02) 
0.056*** 
(.02) 
0.060 
(.04) 
Age -0.042 
(.03) 
0.007 
(.03) 
-0.161* 
(.09) 
Education 0.060* 
(.03) 
0.016 
(.03) 
0.172* 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 0.047** 
(.02) 
0.040** 
(.02) 
-0.017 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.095*** 
(.03) 
-0.122*** 
(.04) 
-0.044 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.090*** 
(.02) 
0.090*** 
(.02) 
0.071 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.748*** 
(.04) 
0.757*** 
(.04) 
0.790*** 
(.12) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.239 
0.231 
0.206 
0.192 
0.191 
0.153 
    
N 974 587 226  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
Table D4: Disgust Index’s Influence on Support for 
Transgender Nondiscrimination Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust Index -0.517*** 
(.04) 
-0.543*** 
(.07) 
-0.383*** 
(.08) 
White -0.021 
(.03) 
0.038 
(.02) 
-0.195** 
(.09) 
Black -0.027 
(.04) 
0.020 
(.04) 
-0.267* 
(.16) 
Latino -0.075** 
(.04) 
-0.025 
(.03) 
-0.294** 
(.12) 
Female 0.061*** 
(.02) 
0.055*** 
(.02) 
0.060 
(.04) 
Age -0.036 
(.03) 
0.006 
(.03) 
-0.157* 
(.09) 
Education 0.060* 
(.03) 
0.019 
(.03) 
0.175* 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 0.046** 
(.02) 
0.037** 
(.02) 
-0.019 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.085*** 
(.03) 
-0.103*** 
(.04) 
-0.046 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.083*** 
(.02) 
0.086*** 
(.02) 
0.059 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.752*** 
(.03) 
0.760*** 
(.03) 
0.815*** 
(.12) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.250 
0.243 
0.231 
0.217 
0.199 
0.161 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table D5: Disgust’s Influence on Support for 
Gay Marriage Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust -0.532*** 
(.04) 
-0.351*** 
(.06) 
-0.544*** 
(.07) 
White 0.043 
(.03) 
0.063** 
(.03) 
0.068 
(.09) 
Black -0.020 
(.04) 
-0.005 
(.04) 
-0.107 
(.15) 
Latino 0.035 
(.04) 
0.042 
(.04) 
-0.004 
(.12) 
Female 0.016 
(.02) 
0.004 
(.02) 
0.048 
(.04) 
Age -0.215*** 
(.04) 
-0.094** 
(.04) 
-0.419*** 
(.08) 
Education 0.092*** 
(.04) 
0.061 
(.04) 
0.139 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 0.086*** 
(.02) 
0.049** 
(.02) 
0.120** 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.211*** 
(.03) 
-0.266*** 
(.04) 
-0.057 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.099*** 
(.02) 
0.064*** 
(.04) 
0.121*** 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.743*** 
(.04) 
0.803*** 
(.04) 
0.575*** 
(.11) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.394 
0.388 
0.233 
0.220 
0.445 
0.419 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
Table D6: Disgust Index’s Influence on Support for 
Gay Marriage Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust Index -0.662*** 
(.05) 
-0.505*** 
(.08) 
-0.624*** 
(.08) 
White 0.040 
(.03) 
0.066** 
(.03) 
0.033 
(.09) 
Black -0.018 
(.04) 
0.004 
(.04) 
-0.169 
(.15) 
Latino 0.031 
(.04) 
0.043 
(.04) 
-0.031 
(.12) 
Female 0.016 
(.02) 
0.003 
(.02) 
0.050 
(.04) 
Age -0.208*** 
(.03) 
-0.095** 
(.04) 
-0.417*** 
(.08) 
Education 0.094*** 
(.03) 
0.064* 
(.04) 
0.143 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 0.086*** 
(.02) 
0.047** 
(.02) 
0.120** 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.201*** 
(.03) 
-0.250*** 
(.04) 
-0.065 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.091*** 
(.02) 
0.061*** 
(.02) 
0.105** 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.747*** 
(.04) 
0.803*** 
(.04) 
0.609*** 
(.12) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.401 
0.395 
0.246 
0.233 
0.438 
0.412 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table D7: Disgust’s Influence on Support for  
Gay Adoption Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust -0.481*** 
(.04) 
-0.403*** 
(.06) 
-0.459*** 
(.06) 
White 0.056** 
(.03) 
0.074*** 
(.03) 
0.131 
(.09) 
Black 0.017 
(.04) 
0.016 
(.04) 
0.124 
(.15) 
Latino 0.017 
(.04) 
0.037 
(.04) 
0.006 
(.11) 
Female 0.054*** 
(.02) 
0.042** 
(.02) 
0.092** 
(.04) 
Age -0.230*** 
(.03) 
-0.152*** 
(.04) 
-0.323*** 
(.08) 
Education 0.105*** 
(.03) 
0.095*** 
(.04) 
0.106 
(.09) 
Non-Religious 0.075*** 
(.03) 
0.045** 
(.02) 
0.068 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.229*** 
(.03) 
-0.266*** 
(.04) 
-0.092* 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.115*** 
(.02) 
0.087*** 
(.02) 
0.159*** 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.693*** 
(.04) 
0.748*** 
(.04) 
0.449*** 
(.11) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.401 
0.395 
0.291 
0.279 
0.405 
0.377 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
Table D8: Disgust Index’s Influence on Support for 
Gay Adoption Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust Index -0.621*** 
(.05) 
-0.586*** 
(.07) 
-0.549*** 
(.07) 
White 0.053** 
(.03) 
0.078*** 
(.03) 
0.102 
(.09) 
Black 0.018 
(.04) 
0.026 
(.04) 
0.073 
(.15) 
Latino 0.013 
(.04) 
0.038 
(.03) 
-0.016 
(.11) 
Female 0.054*** 
(.02) 
0.040** 
(.02) 
0.093** 
(.04) 
Age -0.223*** 
(.03) 
-0.153*** 
(.04) 
-0.319*** 
(.08) 
Education 0.105*** 
(.03) 
0.098*** 
(.04) 
0.110 
(.08) 
Non-Religious 0.073*** 
(.02) 
0.042** 
(.02) 
0.066 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.215*** 
(.03) 
-0.246*** 
(.04) 
-0.097** 
(.05) 
LGB Contact 0.107*** 
(.02) 
0.084*** 
(.02) 
0.143*** 
(.04) 
    
Constant 0.699*** 
(.04) 
0.749*** 
(.04) 
0.483*** 
(.11) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.416 
0.410 
0.309 
0.297 
0.412 
0.385 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table D9: Disgust’s Influence on Support for 
Transgender Healthcare Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust -0.364*** 
(.04) 
-0.323*** 
(.07) 
-0.320*** 
(.06) 
White 0.021 
(.03) 
0.012 
(.03) 
0.053 
(.08) 
Black 0.027 
(.04) 
0.022 
(.05) 
0.074 
(.13) 
Latino -0.028 
(.04) 
-0.057 
(.04) 
-0.054 
(.10) 
Female 0.060*** 
(.02) 
0.062*** 
(.02) 
0.073* 
(.04) 
Age -0.208*** 
(.04) 
-0.163*** 
(.05) 
-0.273*** 
(.07) 
Education 0.111*** 
(.04) 
0.125*** 
(.05) 
0.081 
(.08) 
Non-Religious 0.070*** 
(.02) 
0.071*** 
(.02) 
-0.045 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.169*** 
(.03) 
-0.170*** 
(.05) 
-0.037 
(.04) 
LGB Contact 0.058*** 
(.02) 
0.063*** 
(.02) 
0.020 
(.04) 
Trans Contact 0.157*** 
(.03) 
0.137*** 
(.04) 
0.101 
(.09) 
    
Constant 0.518*** 
(.04) 
0.569*** 
(.05) 
0.379*** 
(.10) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.260 
0.252 
0.191 
0.175 
0.238 
0.199 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Table D10: Disgust Index’s Influence on Support for 
Transgender Healthcare Policy 
Variable Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Democrats 
Model 3 
Republicans 
Disgust Index -0.443*** 
(.05) 
-0.469*** 
(.09) 
-0.337*** 
(.07) 
White 0.019 
(.03) 
0.015 
(.03) 
0.032 
(.08) 
Black 0.028 
(.04) 
0.030 
(.05) 
0.035 
(.13) 
Latino -0.031 
(.04) 
-0.056 
(.04) 
-0.072 
(.10) 
Female 0.060*** 
(.02) 
0.061*** 
(.02) 
0.074** 
(.04) 
Age -0.203*** 
(.04) 
-0.164*** 
(.05) 
-0.274*** 
(.07) 
Education 0.112*** 
(.04) 
0.127*** 
(.05) 
0.085 
(.08) 
Non-Religious 0.070*** 
(.02) 
0.068*** 
(.02) 
-0.041 
(.05) 
Born Again -0.163*** 
(.03) 
-0.155*** 
(.05) 
-0.044 
(.04) 
LGB Contact 0.053*** 
(.02) 
0.060** 
(.02) 
0.014 
(.04) 
Trans Contact 0.162*** 
(.03) 
0.137*** 
(.04) 
0.114 
(.09) 
    
Constant 0.519*** 
(.04) 
0.569*** 
(.05) 
0.391*** 
(.10) 
    
R-Squared 
Adj R-Squared 
0.261 
0.253 
0.199 
0.183 
0.218 
0.177 
    
N 974 587 226 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
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Appendix E 
Demographic Screening and Recruitment Process 
 
After observing the partisan imbalance in my MTurk sample in the first experiment 
(Chapter 3), I designed a demographic screening and recruitment process to improve the 
sample in the second experiment (Chapter 4).68 The overall process was relatively simple. First, 
I conducted a large-scale survey consisting of only demographic questions. Then I re-contacted 
workers who identified as conservative or Republican (or both) to invite them to participate in 
the second experiment. This resulted in a much-improved partisan balance. While in the first 
experiment the sample was roughly 60% Democrats and 23% Republicans, the second 
experiment was roughly 47% Democrats and 42% Republicans. 
 The demographic survey was conducted over an eight-week period in March through 
May 2015. The survey was approximately five minutes in length and contained a variety of 
demographic questions of interest, including partisanship, ideology, race, gender, education, 
employment, and more. Overall, the sample resulted in 9,770 unique respondents. I also used 
this survey as an opportunity to examine (separate from the dissertation) whether there are 
substantive differences in the MTurk sample pool depending on temporal effects such as the (1) 
time of day or (2) day of week that a survey is posted, or (3) the serial position of a respondent’s 
participation (i.e., whether they participate earlier or later in data collection). The full process 
and results of this examination are available in Casey et al (2016).  
 After closing the demographic survey, I assigned a “qualification” in MTurk to 
participants who identified as conservative, Republican, or both. Then in 2016, I sent an email 
invitation through the MTurk platform to all respondents with this qualification, inviting 
them to participate in the second experiment. Respondents were not informed that they were 
being sought out due to their party or ideological identification, or that this was the meaning 
behind the qualification. This limited potential partisan priming going in to the survey.  
When I launched the second experiment, it was visible/available only to respondents 
who had this qualification. This allowed conservative/Republican respondents time to 
participate before opening the survey to the full MTurk population (at which point the overall 
sample size would be met very quickly). The survey was open for only these respondents for a 
total of seven days. I sent an additional reminder invitation email midway through this week.  
                                                
68 Many thanks to Kristyn Karl for the original suggestion of conducting a pre-survey just for 
demographic purposes. Additional thanks to Jesse Chandler for his guidance in optimizing this 
demographic survey, and to Andrew Proctor for his help in the actual re-contacting of workers. 
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After seven days, I opened the survey to the broader MTurk population of workers (i.e., 
I removed the requirement that participants must have the Republican qualification). I met 
my desired sample size for the experiment within six hours.  
However, I realized that trying to improve the representation of Republicans in my 
sample likely meant I had also increased the proportion of white respondents in an already 
disproportionately white sample pool. Therefore I created an additional MTurk qualification 
for respondents who identified in the 2015 demographic survey as anything other than white. I 
re-opened the survey but limited it to respondents who had this qualification, and sent an 
email invitation to these respondents to invite them to participate as well. I left the survey 
open for an additional three days to improve the racial composition of the sample. As noted in 
Chapter 4, this was relatively successful: the first experiment had roughly 8% Blacks and 8% 
Latinos, while this second experiment had roughly 11% Blacks and 9% Latinos. The overall 
proportion of non-Hispanic whites decreased from 71% in the first experiment to 66.4% in the 
second experiment. 
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APPENDIX F 
Experiment 2 Picture Pre-Testing Protocol 
 
For Experiment 2 (Chapter 5), I included pictures of individuals to prime attitudes 
toward specific subgroups of the LGBTQ community. Before conducting Experiment 2, I pre-
tested the pictures to determine that participants would respond in predictable ways to the 
photos, namely that they perceived the images to be of either a man or a woman, and that 
their impressions of other dimensions of the images did not substantively differ, particularly 
along dimensions that might also be disgust-inducing.69 
 This task was hosted on Qualtrics and participants were recruited through MTurk. The 
title of the task was “Rate your first impressions.” The introduction to the task read as follows: 
“People often say they can tell a lot about another person (e.g., about their personality or 
background), just by looking at him or her. These first impressions are something we seem to 
do automatically in our everyday lives. In this study, we want to learn more about these initial 
reactions to other people. You will be asked about 8 photographs in all.”  
 After giving informed consent, respondents were then shown a series of eight pictures 
with the same seven questions after each image. Images were shown at the same size and 
quality. Since I was most interested in how respondents would view these photos relative to 
one another, all respondents rated all eight photographs. I sampled a total of 324 respondents 
in all. I found these images from internet searches. I selected images of white people only in 
order to limit the possibility that in the actual experiment any reactions to photos were due to 
perceived racial differences in the person depicted. However, future research should examine 
exactly that possibility. 
                                                
69 Many thanks to Nicholas Valentino, Ted Brader, and Ashley Jardina (2013) for their model 
of photo pre-testing, and to Ashley Jardina in particular for sharing relevant materials and 
guidance on this process. Much of the introductory language and the overall process was 
modeled on their admirable example. 
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Female pictures 
              Figure F1: Photo A1   Figure F2: Photo A2 
   
 
Figure F3: Photo A3 
 
 
Figure F4: Photo A4 
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Male pictures 
     Figure F5: Photo B1    Figure F6: Photo B2 
     
 
 Figure F7: Photo B3     Figure F8: Photo B4 
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After each photo, respondents were asked the following questions. The photo remained on the 
screen while respondents answered. 
 
1. “How would you rate the attractiveness of the person in this photo?” 
[Very Unattractive, Unattractive, Neither Attractive Nor Unattractive, Attractive, Very Attractive] 
2. “In your opinion, how trustworthy does the person in this photo appear to be?” 
[Not at all Trustworthy, Slightly, Somewhat, A good deal, Very Trustworthy] 
3. “In your opinion, how aggressive does the person in this photo appear to be?” 
[Not at all Aggressive, Slightly, Somewhat, A good deal, Very Aggressive] 
4. “If you had to guess, what age does the person in this photo appear to be?” 
[18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 or older] 
5. “If you had to guess, what gender does the person in the photo appear to be?” 
[Man, Woman, Other (please specify)] 
6. “In your opinion, how feminine does the person appear?” 
[Not at all Feminine, Slightly, Somewhat, A good deal, Very Feminine] 
7. “In your opinion, how masculine does the person appear?” 
[Not at all Masculine, Slightly, Somewhat, A good deal, Very Masculine] 
 
I asked about attractiveness, trustworthiness, and aggression because these might 
influence potential reactions to the photo. Perceived aggression could trigger a sense of threat 
in participants, and so I wanted to ensure that the images were perceived as similarly 
(non)aggressive. If respondents perceived the images to be of unattractive or untrustworthy 
people, this might elicit other feelings of disgust not related to whether the person pictured is 
gay or transgender.  
I also asked about perceptions of gender, masculinity, and femininity to establish that 
respondents consistently perceived the images as male or female and masculine or feminine. 
As the difference of means testing show below, there were important differences for some 
pictures that were perceived as feminine men or masculine women. While future research 
should examine the implications of such perceptions for disgust reactions, for this project I 
chose to focus on largely gender-stereotype-consistent images in order to reduce additional 
variables that might elicit disgust.  
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Table F1:  
Photo Pre-Testing Overall Means (n=324) 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
Attractive 
(1=Very Unattractive, 5=Very Attractive) 3.66 3.36 1.71 2.23 2.66 3.37 3.07 3.00 
Trustworthy 
(1= Not at all, 5=Very) 3.31 3.37 2.40 3.03 2.51 2.98 2.78 3.21 
Aggressive 
(1 = Not at all, 5=Very) 2.10 1.79 3.26 2.21 1.72 2.71 2.72 1.83 
Perceived Age 
(1=18-29; 2=30-39; 3=40-49; 4=50-59;5=65+) 2.48 2.22 3.36 3.18 1.17 2.17 2.36 1.71 
Perceived Gender 
(1=Man, 2=Woman) 1.99 2.00 2.00 1.99 1.05 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Perceived Femininity 
(1=Not at all Feminine, 5=Very Feminine) 3.87 3.86 2.60 3.01 3.14 1.21 1.35 1.58 
Perceived Masculinity 
(1=Not at all Masculine, 5=Very Masculine) 1.38 1.32 2.27 1.93 2.26 3.93 3.61 3.45 
 
 
As the below tables show, there were significant differences of means in many 
instances. However, as the above table (Overall Means) shows, some of these differences occur 
within the same response category. For example, photos A1 and A2 had a significant difference 
of means on perceived age, but the means were 2.48 and 2.22, respectively, which are both still 
solidly in the response category of “30-39 years.” As a result, though there are many instances 
of significant difference of means, the photos were still generally similar along important 
dimensions. Below I present the difference of means testing for each dimension, followed by 
the selection process of the two final photos.  
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Table F2: Difference of Means: Attractiveness 
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - * * * * * * * 
A2 * - * * * x * * 
A3 * * - * * * * * 
A4 * * * - * * * * 
B1 * * * * - * * * 
B2 * x * * * - * * 
B3 * * * * * * - x 
B4 * * * * * * x - 
 
 
Table F4: Difference of Means: Trustworthiness 
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - x * * * * * x 
A2 x - * * * * * * 
A3 * * - * x * * * 
A4 * * * - * x * * 
B1 * * x * - * * * 
B2 * * * x * - * * 
B3 * * * * * * - * 
B4 x * * * * * * - 
 
Table F3: Difference of Means: Aggressiveness 
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - * * x * * * * 
A2 * - * * x * * x 
A3 * * - * * * * * 
A4 x * * - * * * * 
B1 * x * * - * * x 
B2 * * * * * - x * 
B3 * * * * * x - * 
B4 * x * * x * * - 
 
 
Table F5: Difference of Means: Age 
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - * * * * * * * 
A2 * - * * * x * * 
A3 * * - * * * * * 
A4 * * * - * * * * 
B1 * * * * - * * * 
B2 * x * * * - * * 
B3 * * * * * * - * 
B4 * * * * * * * - 
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Table F6: Difference of Means: Perceived Gender 
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - x x x * * * * 
A2 x - x x * * * * 
A3 x x - x * * * * 
A4 x x x - * * * * 
B1 * * * * - * * * 
B2 * * * * * - x x 
B3 * * * * * x - x 
B4 * * * * * x x - 
 
 
Table F7: Difference of Means: Perceived Femininity  
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - x * * * * * * 
A2 x - * * * * * * 
A3 * * - * * * * * 
A4 * * * - x * * * 
B1 * * * x - * * * 
B2 * * * * * - * * 
B3 * * * * * * - * 
B4 * * * * * * * - 
 
Table F8: Difference of Means: Perceived Masculinity 
* = significant difference at p<0.05 
x = not significant 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
A1 - x * * * * * * 
A2 x - * * * * * * 
A3 * * - * x * * * 
A4 * * * - * * * * 
B1 * * x * - * * * 
B2 * * * * * - * * 
B3 * * * * * * - * 
B4 * * * * * * * - 
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Upon reviewing these differences of means tests, I selected photos A1 and B2 using the 
following thought process: 
 
1. Eliminate A3: significantly lower attractiveness, higher age and aggressiveness scores 
2. Eliminate A4: significantly higher age, lower attractiveness scores 
3. Eliminate B1: significant difference in gender score, also has significantly lower 
masculinity and higher femininity scores than other B (male) photos 
4. Eliminate B4: lower age than remaining A1, A2 
5. B2, B3 indistinguishable on aggressiveness. Age, trustworthy, and attractive all in roughly 
same response categories, though distinguishable scores. 
6. A1, A2 indistinguishable on gender, femininity, and masculinity. Age, attractive, and 
trustworthy same categories with distinguishable scores. A1 higher on aggression, but closer 
to B2/B3 aggression scores. 
7. Select A1, since it is indistinguishable from or roughly similar to A2 on all dimensions 
except aggression, but it is closer to the remaining B photos on aggression. 
8. Select B2, since its means on attractiveness and trustworthiness are closer to A1’s than are 
B3’s. 
 
Figure F1: Photo A1    Figure F6: Photo B2 
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Appendix G 
Experiment 2 News Stories and Images 
 
State lawmakers to consider discrimination protections 
for [senior/ lesbian and gay/gay/transgender ] residents 
Associated Press – February 12, 2016 
 
SPRINGFIELD – State lawmakers are considering a bill that would amend the state’s anti-
discrimination law to prohibit discrimination against [senior/lesbian, gay, and bisexual/gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual/transgender] residents. 
 
Last week’s session of the State House of Representatives began with a discussion of the 
proposed legislation. Currently, state law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and 
[gender/age], among other categories. If the bill passes, it would add [age/sexual orientation/gender 
identity] as a protected class. 
 
[In LGBTQ conditions:] At a local rally, [Carol/Carl] Johnson, a [lesbian/gay man/transgender 
woman/transgender man], spoke in favor of the bill. “This bill would protect [lesbian and 
gay/gay/transgender] people against discrimination in the workplace and housing. This is critically 
important for our community,” [she/he] said. 
 
The bill comes as the country continues to consider questions about [the aging population/lesbian 
and gay rights/gay rights/transgender rights]. The House is set to vote on the bill later this month. The 
Governor has made no statement about whether he would sign the bill if it passes.  
 
 
Figure G1: Control Condition 
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Figure G2: Gay female condition      Figure G3: Gay male condition 
    
 
   Figure G4: Transgender female condition  Figure G5: Transgender male condition  
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